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And behold Yahew was passing by.
And a great and mighty wind was rending the mountain and
shattering the rocks before Yahweh. But Yahweh was not in the
wind.
After the wind came an earthquake. But Yahweh was not in the
earthquake
After the earthquake a fire. But Yahweh was not in the fire.
And after the fire a sound of gentle stillness.
Now as soon as Elijah heard it, he wrapped his face in his mantle
and went out and stood at the entrance of the cave.
And behold, there came a voice to him and said:
“What are you doing here, Elijah?”
I Kings 19:11-13
And thus Glaucon, a tale was saved and not lost;
and it could save us, if we were persuaded by it,
and we shall make a good crossing of the river of Lethe
and not defile our soul. But if we are persuaded by me,
holding that the soul is immortal and capable of bearing all
evils and goods, we shall always keep to the upper road and
practice justice with prudence in every way so that we shall be
friends to ourselves and the gods, both while we remain here
and when we reap the rewards for it like victors who go about
gathering prizes. And so here and in the thousand year journey
that we have described we shall fare well.
Plato’s Republic 621c
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ABSTRACT
The following work is an attempt to clarify the relationship of two of the most
significant political thinkers of the later part of the twentieth century. Previous
scholarship on the relationship between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin has focused on
the two men’s different interpretations o f the religious traditions o f Judaism and
Christianity. In this work, we explore the two men’s presentations of classical Greek
philosophy to illuminate how their differing readings of the classics come to similar
conclusions regarding the nature and limits of the political. Our investigation probes
how Strauss’s treatment of philosophy as being slightly more comic than tragic and
history as being political differs from Voegelin’s understanding of philosophy as the
successor to tragedy and history as a record of spiritual irruptions.
Despite these important differences, both men interpret philosophy as a hopeful
search for an elusive ground of order. The structural similarity of both men’s
understandings of philosophy raises questions whether the differences that are so
prominent in the two men’s treatment o f their respective religious traditions are
grounded within the nature o f the philosophic enterprise or their different estimates of
the vitality of Jewish and Christian worldviews. Strauss’s philosophy emphasizes the gap
between natural man and the divine and his subsequent need for a divine law, whereas
Voegelin focuses on man’s need to attune his soul to the divine sources of order in their
historic variety and the subsequent spiritual requirement of resisting totalitarian political
claims. Both men emphasize a transcendent source of political authority and display a
certain amount of skepticism regarding the vessels of the transcendent.

xi
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR PHILOSOPHY
AND ITS POLITICAL RELEVANCE
We live in the world of the modem market economy and the more or less liberal
political structures upon which that economy is built. No Summum bonum takes
preeminence in this world of a plurality of goods. John Locke’s defense o f freedom as
the lack of “restraint or violence from others” represents the consensus binding this
dynamic world of buyers and sellers together.1 In this world the person concerned with
the classics of philosophy is no more privileged nor noble than the person who concerns
himself with basketball. In fact by comparing the monetary valuation of a talented
teacher of the classics with a talented basketball player one may conclude it is a greater
service to the community to play basketball than to philosophize. The choice of the
many for the athletes of the body over the athletes of the mind is a time honored
tradition. Socrates’ philosophizing earned him the death sentence from Athens while
athletic heroes were fed at the public’s expense. Traditionally, the public and philosophy
have had a complex and often adversarial relationship but the guiding spirit of the
modem age has been to reconcile philosophy with the public. Democratic political
theory focuses on this monumental task.
Francis Fukuyama’s analysis of the triumph of liberal democracy and its gift of
universal recognition is one of the voices which is most accessible regarding this spirit
for those educated in the tradition of the great books. Fukuyama’s ambivalence about

1John Locke Two Treatises on Government (New York: The Classics o f Liberty,
1992) p. 206.
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the stability of liberal democracy and its progressive claims is revealed by his attention to
the passion o f Nietzsche and the superman for special recognition of the creative spirit.2
The ordinariness of liberal bourgeois society may pain sensitive spirits to the point of
violent revolt. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra’s proclamation is emblematic of this
temperament. “The world has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes
everything small.”3 The focus on happiness at the expense of greatness is the legacy of
the last man. Nietzsche responds to this legacy with a poetic vision of struggle,
suffering and global warfare as a means of overcoming the smallness of the last man.
Nietzsche’s vision has come to pass in the form of great global catastrophes and in light
of the holocausts of our soon ending century the smallness of the last man has gained
unprecedented allure. “We have invented happiness say the last men and they blink.”4
Not all are convinced that the happiness of liberalism and its unordered plurality
of goods are the complete story of the order of Western civilization. In fact, the
abandonment of the hierarchy of goods contained within the classic and Judaeo-Christian
traditions is argued by some commentators to be the source of the great upheavals
characterizing the twentieth century. They would argue that the relative social stability
of the United States within the Western ecumene is not due to its foil realization of
liberal principles but because of the continuing presence o f ordering elements of the
classical and Judaeo-Christian traditions. From the perspective of American political

2 Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press,
1992).
3 Friedrich Nietzsche Thus Spake Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche. Walter
Kaufman, ed. and trans. (New York: Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1982) p. 129.
4 Ibid.. p. 130.
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science, Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin are two of the most significant defenders o f this
thesis.
Strauss traced the stability of the American regime to the doctrine of natural right
contained within the pronouncements of its founding fathers. Strauss hoped to use this
connection to natural right as a bridge back to what he considered to be the superior
principles of social order contained within classical and medieval rationalism. His
political rhetoric oriented itself toward this task. In a remark in perhaps his most famous
work. Natural Right and History, he inquires whether the American regime still stands by
the sturdy principles of its founders:
Does this nation in its maturity still cherish the faith in which it was
conceived and raised? Does it still hold those ‘truths to be self-evident’?
About a generation ago an American diplomat could still say ‘the natural
and divine foundations of the rights of man ... is self-evident to all
Americans.’5
The question of what is the substance of this self-evident natural right is one of the
fundamental problems facing a student of Strauss. A certain accommodation to ‘the
powers that be’ combined with a firm but diplomatic questioning of those powers
appears to be the cornerstone of Strauss’s natural right teaching but his enigmatic
presentation of the best life as the life of a self-grounded questioning brings the aura of
a riddle to his philosophy.6 Nevertheless, the problem of natural right has been
introduced into arenas of great political import by students educated in the Straussian

5 Leo Strauss Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953) pp. 12.
6 A vibrant body of literature forms around this problem and will be handled in more
detail in the upcoming literature review.
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tradition such as Alan Keyes and Clarence Thomas and has added a nobility to the
political lacking in the rhetoric of modem liberalism.
Voegelin’s position regarding the American founding is on the surface in accord
with Strauss’s defense of the classics. Voegelin sees the resistance o f the AngloAmerican world to the mass ideologies of the twentieth century to be rooted in common
sense in the tradition of Thomas Reid. Voegelin cites Reid’s Essay on the Intellectual
Powers of Man with regards to the meaning of common sense:
Common sense means the same as ‘branch or degree of ratio ’ for which a
separate name is justifiable in ‘that in the greatest part o f mankind no
other degree of reason is to be found. It is this degree that entitles them
to the denomination of reasonable creatures.’ Common sense, therefore,
does not connote a social deadweight of vulgar ideas, nor any idees
recues or ‘relatively natural worldview,’ but rather it is the habit of
judgment and conduct o f a man formed by ratio: one could say the habit
of an Aristotelian spoudaios minus the luminosity of his knowledge of the
ratio as the source of rational judgment and conduct. Common sense is a
civilizational habit that presupposes noetic experience, without the man of
this habit having himself a differentiated knowledge of noesis. The
civilized homo politicus need not be a philosopher, but he must have
common sense.7
Voegelin’s choice o f common sense as the determinate of the ordering force of the
Anglo-American world points away from “a relatively natural worldview” and toward

7 Eric Voegelin “ About the Function of Noesis” in Anamnesis. Gerhart Niemeyer, ed.
and trans. (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1990) pp. 212-213. It
is also worth noting that the commonsense philosophy of Thomas Reid was a reaction to
the extreme skepticism of John Locke and David Hume. David Hume contended that
Reid’s analysis had discovered the problem but his solution was really the same solution
as Hume’s. Skepticism cannot be countered theoretically but must be countered by the
process of living and believing existence. See Richard Popkin’s “Modem Skepticism” in
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, volume 4 in a 4
volume collection, Philip P. Wiener, ed. (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1973) p.
248.
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the ordering power of reason. The attitude that enables a political community to
function on the level of common sense is dependent upon a differentiated knowledge of
noesis. Both Voegelin’s historical studies and his development of a theory of
consciousness clarify the principles by which societies order themselves. Voegelin’s
attention to the tensional structure of reality articulated in both the classic and JudaeoChristian traditions as well as the less differentiated traditions of both ancient and far
Eastern civilizations illustrates the precarious order of individual souls and the
civilizations which mirror the order of their citizens spiritual lives. The challenge to exist
in truth as it has been expressed by symbol-experiences that have been articulated in
differing but equivalent forms by exceptional spiritual personalities throughout human
history is the great struggle for man from a Voegelinian perspective.8 Despite an
apparent agreement regarding the significance of classical Greek philosophy, Voegelin’s
emphasis on the structure of transcendent reality places him in marked contrast to
Strauss’s emphasis on nature. This emphasis on the transcendent may partially explain
why Voegelin’s influence has had difficulty in penetrating a secular political environment
scarred by memories of the religious wars of the Old World but Voegelin’s interweaving
of common sense and transcendence may eventually appeal to the taste of democracies
seeking a legitimate ground for their order more stable than universal hedonism.
Those who will attend to the issues raised by Strauss and Voegelin are
necessarily a small part of society. The attraction of these two thinkers is to a class of

8 The intricacies and problems of Voegelin’s theory of differentiation, equivalent
experiences and theory of consciousness, much as the controversies surrounding
Strauss’s conception of the relation of philosophy and religion, are quite substantial and
will be addressed in the literature review.
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people who are sensitive to the great questions apparently but not necessarily abandoned
by liberal democracy.9 What is the relation o f man to the divine?, what is the best life?,
and what are the requirements for a man to exist in truth? are all questions animating
these souls who feel disenfranchised by the universal recognition of a plurality o f goods
inherent in the liberal worldview. They are a remnant reminiscent of the remnant spoken
of in Alfred Jay Nock’s “Isaiah’s Job.” They represent the few who have the saving
force o f intellect and force of character to stand against the tide of mass culture even
though their numbers are too small to resist the madness and stupidity that often
possesses the mass of men.10
Strauss and Voegelin are unanimous in asserting a hierarchy of goods rooted in
both the classic and Judaeo-Christian traditions against cultural relativism. They are
prophets to the remnant. Nevertheless, a strong disagreement divides these two men
regarding the unity of truth represented by these two traditions. Strauss pointedly
argued that a person cannot be both a theologian and a philosopher but every person
must be either a philosopher engaged with theology or a theologian engaged with
philosophy.11 In contrast to Strauss’s clean distinction between philosophy and

9 Ludwig Von NCses once commented that liberal society does not bolt the door to
questions of transcendence and with this important point raises the question whether a
society built upon Lockean principles is as spiritually impoverished as both Strauss and
Voegelin seem to indicate by their critiques o f liberalism. Von Mises offers a theoretical
outline of this position in his Socialism. J. Kahane, trans. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund
Press, 1981) pp. 223-232.
10 Alfred Jay Nock “Isaiah’s Job” in Keeping the Tablets: Modem American
Conservative Thought. William F. Buckley, Jr. and Charles R Kesler, eds. (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1988) pp. 431-441.
11 Leo Strauss “Progress Or Return” in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism:
An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1989) p. 270.
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theology, Voegelin emphasized the common ground of both articulations of order in
their shared experience of the divine ground. Both men understood that they disagreed
on the nature o f the relation of the divine to philosophy. They never worked through
this disagreement and its implications within the span of their careers. It is the
responsibility of scholarship to work through this incomplete debate.
If liberalism and its ideology of universal recognition and continual progress fail
us, Strauss’s and Voegelin’s respective legacies may lay claim to become the
foundational truths of a new articulation of order within Western civilization. The key
step in evaluating the worthiness of these two men’s thought to be considered as
legitimate articulations of order is to evaluate their understanding of classical Greek
philosophy and its relation to the political. The first step in this process involves
determining how each man came to focus on the classic and religious traditions as
representing a more perfect form of order than the ideological politics of modem society.
The Neo-Kantian Beginnings of the Rejection of Progress
It is notable that both men began their careers in cradles of Neo-Kantian thought.
Strauss studied at the University of Marburg, a center of Neo-Kantian thought led by
Herman Cohen. Voegelin studied with a student of Herman Cohen, Hans Kelsen, at the
University of Vienna. The progressive view of Judaism and philosophy embraced by
Cohen is purged from the philosophy of both Strauss and Voegelin.12 Strauss is rather
subtle but nonetheless clear about his rejection of Cohen’s synthesis of Jerusalem and

12For an excellent synopsis of Cohen’s work see Chapter 4 “From the Ethical Idea to the
True Being” in Nathan Rotenstreich’s Jewish Philosophy in Modem Times: From
Mendelssohn to Rosenzweig (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968) pp. 52105.
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Athens. For Strauss, the incredible sufferings of the twentieth century make Cohen’s
belief in progress to at least appear to be deeply mistaken.13 In response to this error,
Strauss advocates a project of return to the ancient grounds of wisdom contained within
medieval and classic rationalism.
Strauss’s return to the ancients came in the wake of his understanding of the
twentieth century as the outcome of reason’s self destruction. “The death of God” and
the triumph of the “will to power” as articulated by Nietzsche appeared to be the
outcome o f hubristic modem rationalism. Modem rationalism turned on itself and
deconstructed the Enlightenment as it revealed a modernity centered upon self interest,
no matter how that interest defined itself. The doors to the modem ideological
movements were opened. Strauss contends:
The victory of orthodoxy through the self-destruction of rational
philosophy was not an unmitigated blessing, for it was a victory, not of
Jewish orthodoxy, but of any orthodoxy, and Jewish orthodoxy based its
claim to superiority to other religions from the beginning on its superior
rationality (Deut. 4:6). Apart from this, the hierarchy of moralities and
wills to which the final atheism referred could not but be claimed to be
intrinsically true, theoretically true; “the will to power’ of the strong or
of the weak may be the ground of every other doctrine; it is not the
ground of the doctrine of the will to power: the will to power was said to
be a fact. Other observations and experiences confirmed the suspicion
that it would be unwise to say farewell to reason. I began therefore to
wonder whether the self destruction of reason was not the inevitable
outcome of modem rationalism as distinguished from premodem
rationalism, especially Jewish-medieval rationalism and its classical
(Aristotelian and Platonic) foundation.14
13 Leo Strauss “Introductory Essay for Herman Cohen Religion of Reason out of the
Sources o f Judaism” in Leo Strauss’s Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1983) pp. 246-247. Also see Leo Strauss’s “Progress or
Return” in The Rebirth o f Classical Political Rationalism, pp. 227-270 for Strauss’s
partisanship for a return in opposition to the modem prejudice for progress.
14 Leo Strauss “Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion” in Liberalism: Ancient and
Modem (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) pp. 256-257.
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The essence of Jewish medieval rationalism and its classical foundation differed only in
the slightest degree from its modem variety. Modem rationalism and its skeptical bent
expressed its doubt in the political arena. Ancient rationalism, as represented by
Maimonides, al-Farabi and their understanding of the classics, subordinated its doubt to
the authority of faith. The philosophers of old went so far as to bolster the regime of
faith.15
Strauss’s conclusions regarding the skeptical essence of reason and the danger of
this skepticism led him to explore and some would argue embrace a hermeneutics of
suspicion. Strauss’s classic work, Persecution and the Art of Writing, explores how
writers in the past wrote in a way to cloth their true teaching from the unworthy and
disclose that teaching to the careful reader.16 The distinction between the worthy careful
readers and the unworthy mass of humanity permeates Strauss’s thoughts on both
philosophy and the political. A typical comment of Strauss’s on philosophy and politics
faithfully adheres to this paradigm. He contends:
Philosophy or science, the highest activity of man, is the attempt to
replace opinion about “all things” by knowledge of “all things”; but
opinion is the element of society; philosophy or science is therefore the
attempt to dissolve the element in which society breathes, and thus
endangers society. Hence philosophy or science must remain the preserve
of a small minority, and philosophers or scientists must respect the
opinions on which society rests. To respect opinions is something
entirely different from accepting them as true. Philosophers or scientists
15 It is noteworthy that many of the prominent defenders of religious faith in the Middle
Ages utilized skepticism to reinforce traditional belief. Juda Halevi and al-Ghazali along
with rationalist such as Maimonides focused on philosophy’s inability to answer
questions confidently answered by faith. See Richard Popkin’s “Modem Skepticism” in
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, p. 241.
16 Leo Strauss Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1988).
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who hold this view about the relation of philosophy or science and society
are driven to employ a peculiar manner o f writing which would enable
them to reveal what they regard as the truth to the few, without
endangering the unqualified commitment o f the many to the opinions on
which society rests. They will distinguish between the true teaching as
the esoteric teaching; whereas the exoteric teaching is meant to be easily
accessible to every reader, the esoteric teaching discloses itself only to the
very careful and well-trained readers after long concentrated study.17
Strauss’s concentration on the text and the path the text takes between the exoteric
political teaching and the esoteric philosophical teaching raises interesting issues and
fundamental problems but a greater attention to the details surrounding a text may raise
questions regarding the position Strauss politically affirms to be the case regarding
Western civilization’s vigor.18
Voegelin’s rejection of Neo-Kantianism has the tone o f a less political rejection
than Strauss’s turning away from the Neo-Kantian legacy of Herman Cohen and more
strongly bears the imprint of a rejection of an approach inadequate to the task of
scientifically examining the evidence before the political scientist. Hans Kelsen’s
treatment of Staatslehre as Rechtslehre led Voegelin to abandon an approach which was
quite excellent for studying the logic of the law but totally inadequate to account for a
wide range of phenomena which were not related to law but nonetheless essential parts

17Leo Strauss What Is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959) pp.
221- 222 .

18 Strauss’s criticism of historicism in Natural Right and History does not pardon him
from having to deal with the phenomenal surface o f history. It is important to note that
two of Strauss’s paragons of rationalism Socrates and Maimonides both encountered
vigorous and bloody persecution despite their usage of esoteric teaching. Socrates’ case
is well known but the war of orthodox Judaism against Maimonidean rationalism may
not be familiar to the reader. Will Durant’s The Age of Faith, volume 4 in his 11 volume
The Story of Civilization (New York: MJF Books, 1950) pp. 414-416. The only item
missing from these early periods of persecution to bring them up to the level of horror of
the twentieth century is the technology of suppression and mass murder.
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of political science. Voegelin likewise rejected the language of “values” developed by
the Southwest German school of Neo-Kantianism as being inadequate to address
political experiences contradicting the state-centered order of the modem liberal state.
Human beings were acting politically long before the Western liberal language of values
dominated the political horizon.19
Voegelin’s science oriented approach to the problem of the political led him to
reject the method based approach of many of the Neo-Kantians but his empiricism would
force him into seemingly accepting the philosophically difficult dualistic position of
Immanuel Kant regarding phenomena and noumena. His argumentation would be most
clearly explained in his presentation of one of the richest political and spiritual symbolexperiences, history. Voegelin posited a “double constitution of history”:
We thus arrive at something like a double constitution of history: On the
one hand, the phenomenal objects can be recognized as historical only
through tracing their meaning to the sphere of encounter; on the other
hand, the phenomena must be explored by methods that, in principle, are
the same as those used in other sciences o f the external world. The
question can be further clarified by applying to historiography the Kantian
language of phenomena and noumena, originally developed for the case
of physics. Using this language one might say: History has a phenomenal
surface that can be explored by an objectifying science, but the enterprise
of science makes sense only as long as the facts ascertained can be related
to the noumenal depth of the encounter. This proposition, if it is thought
through, shows the point at which the analogy with physics will prove
untenable. The natural phenomena envisaged by Kant, it is true, have a
noumenal depth, but the ontic underground o f the external world is that
part of the constitution of being that is hidden from man, so that the
manner in which the phenomenon depends on the noumenon is unknown.
What is accessible to knowledge is only the definitely constituted surface
of phenomena. One might define given, therefore, as the pre-given
definiteness o f constitution. This is the sense in which one can speak of
objects as given. In history, on the contrary, the noumenal depth of the
19Eric Voegelin Autobiographical Reflections. Ellis Sandoz, ed. (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana, 1989) pp. 20-23.
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encounter involves man in the constitution of being; and the process
leading from the encounter, through the experiences, to their expression,
again involves man in its constitution at every step. As a consequence,
the surface of the process does not have the pre-given definiteness o f
constitution; it is not given at all but constitutes itself in the acts of
symbolic expression. Still, we cannot escape the earlier insight that
history has a surface that is phenomenal in character, history, if it is not a
given object, at least partakes of givenness in one of its strata. The
resulting relationship between the two factors of what we have called the
double constitution of history can be formulated as follows: The
historiographer’s work is essentially a part of the expressive surface of
history, while the subject-object dichotomy of the phenomenal surface is a
secondary stratum within the primary expressive surface. Hence, if a
philosophy of history were reduced to a methodology of exploring the
phenomenal surface, its essential part would have been abandoned.20
The “dual constitution of history” is an expression of an apparent dualism present in the
thought of Eric Voegelin. Voegelin presents reality as being constituted by both
phenomenal and noumenal strata. The grand problem facing Voegelin is how do these
two strata interact.21
Voegelin’s articulation of Plato’s In-Between reality, Aristotle’s participatory
reality, the Vision of the Resurrected and his interpretations of other symbol-experiences
of right order are his attempt to make the interaction of these different strata intelligible.
Voegelin asserts:
Existence has the structure o f the In-Between, of the Platonic metaxy,
and if anything is constant in the history of mankind it is the language of
20 Eric Voegelin What Is History? and Other Late Unpublished Writings. Thomas A.
Hollweck and Paul Caringella, eds., volume 28 of 34 volumes, The Collected Works of
Eric Voegelin (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1990) pp.
12-13.
21 John J. Ranieri’s Eric Voegelin and the Good Society (Columbia and London:
University of Missouri Press, 1995) pp. 142-143 contends this problem is due to
Voegelin’s over reliance on a positivist paradigm lingering in his thought. My present
approach to Voegelin’s study of the Greeks does not attempt to abandon the perspective
of the natural sciences but instead attempts to make comprehensible how a non-thing
noumenal reality can effect politics on a phenomenal level of subjects and objects.
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tension between life and death, immortality and mortality, perfection and
imperfection, time and timelessness; between order and disorder, truth
and untruth, sense and senselessness of existence; between amor Dei and
amor sui, L ’ame oitverte and I ’ame close; between the virtues of
openness toward the ground of being such as faith, love, and hope, and
the vices o f infolding closure such as hybris and revolt; between the
moods of joy and despair, and between alienation in its double meaning of
alienation from the world and alienation from God. If we split these pairs
of symbols, and hypostatize the poles of the tension as independent
entities, we destroy the reality of existence as it has been experienced by
the creators of the tensional symbolisms; we lose consciousness and
intellect; we deform our humanity and reduce ourselves to a state of quiet
despair or activist conformity to the ‘age,’ of drug addiction or television
watching, o f hedonistic stupor or murderous possession of truth, of
suffering from the absurdity of existence or indulgence in any
divertissement (in Pascal’s sense) that promises to substitute as a “value”
for reality lost. In the language of Heraclitus and Plato: Dream life
usurps the place of wake life.22
Voegelin’s attempt to discern how accurately this structure is portrayed in the various
symbols-experiences of order throughout human history is an affirmation of the
intelligibility of the world expressed by mythic, noetic and pneumatic articulations of
order. The strength of Voegelin’s investigation of these symbol-experiences is both his
articulation of a tensional structure of reality which correlates with human experience
and his articulation of the possibility of the rejection of existence in truth.23

22 Eric Voegelin “Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in History” in
Published Essays: 1966-1985. Ellis Sandoz, ed., volume 12 in the 34 volume, The
Collected Works o f Eric Voegelin (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State
University Press, 1989) pp. 119-120.
23 Though Voegelin identifies himself as a mystic, the orientation o f his study is aligned
with those thinkers who have attempted to discover the rationality of the religious
experience. An examination of the relation o f Voegelin’s thought to the medieval
rationalists such as Abelard and St. Thomas Aquinas would be of great help in
understanding the intelligible nature of the mysteries of Christian mysticism. Needless to
say, this has been treacherous ground for Christian thinkers and has often resulted in
charges of heresy. See Will Durant’s previously cited The Age o f Faith, pp. 931-983 for
the details of some of these controversies. For a testimony of Voegelin’s unique
combination of Greek rationalism and mysticism see Gregor Sebba’s “Prelude and
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From this brief presentation o f Strauss’s and Voegelin’s teachings, their
differences are manifested. Strauss contends the ordering principles o f the past are
superior to modem articulations o f order and calls for a return to the separate pillars of
Western civilization represented by the cities Jerusalem and Athens. Voegelin does not
seek a return to the past and some idyllic tension between two apparently dogmatic
approaches to reality but instead seeks to present an argument for the structure of reality
by pointing to the experiences of order articulated throughout human history. The
purpose of this study will be to unmask serious difficulties in Strauss’s teaching that are
not present in Voegelin’s teaching. The device for this undertaking will be a
comparative meditative exegesis of the texts o f both thinkers dealing with their treatment
o f the classics including Thucydides, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Socrates and Plato but
before we begin this study we should become acquainted with the pertinent scholarship
addressing the contributions of both authors.
Literature Review o f Straussian and Voegelinian Studies
Both Strauss and Voegelin have engendered broad research programs over their
contributions in the disciplines of political science, philosophy, religious studies and
literature. Kenneth Hart Green has created a rather extensive bibliography on Leo
Strauss contained within his book Jew and Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in
the Jewish Thought of Leo Strauss.24 Although this bibliography is rather dated and

Variations on the Theme of Eric Voegelin” in The Collected Essays of Gregor Sebba:
Truth. History and the Imagination. Helen Sebba, Anibal A. Bueno and Hendrikus
Boers, eds. (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1991) p. 216.
24 Kenneth Hart Green Jew and Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in the Jewish
Thought of Leo Strauss (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1993) pp. 248264.
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misses some of the more recent work about Strauss, it is an excellent source of over 300
articles and books dealing with Straussian studies up through 1993. Research on
Voegelin is just as abundant and an extensive bibliography of over 400 articles and books
has been compiled at the University of Manchester by Geoffrey Price. The abundance of
research on these two modem scholars is the mark of the compelling nature of their
work. A survey of the foundational literature regarding these two men will reveal the
major issues which must be addressed in an examination of the relative worth of their
scholarly contributions.
The controversies surrounding Strauss’s teaching are intense. We can thank
Susan Orr and Shadia Drury for shedding valuable light on what Harry Jaffa cleverly
named the “crisis of the Strauss divided.”25 The crisis surrounded whether Strauss
taught that Jerusalem was like or unlike the poetry of the ancient world opposed by
Plato. If Jerusalem was equivalent to ancient poetry, the best life is simply philosophy
because poetry is not knowledge but only opinion. If Jerusalem is unique, the quarrel
between faith and reason is unresolvable with a bias toward the life o f faith, given that
the life of faith provides answers that appear to be essential but ungiven by philosophy.
Under the first conception of the relation of Jerusalem and Athens, poetry and religion
are equivalent ways of establishing political order. Under the second conception of the
relation of Jerusalem and Athens, religion, as represented by Jewish orthodoxy and
perhaps its Christian progeny, are more than political modes of establishing order but
instead a complete and adequate answer to the question “what is the best life for man?”

25 Harry Jaffa “Crisis of the Strauss Divided: Legacy Reconsidered” in Social Research
54 (Autumn 1987) pp. 579-603.
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Thomas Pangle and Alan Bloom are the most notable defenders of the first school of
thought which makes all poetry and religion equivalent and in some ways deficient in
answering the question “what is the best life for man?” Pangle, Bloom and their
followers are known as East Coast Straussians. Harry Jaffa represents the more pious
view of thought which gives the Revelation of Jerusalem precedence over the poetry of
the classics.26 Jaffa is the most notable representative of the West Coast Straussians.27
Pangle presents the problem o f the gods from the perspective of philosophy. He
contends:
Belief in the gods is seen to veil from man the evidence whose reasonable
interpretation would lead toward knowledge of the true causes of things.
In particular, it seems plausible to suppose that the gods are needed as the
supporters of nobility and justice lack intrinsic support in the hearts of
men-in their natural and not simply imagined needs and inclinations.28

Pangle’s acknowledgment that man is not naturally disposed toward nobility and justice
is not startling from the perspective o f Western civilization. Both the Judaeo-Christian
and classic traditions contend man has a nature subject to tyrannical passions. The
shocking element of Pangle’s position is that the gods who save us are also the gods

26 Strauss remained largely silent on the issue of Christianity and some commentators
such as Frederick Wihelmsen in his Christianity and Political Philosophy (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1978) pp. 209-225, detect a notable absence of discussion
o f the Christian contribution to political philosophy from the work of Strauss.
Wilhelmsen labels Strauss a Hellenized Jew and places him in the tradition of Averroes.
27 Susan Orr’s Jerusalem and Athens: Reason and Revelation in the Works of Leo
Strauss (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995) pp. 3-19
offers a presentation of this dispute from the perspective o f a West Coast Straussian.
Shadia Drury’s The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988)
concludes the East Coast Straussians have best captured the essence of Strauss’s
teaching but then precedes to demonstrate the moral bankruptcy of this position.
28 “Introduction” by Thomas Pangle in Leo Strauss’s Studies in Platonic Political
Philosophy. Thomas Pangle, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) p. 11.
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who keep us ignorant.29 Philosophy is the choice to abandon the ignorance of faith while
not disrupting the salutary faith that keeps the mass of humans bound to traditional
nobility and justice. The search for the “true causes of things” gains a certain superiority
to a merely salutary faith.
Jaffa opposes the impiety of East Coast Straussians with the contention that Leo
Strauss’s teaching had a highly practical element: the defense of Anglo-American
constitutionalism and the natural law tradition upholding that tradition.30 Jaffa’s
attention to the political realm and the importance of the natural law tradition as opposed
to Pangle’s attention to the “true causes of things” is easily explainable as the difference
between emphasis on certain elements of Strauss’s teaching. Pangle emphasizes the
quest for knowledge, whereas Jaffa emphasizes the political. For Pangle, all political
faiths as faiths can be in theory equally flawed in the failure to disclose true causes of
reality. Jaffa knows that as a citizen, he must defend and where possible, improve his
regime. The battle o f the “Strauss divided” appears to be a struggle over the application
of the teaching of Leo Strauss and not its content.
The inner sanctum of Straussian studies is surrounded by a largely if not
altogether hostile world of critics. Shadia Drury’s attempt to breach the walls of
Strauss’s exotericism is perhaps the most notable comprehensive study of the Straussian
29

In Pangle’s defense, it is worth noting the underlying theme of man’s and woman’s
expulsion from the garden of Eden in the tradition of the Occidental faiths is
consumption of the fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. See Genesis 2:13
and 3:22-24.
30 Harry Jaffa “Political Philosophy and Honor: The Leo Strauss Dissertation Award” in
How to Think About the American Revolution (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina
Academic Press, 1978) p. 171.
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corpus to date. Drury advances the line of argument that Strauss esoterically embraces
the teachings o f modem thinkers such as Machiavelli and Nietzsche as opposed to the
teachings of the classics he exoterically embraces. Through a selective textual analysis,
Drury comes to the conclusion that Strauss uses Machiavellian insight to bring about a
new order. Strauss’s return to the past is to avail his new order the credibility of the
ancient. This new order is based upon the subtle acknowledgment of Thrasymacus with
the resurrection of a religious consciousness. Strauss’s description of the Nietzschean
project lends credibility to Drury’s interpretation.31 While reflecting upon the difference
between Nietzsche and Plato he asserts:
But there is one decisive difference between Nietzsche’s philosophy of
the future and Plato’s philosophy. Nietzsche’s philosopher of the future
is an heir to the Bible. He is an heir to that deepening of the soul which
has been effected by the Biblical belief in a God that is holy. The
philosopher of the future, as distinct from the philosopher of the past, will
be concerned with the holy. His philosophizing will be intrinsically
religious.32
The nature o f Drury’s thesis, though backed up by innumerable quotes from the
Straussian corpus, involves a great deal of imagination. Drury’s harsh critique of
Strauss’s amoralism is based upon a denial of the theoretical conclusions launching the
Straussian project. If the world is devoid of the divine and run on the basis of the “will
to power” as argued by Nietzsche and Heidegger, Strauss’s attempt to bring us back to
the God of Jerusalem and the wonder of Athens is preeminently humane.

31 See the previously cited Shadia Drury’s The Political Ideas o f Leo Strauss.
32 Leo Strauss The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism. Thomas Pangle, ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989) p. 41.
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Nevertheless, Strauss’s enigmatic teaching regarding Jerusalem and Athens has
created a popular furor against the scholar best represented by a recent editorial in The
New York Times. Brent Staples “Undemocratic Vistas: The Sinister Vogue of Leo
Strauss” labeled Strauss as being “unapologetically elitist and anti-democratic” and
proceeded to blame him for a gross mischaracterization o f the Enlightenment as the
source of the evils of the twentieth century.33 Staples’ argument, perhaps bolstered by
the scholarship of Shadia Drury, was quickly countered by Strauss’s defenders.
Hadley Arkes, one of the more notable respondents to the Staples’ article,
assaulted Staples claim that Strauss was an enemy to the American democracy and
quickly pointed out Strauss’s esteem for The Declaration of Independence. Arkes
emphasized the religion of reason that permeated Strauss’s teachings and presented
Strauss as a serious man dealing with the most serious questions.34 In the end, the
political battle over Strauss’s significance leaves as many questions open as it answers.
One of the less political responses to the Strauss controversy makes this apparent.
Richard Bernstein’s “A Very Unlikely Villain (or Hero)” conjures up a
complicated picture of a scholar utilizing the great books o f the past to discover the
answer to the great catastrophes of the twentieth century culminating in the Holocaust.
He focuses on the level of controversy surrounding Strauss and remarks:
This level of attention is an improbable accomplishment for a man who
was far more concerned about the sophist Prodicus’s attitude toward
moral education than he was about, say, big government or affirmative
33 Brent Staples “Undemocratic Vistas: The Sinister Vogue of Leo Strauss” in The
New York Times (November 28,1994).
34 Hadley Arkes “Strauss and the Religion of Reason” in The National Review (June 26,
1995) pp. 60-63.
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action. How is it that this formerly obscure scholar inspires such passion
today?35
Berstein concludes that Strauss’s great appeal emerges from the intensity of the
kulturkampf and the success of his students. Strauss’s great book traditionalism and
democratic elitism are the pillars upon which the charm of Leo Strauss is built.36
Berstein reminds us of Strauss’s origins as an obscure scholar. A study of
Strauss’s thought can be deeply profited by a referral to what scholars thought of
Strauss. A brief perusal of book reviews of Strauss’s classical scholarship finds a mixed
response of adulation and serious scholarly criticism. Harry Neuman takes the reader
line by line through Strauss’s Argument and Action of Plato’s Laws and concludes with
the highest praise:
Apparently, Strauss believed that Socratic courage demands concessions
to the ancient Dorian piety, while concessions to Socratic prejudices are
un-Socratic. No scholarly work does more to stiffen resistance to those
prejudices than Strauss’s interpretation of the Laws. None is more
Socratic in its appreciation of Dorian taste forbidden in souls that
experience the Socratic way of life as an answer and not a question.37
Neuman’s attunement to the Straussian project enables him to appreciate the opening o f
skeptical philosophy to faithful citizenship.
Other scholars confronting Strauss on the academic playing field were quite harsh
to both his method and the quality of his research. M. Schofield’s review of the same

35 Richard Bernstein “A Very Unlikely Villain (or Hero)” in The New York Times
(January 29, 1995) p. 4e.
36 Ibid.
37 Harry Neuman’s book review of The Argument and Action of Plato’s Laws in Journal
of the History of Philosophy (January 1979) pp. 81-82.
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text, as dealt with by our preceding commentator, is characteristic of this genre of
response to Strauss’s way of reading a text. He states:
Strauss has an axe to grind here, viz. the impracticability of the Nocturnal
Council. Where he has not, he sometimes raises interesting questions and
makes apposite observations but he is too frequently obscure, skimpy, or
sloppy. He seems to have taken little account o f modem scholarship on
the Laws. His book is to my mind a model of how not to read or write
about Plato.38
Schofield’s critique of Strauss is aware of some of Strauss’s biases and of his failings in
classical scholarship but the grand project, so familiar to Strauss’s students, slips the
critic’s grasp.
Glen Schram is a critic of Strauss who recognizes the grandeur o f Strauss’s
project. In a thoughtful response to Shadia Drury’s assault on Strauss’s amoralism,
Schram offers a line by line defense of Strauss’s noble purpose. He constantly brings the
salutary aspect of Strauss’s teaching to the forefront, whereas Drury focuses on its
darkest implications. Schram contends:
Though he despaired, as I do not, of reconciling reason and revelation, he
made a powerful case not just for revelation but for a literal interpretation
of it. Moreover, the version of ‘classic natural right’ with which he
identified is not so vacuous as Professor Drury would have us believe,
and he did not consider himself above morality. In short, he is not a
dangerous writer, though one might regret his failure to temper his elitism
by urging upon elites a religiously grounded humility.39

38 M. Schofield’s book review of The Argument and Action of Plato’s Laws in The
Classical Review (No. 1, 1978) p. 170.
39 Glen Schram “Leo Strauss in a Liberal Education” in Toward a Response to the
American Crisis (Front Royal, Virginia: Christendom Press, 1993) p. 201.
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Defenders of Strauss, such as Schram, focus on Strauss’s decency and his defense of the
life of faith. The problem of Strauss’s idiosyncratic treatment of classical philosophy is
given minimal attention.
Strauss’s resurrection of orthodoxy is achieved by a transformation of classical
philosophy. Strauss denies a fact that would be obvious to the most superficial observer
of the classic tradition. He states it is impossible to be both a theologian and a
philosopher, even though the classical philosophers were the founders of theology.40
Schram notes this extraordinary transformation in a comparison of Strauss to Eric
Voegelin. He states, “Strauss was no doubt a brilliant philosopher, but I believe
Voegelin to be greater, chiefly because Voegelin was alive to the spiritual dimension of
ancient thought as Strauss was not and had a surer sense o f the spiritual disorder at the
base of modem political thought.”41 The passing over of the religious experiences of the
classical philosophers appears to be the potential Achilles heel of the Straussian project.
The origin of this particular short-coming is likely to be found in Strauss’s studies of
medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy.
The two faiths occupying a central position in Strauss’s study of medieval
philosophy are Judaism and Islam. Both these faiths emphasize the centrality of the law
to the life of faith. Hillel Fradkin clarifies the meaning of this emphasis. He states:
The primacy o f law as the form of expression of Jewish and also Islamic
revelation implies that the primary task of the prophet is to be a lawgiver.
40 Mortimer Adler offers the traditional conception of the relation of the Greek
philosophers to theology in his The Great Ideas: A Lexicon of Western Thought (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992) pp. 846-855.
41 Glen Schram’s previously cited “Leo Strauss in a Liberal Education”.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

Law-giving is emphatically a political action and this fact means that the
proper interpretation of revelation requires a political analysis.42
Fradkin understands Strauss’s interpretation of classic philosophy to be in terms of the
perfect law aspired to by Plato and only manifested in Jewish and Islamic revelation.
From this perspective, obedience is the central pillar of faith. The difference between
Plato and Judaism is the Jews had a perfect law, whereas the philosophers had no such
law. Under Fradkin’s teaching, we must understand Strauss as seeing something
uniquely authoritative in the Jewish and Islamic traditions lacking in the religious
traditions of the Greeks. Yet it seems that the dual claims of Judaism and Islam and the
political purposes o f their laws would bring us back to doubt whether these two
revelatory faiths are any different than the civic faiths of the Greeks.
The political interpretation of religious experiences can be traced to a wide
variety of Islamic and Jewish philosophers including al Farabi, Maimonides and
Averroes. Unraveling this legacy out of Strauss’s works would take considerable skill
and imagination, yet, even a conservative interpreter such as Susan Orr admits Strauss’s
teaching opens him to charges of being an Averroist.43 Though the question of Strauss

42 Hillel Fradkin “Philosophy and Law” in Leo Strauss: Political Philosopher and Jewish
Thinker. Kenneth L. Deutsch and Walter Nicgorski, eds. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994) p. 139.
43 Susan Orr Jerusalem and Athens: Reason and Revelation in the works of Leo
Strauss, p. 28. As noted earlier, Frederick Wilhelmsen began this line of interpreting
Strauss in his Christianity and Political Philosophy. A paper, “Voegelin and Strauss”
presented by Barry Cooper at the May meeting of the Canadian Political Science
Association meeting at Laval University, Quebec City offers support to this thesis and
Ellis Sandoz’s “Medieval Rationalism or Mystic Philosophy? Reflection on the StraussVoegelin Correspondence” in Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence
Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin. 1934-1964. Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper,
trans. and eds. (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
1993) pp. 297-319. Kenneth Hart Green offers an argument that places Strauss outside
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being an Averroist is certainly open, his debt to medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy
can offer insight into his approach toward understanding his interpretation of classical
philosophy.
The political centrality of religious faith for the overlapping worlds of medieval
Islam and Judaism is self-evident. The intellectual climate demanded that all claims to
knowledge be either shown to be in accord with religious revelation or in opposition to
the truth revealed by God. The encounter of Islam with the classic thinkers of Greece
acted as stimulus for development of a rich philosophical tradition. Al-Farabi laid the
foundation for a political philosophy illuminating the parallels between the Platonic idea
o f the philosopher-king and the Islamic idea of prophet-ruler. The wedding of Islam and
philosophy produced two powerful schools of thought. The first school of thought
involved an assault on philosophy by the Islamic theologian, al-Ghazali. His treatise,
Incoherence o f the Philosophers, assaulted the integrity of philosophical knowledge and
initiated a tendency in Islamic theology to deprecate reason’s capabilities in order to
assert the necessity of revelation. The second, less successful, school of thought sided
with the forces o f rationalism. Averroes, the great spokesman for the rationalist school,
demonstrated the Incoherence of the Incoherence, as his response to al-Ghazali was
called. Averroes followed in the school of political philosophy founded by al-Farabi but
a confrontation with mystical Islam and its deprecation of reason created a tendency to

o f the Averroist tradition that points to the difference between Maimonides and Averroes
as being in the fact that Maimonides believed in the necessity of revelation for all human
knowledge of the highest things and Averroes believed that human intellect was
sufficient to attain the highest truths about “God and the angels.” For more details
regarding this argument see Kenneth Hart Green’s previously cited Jew and Philosopher.
The Return to Maimonides in the Jewish Thought of Leo Strauss, pp. 180-181 n. 76.
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see a teaching of dual truths guiding the lives of the simple believer and the
philosopher.44 Strauss’s choice of Maimonides as representing the claims o f Jerusalem
and Muhammad ibn Zakariya’ al-Razi as offering the best presentation of Athens show
how his teaching is entangled with the problems of knowledge plaguing the world of
medieval Islam.
When presenting medieval rationalism, Strauss selected a thinker absolutely
sympathetic with the claims of revelation, Moses ben Maimonides. Maimonides
understood the position of philosophy with particular respect to the eternity or the
creation of the universe to be contingent and not necessary.45 Rationalism could be
reconciled with Judaism by recognizing the limits o f philosophical speculation. The
revelation of God tells the believer that the universe is created. Philosophy has no means
of accessing whether the universe has been created or is eternal. Therefore, the word of
God is a possibility for philosophy and a reality for the believer. Faith and philosophy
can coexist because they do not logically negate one another’s existence as approaches
to life.
Al-Razi, who Strauss chooses to represent the classic teaching of Socrates,
contends that prophecy is not necessary, though he would not deny its existence. The
possibility of human beings being left to their own wisdom to find a place in the universe
remains open in the thought of al-Razi. It does not refute the order of revelation but it

44 Sayyed Hossein Nasr ‘Islamic Conception of Intellectual Life” in Dictionary of the
History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. Volume 2 of 5 Volumes, pp. 638652.
45 Leo Strauss Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1965) pp.
159-161; Moses Maimonides The Guide for the Perplexed. M. Friedlander, trans. (New
York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956) pp. 171-176.
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does question its necessity.46 Strauss’s famous position that Jerusalem and Athens must
coexist can be found in the space between Maimonides and al-Razi.
For Strauss, the limits of the life of reason and the promise of a rational religion
are the respective teachings of Athens and Jerusalem. This achievement requires Strauss
to read the symbol-experiences of transcendence of the classical philosophers as not
revealing divine reality in its greatest breadth. Similarly, Strauss must be willing to
accept the superiority of a single faith, Judaism, in order to make the case for revelation.
The breaking of philosophy and myth from the divine ground to advance the claims of a
single faith appears unseemly to thoughtful modems. The banishment of the divine in its
formative presence appears equally unseemly to attentive readers of the classics of
philosophy. Strauss’s attempt to solve the crisis of modernity leaves us with a strange
remedy to the problem of how are we to order ourselves. The faithful are to organize
themselves according to the tenents of their faith, while those not gifted with this faith
and propelled by the passion of reason should use the tenents of the faith to serve the
interests of reason. The faithful must remain open to the claims of reason and the
reasonable must remain open to the claims of faith. The limits o f reason make this a
quite complex but perhaps necessary approach to order.

46 The importance of al-Razi for Strauss emerges in his Socrates and Aristophanes.
(Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1966), p. 314. In an extensive treatise
dealing with the relationship between Socrates and Aristophanes, Strauss cites
Muhammad ben Zakariyya al-Razi’s The Philosophic Wav of Life as being the “clearest
and most thoughtful” exposition of the maturation of Socrates. Sayyed Hossein Nasr’s
previously cited article, “Islamic Conception of Intellectual Life,” pp. 646-647 is the
source for information regarding al-Razi.
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Whether the founding principles o f the American regime are an orthodoxy like
the law of Judaism is a difficult question. The presence of a creator God who endows
men with certain inalienable rights parallels Maimonides’ faith in the creation of the
world. In the light of reason, does our faith have the same status as the law of Moses?
What is the status of a life that focuses on its inability to fully participate in the formative
reality articulated by its society? What is the content of the life of reason that makes this
semi-detachment from human community necessary? The answers to these questions
turn us away from the life of faithful obedience exemplified by Jerusalem and toward the
questioning world of the philosopher.
Strauss was clearly aware of the difficulties and prejudices confronting his
attempt to regain a simple and natural understanding of human community that would
reinvigorate both the classical and religious worldviews. Nathan Tarcov clarifies
Strauss’s historical journey to the natural world where Jerusalem and Athens could stand
in a stalemate of principles. Tarcov brings us through the necessary historical labors in
which Strauss engaged and makes it known that Strauss’s quest for the natural and
simple world of the philosopher or the world of faithful obedience of the believer began
in the deconstruction o f the relativistic world of historicism. Tarcov states:
That investigation is in part the application of historicism to itself. This
requires ultimately a nonhistoricist account of the genesis of historicism
out of previous nonhistoricist thought. Historical understanding of
nonhistoricist thought frees one from historicism, at least to the extent of
enabling one to see its problematic character, all that is required for the
possibility of philosophy. This is the ‘self-destruction of historicism.’47

47Nathan Tarcov “On a Certain Critique of Straussianism” in the previously cited Leo
Strauss: Political Philosopher and Jewish Thinker, p. 272.
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The absolute relativism of historicism created a crisis incapacitating the holders of this
theoretical position from making judgments regarding the nature of good and evil. The
naive or natural view of the world, as well as the revelatory view of the world, were on
the surface spared this indecisiveness. Strauss’s attempt to regain these morally more
rigorous perspectives involved him in undermining the theoretical foundations of the
historicist worldview. Ultimately, the reinforcement of strict moral codes demanded that
theoretical wonder not engage itself in such an open manner as to bring doubts regarding
the moral foundations of society. It would appear that the knowledge o f good and evil is
best left to the philosopher, whereas the masses o f society are most secure in the
opinions regarding good and evil o f the founders. Strauss’s project is involved in a
purposeful rejection o f the historical understanding of man. Werner Dannhauser’s title
o f an article in the American Scholar captures the spirit of the movement animating
Strauss. The work is called “Leo Strauss: Becoming Naive Again.”48
The content o f this naivete is most likely to be found in Strauss’s understanding
o f classical philosophy and its relationship to natural right. Strauss longed to leave the
historical cave of the modem age and return to the natural cave of classical antiquity but
what made this world more appealing? We know that the crisis of modernity as it
cumulated in the holocaust certainly took much of the luster off the modem world but
technology, as opposed to a change in the mode o f thought appears to account for the
excesses of the modem age 49 Regardless of our modem apprehensions against returning

48 Wemer Dannhauser “Leo Strauss: Becoming Naive Again” in The American Scholar
44(Autumn 1975) pp. 636-642.
49 Donald Kagan’s excellent account of the Peloponnesian War in his On the Origins of
War (New York: Doubleday, 1995) pp. 15-68 offers clear insight into the constant
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to the modes of thought characterizing the ancient world, Strauss believed the classics,
particularly Plato, had a better understanding o f politics and reason’s limitation than the
modems.
Unraveling the content of this classical view is not without its difficulties. Much
of what Strauss wrote about the classics is clouded in the mystery of Socratic irony. His
interpretation of the classics can be broken into two parts. The first part is his defense of
the philosophic life as being the best life. The second part is reconciling the philosopher
with the city through political philosophy and the important concept of natural right. A
close reading of Strauss’s presentation of these classical views will be the greater part of
this study but a quick review of a fair presentation of Strauss’s understanding of natural
right and the philosophic life would serve a useful purpose.
Steve Umphrey courageously wrestles with the problem of Strauss’s teaching
regarding natural right and his apparent skepticism about natural right. Umphrey points
to Strauss’s metaphysical skepticism as being no barrier to understanding the demands of
natural right in the political sphere. His inability to reconcile these two strands of
thought ultimately leads him to conclude that the incoherencies of Strauss’s philosophy
are a remedy against groundless questioning, as well as doctrinaire thought. He
understands Strauss to be in the tradition of the Socrates who questioned the
foundations of order and eventually surrendered his life to maintain the sacredness of

nature o f man which makes atrocities a part of the human condition. Martin Heidegger
goes so far as to trace the technological spirit originating in Plato’s metaphysics of
production as the cause of the modem crisis. See Michael Zimmerman’s Heidegger’s
Confrontation with Modernity: Technology. Politics and Art (Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 1990) pp. 137-274.
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those foundations.50 A close reading of Strauss’s texts confirms the perplexing character
so well articulated by Umphrey but besides doubts regarding the effectiveness of this
way of thinking as a cure for the ails that plague our present polity, we are also
confronted with the question whether this is the best way to represent the character of
the philosophic life. Strauss’s argument making philosophy man’s attempt to
comprehend his world through sense perception and the guidance of autonomous reason
and his acknowledgment of this reason’s impotence to give a decisive answer to the
question of the whole creates a climate that may be open to those who are not so timid
about answering those questions decisively. Strauss’s philosophy as an answer to the
crisis of modernity seems to be both subtle and restrained. Emil Fackenheim comments,
“I think there is a restraint in him vis-a-vis evil, altogether.”51 At this point of Straussian
moderation, it may be appropriate to begin to review the literature about a man, though
not immoderate, preferred to think o f the Platonic enterprise as an ascent to the Good as
opposed to a subtle guide to the limits of reason.
Eric Voegelin, though dealing with many of the same materials as Strauss, came
up with radically different conclusions regarding how to interpret these materials.
Voegelin’s treatment of the life of reason is the core of his scholarship. Reason is not
autonomous man’s attempt to make sense out of his world but instead it is the location
of the tension between man and God. Voegelin contends:
Reason... was formulated in the Greek fifth century denoting the tension
between man as a human being and the Divine ground of his existence of
50 Steve Umphrey “Natural Right and Philosophy” in the previously cited Leo Strauss:
Political Philosopher and Jewish Thinker, pp. 275-295.
51 Emil Fackenheim “Leo Strauss and Modem Judaism” in the Claremont Review of
Books (Winter 1985) p. 22.
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which he is in search. The consciousness of being caused by the Divine
ground—that is reason. Period. That is the meaning of the word
“reason.” That is why I always insist on speaking o f noetic and use the
term nous: in order not to get into the problems o f the ideological
concept of reason of the eighteenth century.52
In that brief genealogical history of the word reason, one can begin to fathom the
controversy that surrounds the philosophy of Eric Voegelin. Voegelin’s survey of
history led him to formulate a theory of consciousness to accommodate the immanent
and transcendent dimensions of human experience, a theory o f symbol that integrated the
variety of symbols of order of differing ethnic societies into a common understanding of
the structure of reality and a critical political theory that illuminated the deficiencies of
various symbols-experiences of order as representative of existence in truth. Voegelin’s
project is of epoch shaping proportions.53 Naturally, such a project would attract a
certain amount of critical attention.
Voegelin’s theory challenged contemporary worldviews. Unlike Strauss, who
bolstered religious orthodoxy, skepticism and the natural perspective of rationalism,
Voegelin embraced a form o f empirical mysticism that affirmed both the immanent world
and the presence of the unknown God. His attention to the transcendent pole of order

52 Eric Voegelin Conversations with Eric Voegelin. Eric O’Connor, ed. (Montreal:
Thomas More Institute, 1976) p. 138.
53 Ellis Sandoz’s The Voegelinian Revolution. (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana
State University Press, 1981), pp. 188-189 compares Voegelin’s achievement to the
achievements of Copernicus and Newton. Sandoz states, “It is a comprehensive new
science of man which, when drawn together from the array of theoretical insights
dispersed over the extensive work of a lifetime, may be said to compose a Philosophiae
Hominis Principia Noetica, a turning point in man’s understanding of himself and the
truth of existence.” Sandoz’s discussion of epoch in his Truth and the Experience of
Epoch in History: A Voegelinian Perspective in Modem Age (Fall 1995) pp. 7-21
remind us that the undying struggle remains the character of reality whether we are in a
new or old epoch.
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led him to come into conflict with both orthodox faith and the standard paradigms of
political science.
Voegelin’s Christian critics make up a considerable body of the research in
Voegelin studies. Voegelin’s engagement with the truth represented by the Christian
experience makes this encounter necessary. In “The Gospel and Culture” Voegelin
articulates his understanding of the promise and peril of the Gospel. He states:
In the historical drama of revelation, the Unknown God ultimately
becomes the god known through his presence in Christ. This drama,
though it has been alive in the consciousness of New Testament writers,
is far from alive in the Christianity of the churches today, for the history
o f Christianity is characterized by what is commonly called the separation
o f school theology from mystical or experiential theology which formed
an apparently inseparable unit still in the work of Origen. The Unknown
God whose theotes was present in the existence of Jesus has been
eclipsed by the revealed God of Christian doctrine. Even today, however,
when this unfortunate separation is recognized as one of the great causes
o f the modem spiritual crisis; when energetic attempts are made to cope
with the problem through a variety of crisis and existential theologies; and
when there is no lack of historical information about either the revelatory
process leading up to the epiphany of Christ, or about the loss of
experiential reality through doctrinization; the philosophical analysis of
the various issues lags far behind our preanalytical awareness. It will be
necessary, therefore, to reflect on the danger that has given the Unknown
God a bad name in Christianity and induced certain doctrinal
developments as a protective measure, i.e., on the danger of the gospel
movement derailing into gnosticism.54
Voegelin’s heterodox Christology and interpretation of the Christian gospel did not go
unanswered.

54 Eric Voegelin “The Gospel and Culture” in Published Essays: 1966-1985. pp. 199200.
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The absence of the Christ of dogmatic Christianity led many to question the value
of Voegelin’s scholarship. Frederick Wilhelmsen offers a critique of Voegelin’s
approach to Christ. He states:
Christianity is represented through the prism of the experience o f St. Paul
and exclusively through that prism. The historical figure o f Jesus is
totally by-passed and the only “Christ” to emerge in Voegelin’s pages is
“The Resurrected” of Paul’s experience... This omission is likely to
disappoint a number o f Voegelin’s Catholic “conservative” followers...
To speak, as [Voegelin] does, of the “fallacy... entertained by doctrinaire
theologians, metaphysicians, and ideologists” indicates a kind o f precious
washing of the hands by a latter-day Pilate who is too pure to enter the
Golgatha of history.... But, Dr. Voegelin, “if He is not risen”-in the
words of St. Paul-I for one don’t give a damn about St. Paul’s experience
of Him.... Professor Voegelin’s understanding of the structure o f history
fails.55
The harsh words of Professor Wilhelmsen are perhaps more dogmatic than many of the
more thoughtful critics of Voegelin who believe that Voegelin has missed the central
issue of the Christian faith and perhaps offers a radically Platonized Christianity in its
place.56
Murray Jardine offers the beginning of such a criticism in his “Eric Voegelin’s
Interpretation(s) of Modernity.” Jardine argues:
By demanding that all theophanic experience conform to noetic control,
he slights dimensions of human experience revealed in the biblical story.
And indeed, it does seem that Voegelin, in arguing that Christianity has
rendered earthly existence meaningless by closing revelation, seems to
have forgotten that a completed revelation still leaves very much open the
possibility of a meaningful life in the everyday imitation o f Christ’s
example. By claiming that earthly human existence becomes meaningless
without the possibility o f new revelations, Voegelin almost seems to be
55 Cited from Ellis Sandoz’s Voegelinian Revolution, p. 16 from the original Frederick
Wilhelmsen’s “The Achievement of Eric Voegelin” in Modem Age (Spring 1959) p. 182;
Frederick Wilhelmsen’s “The New Voegelin” in Triumph (January 1975) pp. 32, 35.
56 Michael Federici’s “Voegelin’s Christian Critics” in Modem Age 36 (1994) pp.331340 offers a discussion and important references for this particular issue.
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saying that only mystic philosophers can lead meaningful lives. Truly this
would be Platonism with a vengeance.57
Jardine’s line of argumentation follows in a long tradition that attempts to demonstrate
the incompatibility of Greek rationalism and Christian faith, but he fails to take
Voegelin’s task to apperceive the divine ground animating a history filled with gods
seriously.58 Jardine also fails to take Voegelin’s teaching regarding the plurality and the
equivalences of experience characterizing man’s encounter with the divine into account
when he accuses Voegelin of seemingly endorsing a view o f existence that reserves the
status of a meaningful life solely for mystic philosophers.
Voegelin’s response to another Christian critic should be a warning to those who
would dismiss Voegelin as a Platonist. In a response to Professor Altizer’s critic of
Voegelin’s non-orthodox position59 Voegelin invokes the gospel to show how the
Christian faith embraces every faith. Voegelin states:
...For it is the Christ of the Gospel of John who says of himself: “Before
Abraham was, I am’ (8:58).... In practice this means that one has to
recognize, and make intelligible, the presence of Christ in a Babylonian
hymn, or a Taoist speculation, or a Platonic dialogue, just as much as in a
Gospel.60

57 Murray Jardine “Eric Voegelin’s Interpretation(s) of Modernity” in The Review of
Politics. 4 (Fall 1995), p. 604.
58 Leo Strauss’s project o f Jerusalem and Athens is attuned with this project but others
such as Karl Lowith’s Meaning and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1949); Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation.
vol. I: Human Nature (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons and Thorlief Boman’s
Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek Thought. Jules C. Moreau, trans. (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1960) represent similar projects.
59 Thomas J. J. Altizer “A New History and a New but Ancient God” in Eric Voegelin’s
Thought: A Critical Appraisal. Ellis Sandoz, ed. (Durham: Duke University Press,
1982) pp. 179-188.
60 Eric Voegelin “Response to Professor Altizer’s eA New History and a New but
Ancient God?”’ in the previously cited Published Essays: 1966-1985. p. 294.
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The light Christ brings to the human condition is one of the major concerns of
Voegelin’s scholarship. Nevertheless, he does challenge the orthodox belief in the
finality of revelation as it is manifested in the Christian doctrine of atonement.
Voegelin’s articulation of the Christian message may offer clarity to why he takes
the position he does. He asserts:
The strength of the gospel is its concentration on the one point that is allimportant: that the truth of reality has its center not in the cosmos at
large, not in nature or society or imperial rulership, but in the presence of
the Unknown God in a man’s existence to his death and life. This very
strength, however, can cause a breakdown, if the emphasis on the center
of truth becomes so intense that its relations to the reality of which it is
the center are neglected or interrupted. Unless the Unknown God is the
undifferentiated divine presence in the background of the specific
intracosmic gods, he is indeed a god unknown to the primary experience
of the cosmos. In that case, however, there is no process of revelation in
history, nor a millennial Movement culminating in the epiphany of the Son
of God, but only the irruption of an extracosmic god in a cosmos to
whose mankind he hitherto had been hidden.61
Voegelin insists upon appreciating the importance of the Christ-event but he refuses to
make nonsense out of the rest of the human spiritual experience in order to secure the
absolutely otherness of the Christ experience. In the words of one of Voegelin’s more
sympathetic theological critics, Michael Morrissey, ‘The thrust of his position appears to
be plain and simple: the Spirit o f God is universal and can incarnate itself in diverse
modes throughout history and society.”62

61 Eric Voegelin in the previously cited “Gospel and Culture,” p.210.
62 Michael P. Morrissey Consciousness and Transcendence: The Theology of Eric
Voegelin (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) p.242.
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Glenn Schram, in a review of Voegelin’s Published Essays: 1966-1985 and What
Is History? and Other Late Unpublished Writings, offers some insights into Voegelin’s
philosophy of divine presence while raising some interesting questions.
Schram focuses on Voegelin’s assertion that God is “non-existent reality” and that one
must not ascribe properties to God for fear of becoming involved in prepositional
metaphysics that cloud the primary experience of the divine ground of being.63 Schram
goes on to examine Voegelin’s understanding of the soul as “the sensorium for divine
reality and the site of its luminous presence.”64 The combination of these teachings leads
Schram to see in Voegelin’s teaching a potential exclusive identity of the divine and the
soul when he states, “He might of course mean that it has a nonluminous presence
outside the soul, but I see no evidence for such an interpretation.”65
Schram goes on to examine Voegelin’s criticism of doctrinal Christianity, his
affinity for the spirituality of the Greeks, his rejection o f gnostic modernity and Voegelin
as a potential bridge to faith for secular minds. Schram states:
He has taken a first step toward such a renaissance [A renaissance of
traditional religiosity] by showing intellectuals who are averse to doctrine
how they can nonetheless believe in God. As he says twice in his book
under review, “One cannot prove reality by a syllogism; one can only
point to it and invite the doubter to look” (PE, p. 388; WIH, p. 202).
63 Schram cites “On Debate and Existence,” pp. 48-49 and “Wisdom and the Magic of
the Extreme: A Meditation,” p. 376 and “Quod Deus Diciteur,” p. 376 in the previously
cited Published Essays: 1966-1985 to make his argument.
64 Eric Voegelin “The Beginning and the Beyond: A Meditation on Truth,” in the
previously cited What Is History and Other Late Unpublished Writings, p. 184.
65 Glenn N. Schram “The Heterodoxy of Eric Voegelin” in the previously cited Toward
a Response to the American Crisis, p. 258. It is important to note Schram’s speculation
has little textual support and would appear to involve a form of psychologism to which
Voegelin was quite hostile.
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The meditative passages in these books point to reality. For many, belief
in doctrinal religion might follow.66
Though Schram’s statement may have a certain amount of truth, Voegelin’s hope for the
fruit of his meditative labors would better parallel Morrissey’s assessment of Voegelin’s
struggle:
True to the metaxic structure o f existence, he claims to forge a middle
ground between an anthropology that tends to focus on the human pole at
the expense of the divine, and theology that tends to focus on the divine
at the expense of the human. The name he gives his exploration of the
whole of reality, a reality that reaches from the apeirontic depth to the
divine height, which humans faithfully seek to understand from their
position in the middle, is, simply, “philosophy.”67
Voegelin’s encounter with the theologians has been a result of his articulation of a theory
of consciousness that attempts to make sense out of the long trail of symbol-experiences
attesting to the tensional structure of reality. His claim of the equivalence of symbols of
reason and symbols of faith as different modes of illuminating the same reality have made
his work of great interest to both persons o f faith and the philosophic community.
Attention to the literature on Voegelin’s theory of consciousness and its interrelationship
to his philosophy of history may bring us to a closer understanding of how one of the
premier political philosophers of the twentieth century has developed such a
controversial position.
Voegelin’s theory of consciousness is at once the core of his political philosophy
and its most perplexing element. Those unfamiliar with philosophical debate may find
Voegelin’s articulation of a theory of consciousness in accord with common sense. His

66 Ibid.. p. 261.
67 Michael P. Morrissey Consciousness and Transcendence: The Theology of Eric
Voegelin. p. 254
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explanation of differing symbols of order including cosmologic, noetic and pneumatic
symbolisms as equivalent attempts to represent a core experience o f an elusive ground of
being goes a long way toward reconciling the divergent divine-human encounters as
these events have manifested themselves in history.68 Of course such a position is only
commonsensical if one is tolerant and open to the primary experiences of life.
The analogical nature of Voegelin’s understanding of how human beings wrestle
with the transcendent dimension of a non-thing like reality to which their existences point
is key to encountering the mysterious core of human existence. Voegelin spoke of this
core as transcendent reality, the divine ground of being and in later works tended to
utilize language such as “the non-existent reality”69 or “It-reality”70 to emphasize the
non-objectifiable nature of this presence. As Voegelin’s own wrestling with vocabulary
would indicate, the articulation of this reality has the potential of being presented in a
clearer or less clear manner. Voegelin gave expression to this experience in a theory of
differentiation that classified symbol-experiences of order according to how closely they
represented a reality o f participation with both immanent and transcendent poles.71 The

68 Eric Voegelin’s “Equivalence o f Experience and Symbolization in History” in the
previously cited Published Essays: 1966-1985. pp.l 15-133, ends with the assertion,
“Behind every equivalent symbol in the historical field stands the man who has
engendered it in the course of his search as representative of a truth that is more than
equivalent. The search that renders no more than equivalent truth rests ultimately on the
faith that, by engaging in it, man participates representatively in the divine drama of truth
becoming luminous.” The legitimacy of life’s “big questions” is essential to coming to a
point of appreciating the achievement of Voegelin’s theory of equivalent experiences.
69 Eric Voegelin “Immortality: Experience and Symbol” in the previously cited
Published Essays: 1966-1985. p. 52.
70 Eric Voegelin In Search of Order. Volume 5 of 5 Volumes, Order and History (Baton
Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1987) p. 18.
71 Voegelin offers a discussion of differentiation in Israel and Revelation, Volume 1 of 5
Volumes, in the previously cited Order and History, pp. 126-133 and his introduction to
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limitation o f this approach to philosophy is its link to the experiential horizon of the
observer investigating the horizon of symbols-experiences of order. Barry Cooper
captures the limits of this participatory reality when he states, “It [the process o f reality]
cannot be experienced except as presence, that is, concretely or really, in and by the
consciousness of specific human beings. It cannot therefore be experienced as a
whole.”72
The search for order is the content of a reality that finds human beings between
the necessities of everyday existence and the “non-existent ground” of that existence.
Cooper clarifies the peculiar usage of non-existence. He states:
It is not for that reason subjective in the sense of being an invention of the
imagination. As a first approximation we may say that symbols convey
meanings that are experienced as real. At the same time however, the
mode of nonexistence characterizes the experience because the
experience is nothing more than consciousness of participation in
nonexistent reality. The symbolic artifacts-words, paintings, buildings,
etc.-exist, of course, but the mode o f being o f meaning is nonexistent.
The meaning or the truth ‘is’ only in the consciousness of one who
apprehends not the artifacts but the truth they express; and the mode of
being of this truth is nonexistent, namely as consciousness of
participation. Anyone who has ever understood a poem has had this
experience.73
Transforming the experience of non-existent reality into doctrinal reality changes that
which cannot be objectified into an object. This transformation loses the immediacy of

The Ecumenic Age. Volume 4 of 5 Volumes in that same series, pp. 8-11. Paul Grimley
Kuntz’s “Voegelin’s Experiences of Disorder Out of Order” in Eric Voegelin’s
Significance for the Modem Mind, Ellis Sandoz, ed. (Baton Rouge and London:
Louisiana State University Press, 1991) pp. 167-171 offers a discussion of the clarity
Voegelin’s theory of differentiation brings to the study of social order.
72 Barry Cooper The Political Theory of Eric Voegelin (Ontario: Edwin Mellon Press,
1986) p. 212.
73 Ibid, p. 200.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

the truth o f existence and replaces it with the untruth of dogmatic experience.
Voegelin’s philosophy is an attempt to resist the eclipse of experiential reality in its
breadth, including “non-existent reality,” by dogma.
The grounds for the attractiveness of dogma lie in the fact that the experiencers
of reality seek to protect their hard-won insights into the nature of reality by representing
them in terms of symbols which can be misinterpreted as objective truth. Anyone who
has experienced the fundamental idiocy of a philosophic or religious symbolization may
very likely be interpreting the symbolization in an intentionalistic manner.
Voegelin’s preference for the Greek noetic and the Judaeo-Christian pneumatic
symbolizations as the most differentiated representations o f existence in truth is the
characteristic mark of his philosophy. Symbols of divinity or transcendence are the
vessels for the non-existent dimension of reality that plays a formative role in man’s
search for order. The equivalence of philosophy and revelation as symbolically
representative of experiential reality is in the fact that they represent the response of
individual persons to a reality which has a non-thing like or divine dimension that is
formative.
Voegelin’s theory of consciousness and its focus on the divine moves us from
focusing on nature to focus on the social field of order as it is expressed by the mode of
historical understanding. Ellis Sandoz argues:
The central property of reality as transfiguration is, however, analyzable
experientially in terms o f tension of structure and process. No more in
noetic science than in natural science is reality ‘given’ beyond question.
Rather the structures in reality as experienced raise the questions in
search of answers. The structures include the existence of the cosmos;
the hierarchy and diversification of being; the experience of questioning
as the constituent of humanity; the leap in existential truth through the
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noetic and pneumatic illuminations of consciousness; the process of
history in which the differentiations o f questioning consciousness and the
leap in truth occur; and the eschatological movement in the process
beyond its structure (OH, IV, 326). Although the catalog of experienced
structures is not exhaustive, it does suggest the cardinal point of the
Question. The precariousness of existence out o f nonexistence, of there
being something rather than nothing, and of things (including structures
experienced) being the way they are and not otherwise pose questions
which reveal that precariousness and the mysteries of uncertainty attach
not so much to the relatively secure and stable cosmos and the natural
order as to the social field as part o f the cosmos that unfolds its meaning
in history. The process of history, then, can be seen to represent the
process of reality in the preeminent sense, and ‘the events of history
rather than o f nature become crucial as criteria o f order and disorder in
the cosmos’ (OH, IV, 328).74
Human awareness and the articulation of and the actions following that awareness are
the central themes o f Voegelin’s political theory. Whether his articulation of
consciousness is adequate is a question that has inspired serious investigation into the
potential weaknesses hidden in Professor Voegelin’s theory of consciousness.
Robert Dahl represents the concerns o f mainstream political science when he
raises questions regarding the testability of Voegelin’s theory of order and critique of
modernity. He accuses Voegelin of undefining and unsciencing science. Voegelin’s
approach to modernity is an epic story with no means o f testing its truth claims except by
referring to the story.75 The lack of such an Archimedian point is the inspiration of
Voegelin’s project and if “the order of history is the history of order” we cannot expect
the exploration of the human search for order to be subordinated to the horizons of the
scientific method. Certain experiences seem to be beyond the horizon of methods of

74 Ellis Sandoz The Voegelinian Revolution, p. 247.
75 Robert Dahl “The Science of Politics: New and Old,” a book review of David
Easton’s The Political System: An Inquiry into the State o f Political Science and Eric
Voegelin’s The New Science of Politics in World Politics. 7 (1955), pp. 479-489.
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quantification. The logic of story-telling is more appropriate to evaluating the symbols
by which human beings choose to organize their lives and this logic should be a reminder
to avoid the reifying tendencies characterizing the dogmatic systems of order.76
A more sympathetic critic, Professor Eugene Webb, mentions some potentially
serious problems in Voegelin’s theory of consciousness. Webb notes the potential of
Voegelin’s loose philosophic vocabulary to lend itself to an unwanted dualistic
interpretation, the potential circularity of philosophical standards that uses certain
historic forms of symbolic representation as the criteria for adequate representation of
the structure and process of reality and Voegelin’s tendency to use a hermeneutics of
trust without a balancing hermeneutics of suspicion in his approach to texts representing
the experience of the metaxy.77
The charges of dualism are largely intertwined with the assertion that Voegelin is
a Platonist. The tendency to devalue the immanent pole is the issue which is of particular
concern to Webb. The division Voegelin articulates regarding man’s imperfect immanent
state and the perfect but unattainable realm of the transcendent makes Voegelin’s
philosophy potentially frustrating in a way in which a philosopher like Lonergan
following the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition is not. Webb wonders if it is possible to

76 Dahl apparently did not take Voegelin’s argument regarding the appropriateness of a
method to be convincing. To examine the argument on its own merits see The New
Science of Politics, pp. 4-6. Hans Gadamer’s Truth and Method (New York:
Crossroad Publishing Corporation, 1992) pp. 164-169 offers insight into the process of
interpretation which includes the interpreter.
77 Eugene Webb Philosophers of Consciousness (Seattle and London: University of
Washington Press, 1988) pp. 91-136. John J. Ranieri’s Eric Voegelin and the Good
Society, wrestles with similar concerns regarding the dualistic tensions in Voegelin’s
thought and though somewhat critical o f Voegelin’s philosophic vocabulary is ultimately
sympathetic to the journey of Voegelin as a mystic philosopher.
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envision a mode o f acting which is not gnostic but an actual act o f knowing and moral
commitment.7®
Further, Webb contends Voegelin’s preference for the language of myth over
“more explicit theoretical language” not only leaves Voegelin open to charges of dualism
but also makes it possible to accuse Voegelin of circularity of reasoning when
considering his selection of symbols representing well-ordered and disordered existence.
Voegelin’s rejection of most of the language of technical philosophy as a secondary
symbolism detached from the originating experience articulated by the primary
experiencer of reality is of special concern to Webb. Nonetheless, Webb does agree that
Voegelin’s focus on primary symbols and their engendering experiences is a reasonable
course o f action though not without its particular dangers.79
One of these dangers can be found in what Webb understands to be Voegelin’s
hermeneutics of trust and its tendency to focus on certain experiences and ignore other
experiences due to a preconceived notion of what is important and unimportant. Webb
suggest that Paul Ricouer’s hermeneutics o f suspicion may act as a balance to Voegelin’s
hermeneutics of trust.80
From the perspective of modem philosophy, Webb’s critiques are significant and
largely on mark. Voegelin would most probably be in accordance with the majority of
Webb’s criticisms. Voegelin’s theory of consciousness, if abused, has the potential to
lead an individual to inaction as he stands in awe before the great and impenetrable

78 Ibid.. o. 121.
79IWd,pp. 122-124.
80 Ibid, p. 125.
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mystery of existence despite efforts by Voegelin to emphasize the common sense and
immanent dimensions of experiential reality.81 The language of tension also should
serve as a remedy to unstringing the bow of a human life into a tensionless apathy or
fanaticism but reifying or hypostatizing a non-thing reality is an ever present danger.
Perhaps the most serious concern is Voegelin’s potential blindness to the reality
expressed by secondary symbols or more compact symbols, as well as an inattention to
the contextual problems of different symbolizations. Voegelin’s sweeping treatment of
the symbols-experiences of order manifested throughout human history leaves him
particularly vulnerable to this type of criticism though this particular criticism is more a
problem of his philosophy o f history than his theory of consciousness.
Kenneth Keulman criticizes the Western bias of Voegelin’s studies and the
inadequacy of his research into non-Westem symbols- experiences of order.82
Voegelin’s perspective regarding the relative status of degrees o f differentiation is placed
into question by this criticism. Voegelin’s acknowledgment of this weakness in his
introduction to The Ecumenic Age does not appear to satisfy Keulman’s concerns.83 If

81Voegelin’s reference to Machiavelli as a realist as opposed to an immoralist in The
New Science o f Politics (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1987) p. 170 is one
component of his thought that acts as a bulwark against in action but the larger part o f
his work exploring the spiritual dimension of reality acts as a barrier to positive or
proactive political action. Kenneth Keulman’s The Balance of Consciousness: Eric
Voegelin’s Political Theory (University Park: The Pennsylvania State Press, 1990) pp.
152-153 mentions Voegelin’s work seems to leave him open to the same tendencies
regarding indifference to the political he criticized in the writings of St. Augustine and
St. Paul.
82 Ibid., pp. 155-161.
83 The introduction to The Ecumenic Age, pp. 1-58, acknowledges the problem a
plurality of spiritual outbursts set for Voegelin and explains his change of direction from
his realization that he was working from a conception of history emerging from a
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Voegelin’s approach to the structure and process of reality holds true, other traditions
may have grasped this reality with clarity equaling the classical Greek philosophers and
the Hebraic prophets. Voegelin’s theory of differentiation becomes particularly
unseemly when he gives short-time to the insights of the Buddha that appear to correlate
most nearly to a philosophy emphasizing the importance of “non-existent reality.”84
Voegelin’s philosophy of history could be perceived as a stumbling block to his theory of
consciousness.
Eugene Webb’s Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History points to the problematic
meaning of Voegelin’s philosophy o f history. He states:
The advance from cosmological truth through anthropological and
soteriological truth is not, according to Voegelin, a movement from false
to true, not even from an old truth to a new and different one. It is a
movement only toward fuller experience and clearer expression of one
and the same truth of existence. As one emerges existentially into the
fides caritate formata of providentially ordered divine union, one does
not move out of the cosmos or beyond humanity. It is the same Between
as ever that one lives in, only with more luminous presence and clearer
intention of fidelity to the divine drawing and to one’s role in what Plato
called the “serious play”....85

cosmological myth. He does not reject his previous work because he believed the
exploration of the pneumatic and noetic modes of existence to be fundamentally sound.
84 Eric Voegelin’s The Ecumenic Age briefly mentions the spiritual out-burst of the
Buddha but the lack of concern with the mystery of the process through a historical
consciousness leads Voegelin to assert the cosmic process is split away from the Void.
The Buddhist experience of compassion and the Bohdisatva may be a bridge between the
Void and everyday existence that may represent tensional reality as clearly as the vision
of the Resurrected. A group of collected essays on Buddhism in The World of
Buddhism. Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich, eds. (London: Thames and Hudson,
1991) may offer insight into this possibility. An examination of Voegelin’s discussion of
Paul in The Ecumenic Age, pp. 250-251.
85 Eugene Webb Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History (Seattle and London:
University of Washington Press, 1981) p. 264.
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The process of differentiation within reality binds humanity in a common humanity
through its participation in an ever present divine ground. This discovery led Voegelin
to become a defender o f the mythic tales that affirmed this common ground. His choice
of the Hebraic and Hellenic symbols-experiences o f order as being the most articulate
vessels of the truth of existence revolves particularly around the historic consciousness
developed in these two quests for order. Without history, universal humanity remains an
inarticulate reality.
Voegelin clarifies the relationship between humanity, consciousness and God.
He states:
The recognition of universal mankind as an eschatological index
penetrates to the center of the problem presented by history as a
dimension of humanity. Without universality, there would be no mankind
other than the aggregate of members of a biological species; there would
be no more a history of mankind than there is a history of catkind or
horsekind, If mankind is to have history, its members must be able to
respond to the movement of divine presence in their souls. But if that is
the condition, then the mankind who has history is constituted by the God
to whom man responds. A scattering of societies, belonging to the same
biological type, thus, is discovered to be one mankind with one history,
by virtue of participation in the same flux of divine presence.86
Voegelin emphasizes that the existence of universal humanity is dependent upon the
common orientation of human beings toward the timeless in which the human encounters
the divine. Without this dimension of awareness, man is an ahistorical being having more
in common with a lower species than humanity. Awareness o f the mystery of the
process of a history that has eschatological direction is combined with an awareness of
the mysterious ground of being from which life originates and to which life moves.

86 Eric Voegelin The Ecumenic Age, p. 305.
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History is man writ large and its process reverberates with the echoes of the spiritual
drama of man in his search for order.
The meaning for politics o f Voegelin’s in depth analysis of consciousness,
symbol, history and the divine is not as difficult as a first encounter with his jargon would
indicate. The publication of his most accessible work with the clearest indications of the
direction of Voegelinian politics, The New Science of Politics, preceded the publication
o f his more difficult theoretical works on history and consciousness. This work directly
challenged ideological modes of thought and their engendered political orders on the
basis of the tensional reality articulated in his later works. This full scale assault on the
abandonment of the insights of the classical philosophers and the spiritual personalities of
the Judaeo-Christian tradition gained Voegelin the favor o f many cultural conservatives,
as well as leading many non-conservatives to dismiss him as a conservative ideologue.87
Nevertheless, an agenda for a politics of spiritual resistance has been a part of Voegelin’s
project since first engaging the Nazi ideologues in a critical evaluation of the symbols of
their political order in some of his earliest works.88

87 George H. Nash’s The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America (Wilmington,
Delaware: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1996) pp. 42-46 and 428-429 offers a
picture o f Voegelin from a conservative perspective. Murray Jardine’s previously cited
“Eric Voegelin’s Interpretation(s) o f Modernity” and Voegelin’s own self-description in
his Autobiographical Reflections, p. 46 raise serious doubts as to the wisdom of
dismissing or embracing Voegelin as a conservative ideologue.
These works include critiques of the Nazi race idea, a criticism of political movements
fulfilling a religious role and a defense of the authoritarian state as a bulwark against
ideology. The following list of works was the primary reason for Voegelin being forced
to flee Austria to avoid internment by the Gestapo. Die politischen Relieionen (Vienna:
Bermann-Fischer, 1939); Rasse undStaat (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1933): Die
Rassenidee in der Geisteseeschichte von Ray bis Carus (Berlin: Junker & Dunnhaupt,
1933); and Der Autoritaere Staat (Vienna: Springer, 1936)..
a a
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Voegelin would vacillate between understanding the work of a scholar as
potentially therapeutic for his society and believing that scholarly analysis had no effect
on the order of the society though it could be therapeutic for individuals by illuminating
present social disorders blocking the life of the spirit.89 Michael Franz’s evaluation of
the failure of Voegelin to provide us with a remedy for fanaticism is balanced by his
acknowledgment that Voegelin left us with a history of the struggle of well-ordered
souls to balance a history of disorder and pneumapathology. Franz states:
We have seen that Voegelin’s work began as a response to the
civilizational crisis of modernity, and that he characterized philosophy as
‘an act of resistance illuminated by conceptual understanding.’ The
success of such a struggle can never be complete or permanent, since the
wellsprings of disorder flow from the human condition itself, but one can
still speak of successes in a philosopher’s act of resistance....90
The struggle for order located in a sense of human participation in a mysterious reality
does not provide any final propositions regarding the order of society. From this
perspective, a structure built on the tensional encounter between orthodox faith and
classical rationalism does not prevent the sensitive soul from confronting the challenge of
existence in the In-Between. Voegelin’s spiritual individualism makes it clear that the
question o f order lies in a soul’s loving response or fearful and fleeing closure to the
mystery of “the non-existent reality.” The complicated relationship of man to the
symbols o f order displayed in his society is best evaluated on the basis of how that

89 Michael Franz offers an analysis of Voegelin’s alternating hopeful and despairing
moods regarding healing the modem age in his Eric Voegelin and the Politics o f Spiritual
Revolt (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992) pp. 107-114. He
characterizes Voegelin’s Platonic temper as the force motivating him to “try the
impossible” and attempt a therapy for the radical closure of the modem age.
90 Ibid.. p. 134.
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society fulfills man’s temporal and spiritual needs. Voegelin’s presentation of the
Platonic struggle for order in a world denying the needs of the spirit is the best starting
point to begin to understand the implications of existence in truth for political reality.
Naturally, the competing claims of Leo Strauss regarding the nature of political reality
appear to be a major challenge to Voegelin’s interpretation o f the meaning of Platonic
political resistance. The question of “What is Platonic philosophy?” is at the heart of the
scholarly controversy surrounding these two thinkers rejection of a modem politics of
utility.
The Strauss-Voegelin Controversy
From the previous literature review, the attentive reader could piece together
what the Strauss-Voegelin controversy revolved around but an examination of the topics
selected by several scholars commenting on the relationship of these two men may be of
some use in clarifying the issues at stake. An important commentator on the
relationship between Strauss and Voegelin, Ted McAllister, brings attention to both the
differences and similarities of the two thinkers’ achievement in his Revolt Against
Modernity: Leo Strauss. Eric Voegelin and the Search for a Postliberal Order. His
work focuses on the complicated question of the two men’s relationship to the American
conservative movement, as well as their unique approaches to the problem posed by the
crisis of modernity.91
McAllister casts Strauss as the philosopher and Voegelin as the mystic. He
understands the attraction and problematic nature of both men’s appeal to traditional

91 Ted McAllister Revolt Against Modernity: Leo Strauss. Eric Voegelin. & the Search
for a Postliberal Order (Lawrence. Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1996).
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conservatives. The philosophical assault both men launched against liberal individualism
made both men extremely attractive to conservatives who intuitively sensed a need for a
philosophical defense of their political position. Strauss’s defense of traditional moral
codes and religious belief earned him the respect of many conservatives even as his
emphasis on the adversarial relationship between philosophy and religion cultivated their
suspicions. The combination of traditional values and freedom represented by Strauss’s
teaching enabled him to become quite useful to the Neo-conservatives. Voegelin’s
emphasis on the “equivalence” of symbols of faith and philosophy created a certain
amount of discomfort among traditional conservatives, even as it seemed to be the best
philosophical argument against liberalism. Voegelin’s teaching did not receive the
attention Strauss’s teaching received from politically focused conservatives92 Strauss’s
attention to political philosophy appears to have made his complex teaching more
accessible to the politically motivated.
The importance of McAllister’s book for Strauss and Voegelin studies is his
attention to both thinkers as reactionary thinkers. McAllister uses the normally
prejudicial term “reactionary” in a favorable manner. Both Strauss and Voegelin’s
projects are understood as attempts to return to the foundations of true order. In this
sense, reactionary is a retreat from disorder and perhaps meritorious. The disorder of
the age is perceived to make conservation an inadequate response. When speaking of
conservatives, McAllister states:
They find themselves, then like Voegelin, in a disordered age seeking the
roots of order. They no longer have the luxury of conservation, but of
“ ibid^pp. 270-272.
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necessity they must become reactionaries who call for a return to
Christian faith and to political philosophy as a normative enterprise.
In some ways, then, Strauss and Voegelin become more important to
conservatives in the 1990s than they were in the 1950s, not because the
two philosophers became conservatives but because conservatives must
become reactionaries. Now more than ever conservatives require, for
their own survival, a clear understanding (in practical terms it does not
matter that their understanding be historically accurate) of the origins
and nature of their situation as well as some sense o f that to which they
are calling their nation back. Strauss and Voegelin provide them with
versions of the causes of the present problem, but conservatives will have
to look elsewhere, I suspect, for a clear articulation o f their plea.93
Voegelin’s mystic philosophy and his search for the unknown God and Strauss’s search
for natural right and the fundamental problems do not seem to be entangled with a
reactionary politics except at the most superficial level. The historical component of
these two men’s teachings should not be mistaken with a longing for the past or the
glories of a Christian republic. McAllister’s work appears to misinterpret the primary
direction of the two men’s philosophical studies, though Strauss’s use of tradition to
advance his project lends itself to this misinterpretation more readily than Voegelin’s
meditations on a theory o f consciousness do.94

93 Ibid, pp. 278-279.
94 Murray Jardine’s previously cited article, “Eric Voegelin’s Interpretation(s) of
Modernity,” addresses the question of Voegelin’s conservatism directly and finds
Voegelin’s thought more radical than conservative. Similarly Dante Germino’s “Leo
Strauss versus Eric Voegelin on Faith and Political Philosophy,” a paper delivered at the
annual meeting of the Guild of Scholars. General Theological Seminary, New York,
November 12-14, 1993, argued a similar case regarding Voegelin though slightly
ambivalent about Strauss’s position. Ted McAllister successfully captures this
ambivalence when he compares Voegelin to Strauss. He states, “Of course, Voegelin
did not call for any old god-as Strauss came close to advocating-but for the mysterious
God beyond existence whose revelation are revelations of mystery. Politics is equally
dangerous with reified gods or no gods at all” (Revolt Against Modernity, p. 259).
Strauss’s ambiguity makes his thought susceptible to being borrowed by political

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52

Apart from his political bias, his interpretation of Strauss and Voegelin as a
philosopher and mystic presents a clear elaboration of teachings which have already been
elaborated in the previous literature review. The reflections on the correspondence of
Strauss and Voegelin are a richer source for clarifying the competing interpretations of
reality offered by the two thinkers.
Their correspondence from 1934 to 1964 contains brief summaries of the
disagreements that are more deeply elaborated and clarified in their mature work. The
nature of their disagreement surrounds the relationship of reason to faith. Strauss
adhered to what he understood to be in accord with the Catholic position of St. Thomas
Aquinas95 and Voegelin argued for a position that focused on the noetic core of faith
experiences as well as the equivalence of the philosophic and revelatory relationships to
the divine ground.96 Neither man could discover a common ground on which they could
resolve their dilemma.
Their failure to decide whether faith and philosophy had the same or different
motivating experiences resulted in two very different projects. Strauss articulated a
position in which faith and philosophy are competitors for the soul o f man. Voegelin
contended these equivalent symbols-experiences of order were a testament to the
common tension experienced by all humans at all times. Strauss developed a political
philosophy to protect philosophy from potentially powerful antagonists, whereas

activists seeking their own political goals. This possibility raises grave doubts regarding
the justice Strauss attempts to bring to the political arena.
95 Leo Strauss “Letter 39” in Faith and Political Philosophy, pp. 88-91.
96 Eric Voegelin “Letter 38” in Faith and Political Philosophy, pp. 79-87.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53

Voegelin left his own meditative testament on the structure and the process of reality as
his most potent political weapon.
The commentators on their correspondence have left behind excellent clues on
how to interpret the meaning of their different positions for the political. James L. Wiser
makes a substantial contribution by clarifying the two men’s understanding of reason.
Wiser’s interpretation distinguishes between two different conceptions of reason. He
examines Strauss’s claim that philosophy must be based upon “experiences as can be had
by all men in broad daylight” and concludes his conception o f reason is dependent upon
that which is necessary, compelling and explicit. His examination of Voegelin’s
understanding of reason discovers a reason open to experiences within daylight, as well
as in the darkness of the soul. He finds Voegelin’s definition o f reason to be more
affirmatory than demonstrative. In comparing the two men’s understanding of reason,
He states:
....for Strauss reason seeks to uncover contradictions and, therefore,
assumes that truth is specifiable in principle if not in fact, for Voegelin
reason participates in the profoundly mysterious and, therefore, must
accept truth’s principled unspecifiability.
For Strauss reason is
characterized by clarity, precision, and logical rigor, whereas for
Voegelin, its qualities are more properly described in terms of its
fecundity, promise and openness.97
Wiser believes these two approaches to rational discourse created a gap so wide that
their different conceptions of reason were the fundamental problem leading to an
eventual end to their correspondence. Wiser’s interpretation indicates there is little
common ground on which to evaluate the thought of Strauss and Voegelin. Though this

97 James L. Wiser “Reason and Revelation as Search and Response: A Comparison of
Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss” in Faith and Political Philosophy, pp. 247-248.
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conclusion clarifies the differences of surface style of the two thinkers, it may lead us to
miss the myth-building qualities of Strauss’s appeal to classical rationalism.
Hans Gadamer approaches the correspondence from the perspective of
continental philosophy and instead o f finding irreconcilable differences ending the
correspondence of these two men, wonders at its great length. Gadamer’s essay on the
correspondence between the two men cast Voegelin as the traditionalist working within
the Christian tradition and Strauss as defending “extreme positions.” Gadamer spends
the larger part of the essay attending to the problems presented by Strauss. His
comments on Voegelin do not appear to be as in depth or poignant as when he engages
Strauss’s thought. The engagement of Gadamer with Strauss’s hermeneutic may attest
for this bias.98
Gadamer is quite admiring of the originality of Strauss’s thought but is dismissive
of its premises. Gadamer expresses concern that Strauss’s mode of reading texts, as
illustrated in Persecution and the Art of Writing, may expand the hermeneutics of
suspicion to the point of absolutizing the Nietzschean perspective of “will to power” and
thereby dissolve all communication as such. He cautions Strauss’s method should only
be applied, “... Only when the failure or disturbance of communication is
experienced....”99 Gadamer goes on to advocate a communicative approach to the
Platonic dialogue in opposition to Strauss’s approach to the arguments o f the dialogues

98 Hans Gadamer Truth and Method, pp. 532-541 and Leo Strauss “Correspondence
with Hans Gadamer concerning Wahrheit und M ethode” in The Independent Journal of
Philosophy 2 (1978) pp. 5-12.
99 Hans Gadamer “Philosophizing in Opposition: Strauss and Voegelin on
Communication and Science,” p. 256.
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as being a source of esoteric truths. He affirms in contradiction to Strauss’s apparent
approach to the dialogues,

there can be no doubt that we are not supposed to guess a

hidden intention of Plato from the dialogues and their role-playing, not even when the
Platonic Socrates demurs from a final answer to the question of what the good is.”100
Gadamer’s critique of Strauss challenges the very basis of Strauss’s project. He
contends:
Conversation with Greek thought is indispensable for many reasons.
Only in such conversations, in contrast to the encumbered concepts of
modem times, can one learn to return to the original experiences out of
which philosophy and the Socratic question developed in the Greek polis.
In doing so, however, it is important to employ and engage one’s own
thinking, especially in one’s choice of words and development of
concepts. To presuppose classical thought is simply the voice of truth
which one may not question and go behind seems to me to be a mistake.
Above all it seems to me to be wrong to want to restrict oneself to the
concepts and vocabulary of the authors and texts of antiquity. Actually,
this is an impossibility. Understanding demands that one enter into
conversation with the classical texts and their thoughts in a living
language. One must remain conscious that this is a conversation between
today and then, even more than between Jerusalem and Athens; one
comes thereby to recognize the dialectic of repetition as well as the
dialectic of understanding. To interpret is always a speaking that stands
between, and it has meaning only when it is helpful to the conversation.101
Gadamer’s focus on the inadequacy of Strauss’s hermeneutic accents the elements of
Strauss’s thought that leap beyond the cool rationality Wilson attributes to his work.
Gadamer helps us to realize how radical or extreme Strauss’s project truly is.
Regardless of Gadamer’s appraisal of Strauss, Thomas J. J. Altizer does not find
Strauss to be as original as Voegelin, at least in terms of his interpretation of revelation.
Altizer characterizes Strauss’s position as that of an orthodox Jew. He states:

100 Ibjfr, p. 256.
101 Ib ii, PP- 258-259.
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For Strauss was a Jew who was awaiting the Messiah, whereas Voegelin
was a Christian who not only knew the Messiah to be present but knew
him as that Christ who is history writ large. There is a violence in
Voegelin’s opposition to modernity that is absent in Strauss, and absent
not only because of Strauss’s realism but also perhaps because Strauss
never made the absolute commitment to history that is so manifest in
Voegelin, a commitment that can neither tolerate nor understand any kind
o f opacity to revelation.102
Altizer’s statement is indicative of how well Strauss’s defense of religion can mask his
allegiance to philosophy. Strauss does offer one of the more convincing defenses of
orthodox religion but this defense is most effective against a de-divinized reason and not
a reason that can legitimately question literalization or doctrine on the basis of its
experience of a non-thing ground. Altizer correctly senses Voegelin’s anger but his
anger is more at those who refuse to apperceive and accept the primary experiences of
human life including the symbols of those experiences than “opacity to revelation.”
Voegelin’s theory o f unseemly symbols makes “opacity to revelation” an important
phenomenon to be examined by the thoughtful observer o f human affairs as opposed to
an event to inspire anger.103
Stanley Rosen similarly situates Voegelin in the Christian tradition but makes it
emphatically clear that Strauss is a “pagan.” Both thinkers’ struggle with historicism is
the central concern of his commentary. Rosen approaches Voegelin as a thinker
entangled with the Christian problem of historical existence as the symbol of divine

102 Thomas J. J. Altizer “The Theological Conflict Between Strauss and Voegelin” in
Faith and Political Philosophy, p. 273.
103Eric Voegelin World of the Polis. Volume 2 of 5 Volumes, Order and History (Baton
Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986) pp. 174-176, offers insight
into Voegelin’s understanding o f the process that results in symbol-experiences
becoming unseemly.
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transcendence. He understands the Christian nature of Voegelin’s thought to tie him to a
metaphysical solution to the problem o f historicism. Of course if the merger of
philosophy and faith in Christianity is the source of the destruction of philosophy and
faith in the modern age, Voegelin’s closeness to this tradition makes his solution to the
modem crisis less satisfactory than Strauss’s attempt to resurrect Aristotelian-Platonic
science. Rosen is not overly optimistic about either the success of Strauss or Voegelin in
a postmodern world. He argues:
To conclude these remarks, it is plain that neither Strauss nor Voegelin is
likely to achieve a paramount position among postmodernist who, despite
their frequent invocation of Nietzsche, are denounced prophetically in 44
and 200-203 of Beyond Good and Evil. And yet I have the impression
that Strauss’s paganism is somewhat more appealing (whether as traced
back to Aristotle or to Machiavelli), hence more politically effective in
today’s environment than is Voegelin’s transcendental or metaphysical
approach to politics.104
Rosen’s appreciation for Strauss’s closeness to Nietzsche and his equivalent feelings
about Aristotelian or Machiavellian politics leaves us with a Strauss most comfortable in
the Eastern halls of the Straussian world. Rosen’s dismissal of Voegelin’s work as
metaphysical is apparently uninformed by Voegelin’s rejection of propositional
metaphysics in Anamnesis.105 A certain hostility toward the Christian experience of
order can be detected in an approach so willing to dismiss investigation of its ordering
principles as unpopular and therefore politically impotent. If the case against historicism

104 Stanley Rosen “Politics or Transcendence? Responding to Historicism” in Faith and
Political Philosophy, pp. 265-266.
105 Eric Voegelin Anamnesis Gerhart Niemeyer, ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1989) p. 193 offers insight into a Voegelinian criticism of Thomistic
metaphysics as a “perversion of noetic exegesis by hardening its terms into a
propositional science of principles, universals, and substances.
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must be made in a historically informed manner, Christianity is deserving o f more
attention as a potentially non-historicist form of order.106
Timothy Fuller brings light to Strauss’s attitude toward Christianity by examining
Strauss and Voegelin’s rejection of Hegelian progressivism. Strauss rejects the synthesis
o f Bible and philosophy on the pragmatic grounds that the Hegelian project creates a
weak morality from two demanding moralities. Strauss’s stance against any such
synthesis is questioned by Fuller. He asks:
To assert that philosophers cannot be men of faith or religiously
committed may require that some significant thinkers (Voegelin?) be
considered as either dissembling or self-deluding. At the very least one
must question how far this can be shown to be understanding them as
they understood themselves. Moreover, how far is this a strategic
doctrine, arguable but indemonstrable, a protective measure against
modem excesses?107
Once again, the philosophical seriousness of Strauss’s teaching is brought into question.
Voegelin’s rejection of the progressive movement of Hegelian history comes at
the expense o f removing Christianity from its privileged position as the sole nexus of
existential truth for man. Fuller states:
Voegelin is a Christian thinker in the sense that his work began with
Christian assumptions. Nevertheless, it has continually advanced by
means of an effort of self-liberation from claims of the exclusive or
necessarily superior character of the Christian experiences of theophany.
Christianity is a crucial episode in man’s implication in a much larger
cosmic order that necessarily must be apprehended by many in
undergoing other theophanic experiences.108
106 Strauss’s Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1965) contains
a similar subtle critique o f Christianity and its merger of theology and natural right, as
well as a critique of the “secularization of providence” in the historicism of Hegel and its
echoes in the thought o f Edmund Burke.
107 Timothy Fuller “Philosophy, Faith and the Question of Progress” in Faith and
Political Philosophy, p. 291.
108 Ibid, pp. 292-293.
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Fuller characterizes Voegelin as trying to balance Christianity and Platonism in order to
avoid the dangers of over emphasizing pneumatic or noetic experience. The balancing
act Fuller perceives in Voegelin’s philosophy of history parallels the balance of
consciousness between immanent and transcendent poles that Voegelin understands to
be the constant challenge of existence in truth.
Fuller’s analysis of Strauss and Voegelin’s rejection of Hegelian progressivism
ends in an approving affirmation of the efforts of both thinkers. He asserts:
Neither philosophy nor faith is a savior in an activist, programmatic sense;
they are the resources that keep alive the possibility of recollecting the
truth of reality when efforts to overcome reality, and the empirical
plausibility of progress, begin to fail. Strauss and Voegelin were each
inclined to replace the emphasis on different aspects of the reality they
equally longed to know. This prompted their conversation that each saw
was of necessity of the eternal things. We would do well to note that
concern for the eternal things generates the human conversation, and that
human conversation grounds humanity.109
Ellis Sandoz’s critique of Strauss’s medieval rationalism questions whether Strauss’s
understanding of humanity is adequate.
Sandoz’s treatment of Strauss’s thought traces the roots o f his “classical
rationalism” to the medieval Islamic philosophers of Spain. Sandoz invokes Voegelin’s
article on Siger de Brabant, a Latin Averroist, to raise to the level of contemplation the
elitism inherent in the medieval rationalism of the Islamic school. Sandoz states:
The notions of the grades of human nature and levels of communication
just noticed, Voegelin finds, show “the inclination to treat the nonphilosophical man as an inferior brand and even to compare him to
animals, an attitude which seems to crop up as soon as the Christian
insight into the equal spiritual dignity of all men is abandoned.” Along
with the elitist idea, which may be confined to the “intellectual sphere of
109 IM i, p. 295.
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the vita philosophi... [comes also] the liberal idea of the educated man as
a social type superior to the uneducated common man, the vilis homo...
The bourgeois implications are obvious, for the ideal of intellectual life is
coupled with the idea that the man o f substance is morally superior to the
poor man.”110
The dehumanizing dangers posed by the medieval rationalism embraced by Strauss are
countered by pointing toward the breadth of what Voegelin understood to be the
meanings of reason.
Sandoz offers us insight into Voegelin’s understanding of reason by referring to
the ten meanings of reason Voegelin offered during his 1967 Candler lecture, “The
Drama of Humanity.” A reexamination o f that list may prove profitable in understanding
Voegelin’s interpretation of the classic experience of reason.
Reason is:
1. The consciousness o f existing from a Ground, an awareness filled
with content and not empty. Reason is thereby the instrument for
handling world-immanent reality. Rebellion against reason since the
eighteenth century creates a void in this dimension that must then be
filled by substitutes.
2. The transcendence of human existence thereby establishing the poles
of consciousness: immanent-transcendent.
3. The creative Ground of existence which attracts man to itself.
4. The sensorium whereby man understands himself to exist from a
Ground.
5. The articulation of this understanding through universal ideas.
6. The perseverance through lifetime of concern about one’s relation to
the Ground, generative of existential virtue: phronesis (wisdom,
prudence), philia (friendship), and anathanitizein (to immortalize
human existence).
110 Ellis Sandoz “Medieval Rationalism or Mystic Philosophy? Reflections on the
Strauss-Voegelin Correspondence” in Faith and Political Philosophy, p. 318.
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7. The effort to order existence by the insight gained through
understanding the self to be existentially linked to the Ground and
attuned to it: the major intellectual operation o f so translating
consequences of this insight as to form daily habits in accordance with
it.
8. The persuasive effort to induce conscious participation of the self and
other men’s conscious participation, in transcendent reason (Plato’s
peitho). The problem of communicating and propagating the truth of
being.
9. The constituent of man through his participation in (the reason of) the
Ground; or the constituent force in man qua human through
participation in the divine Nous which is his specific essence.
10. The constituent of society as the homonoia or “like-mindedness” of
Everyman in a community formed through recognition of the reason
common to all men. In Aristotle, if love within the community is not
based upon regard for the divinity of reason in the other man, then the
political friendship (philiapolitike) on which a well-ordered
community depends cannot exist. The source of the Christian notion
of “human dignity” is the common divinity in all men. Nietzsche
perceived that if that is surrendered then there is no reason to love
anybody, one consequence of which is the loss of the sense and force
of obligation in society and, hence, of its cohesiveness.111
From this understanding of reason, Strauss’s teaching regarding the disintegrative
influence of rationality on society appears to be blind to the formative power of a reason
in tension to a Ground. Voegelin’s interpretation of the classic experience of reason
gives us a decidedly different picture of the relation of the classical philosopher to the
political than Strauss’s interpretation.
Thomas Pangle defends Strauss’s approach to classical rationalism and argues
Voegelin is at odds with Platonic-Aristotelian science. Pangle states:
Voegelin does not do justice to the experience of doubt: not the “feeling”
or “sentiment” of doubt, not guilty doubt (“doubting Thomas”), but the
111 Ibid, pp. 308-309.
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erotic doubt of the scientist or philosopher such as that young Socrates
who knew something about the criteria o f validity or clarity, and whose
soul was electrified by the recognition or admission of his overwhelming
certainty that he did not know the answer to certain specific moral and
human questions on which his whole life depended.112
Pangle follows this indictment and discusses the contradictory nature of fundamental
experiences such as justice, love and morality and how their contradictoriness arises from
how opinions are inseparable from these experiences. He states, “This experience, of
the contradictory character of reality as it manifests itself in our speech or opinion, i.e., in
our only intelligible beginning point for the comprehension of reality, at the morally and
humanly most serious moment of our existence, is what compels the beginning of
rigorously logical, dialectical analysis of this and all fundamental opinions or
experiences.”113 From the point of dialectical analysis, Pangle goes on to argue
persuasively for the Straussian teaching.
He clarifies how the philosopher is necessarily at odds with the political because
his quest for the eternal is at odds with the political’s concern for the particular. Political
philosophy is the attempt to reconcile these two contradictory concerns. Pangle is
attentive to the comic aspect of philosophy and how laughter liberates the philosopher so
that he may begin his serene contemplation o f the whole. Finally, Pangle speaks of the
relationship between the philosopher and his quest for knowledge and the gentleman and
his quest for a moral life. He states:
The moral virtues are a product of common sense, which is rooted in the
habits instilled by a decent upbringing. The practice of these moral
virtues does not require knowledge of their foundations. But moral
112 Thomas Pangle “Platonic Political Science in Strauss and Voegelin” in Faith and
Political Philosophy, pp. 334-335.
113 Ibid, p. 336.
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virtue, precisely because it is a matter of action and habit and practical
wisdom rather than speculative inquiry, is threatened by challenges or
questions that arise from such inquiry. Philosophy, which necessarily
traffics in this kind of inquiry, is therefore under an obligation to protect
the moral sphere from the possible, erroneously disturbing consequences
of theorizing: philosophy does this by providing a quasi-theoretical
defense of the moral virtues, such as will to some extent calm the waters
philosophy has a hand in troubling. At the same time, the political
philosopher, having listened with painstaking care to the most thoughtful
opinions of the “most serious” practical men, brings an order, clarity, and
awareness to the moral life that it would otherwise lack. The political
philosopher even opens the moral man to the higher philosophic virtuesbut in such a way as will do the least damage to the integrity of the moral
virtues as they are known to and experienced by men o f action.114
The war between opinion and knowledge is resolved through the diplomacy of political
philosophy.
Pangle’s criticism of Voegelin is that Voegelin’s historical philosophy, as it is
related to existentialism, risks not distinguishing between the theoretical life of the
philosopher and the practical world of the gentleman. Just as poetry, the historical
perspective involves a particular truth and not that which is always.115 Pangle seems to
be unmoved by Voegelin’s reading of history as an attempt to discern that which is
always present as a constituent of human consciousness and how it becomes articulate
through the particular symbol-experience it leaves behind.
Reading the correspondence of Strauss and Voegelin and the critiques of their
commentators indicates the two men’s thought are at odds but all too frequently we see
a glimpse that their thought is grounded in fundamental accord about the goal of
philosophy and the tentative position of the philosopher. Nonetheless, both men

114 Ibid, pp. 337-340.
115 Ik ii, pp. 340-341.
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articulate the existential position o f the philosopher in such radically different ways we
are brought to wonder whether the surface of their arguments belie a deeper
disagreement between the two men. David Walsh captures the spirit of this conflict. He
contends:
If truth is one, however dimly perceived it may be by contingent human
beings, then we must preserve the faith that reason and revelation are
united. To do this we must take seriously the task of exploring their
continuity to the fullest extent available to us. Strauss’s tension between
Athens and Jerusalem defines the impasse better than it has been
expressed in recent times.
Voegelin’s theory of equivalences of
compactness and differentiation provides the most convincing means of
overcoming it in the contemporary world.116
The faith that “truth is one” is the guiding force behind this inquiry into the thought of
Strauss and Voegelin. A focus on their interpretations of the classics and how these
interpretations collide will be the way to discover whether this faith is shared by these
two thinkers. The use of the term “faith” indicates that this study has chosen an
approach sympathetic to Voegelin’s articulation of the conditions essential for the loving
search of the ground called philosophy.
The Course of the Study: A Return to the Classics
The divergent positions which Strauss and Voegelin take with regards to faith in
revelation makes an approach to the issue of their fundamental disagreement through the
path of revelation impossible. Strauss defends orthodox Judaism and the life of faithful
obedience to the divine law, whereas Voegelin is sympathetic to the claims of the
Christian mystics and the life of existential unrest animating the search for God. Their

116 David Walsh “The Reason-Revelation Tension in Strauss and Voegelin” in Faith and
Political Philosophy, p. 368.
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discussions of faith occur on different ground. In contrast, their discussion of the
classics shares the common ground o f the Platonic dialogues. From this common
ground, we can begin to find whether the differences separating the two men are
fundamental or cosmetic. The method for this study will be to pursue an aggressive
comparison of their teachings regarding classical philosophy from a perspective
sympathetic to Voegelin’s understanding of myth and its relation to the divine as
fundamental to the Platonic dialogues. This bias is grounded in several important
prejudices.
First, myth is an omnipresent factor in human social orders and Voegelin’s
attention to the relation of myth to the structure of human consciousness appears to be a
more fruitful approach to explaining myth’s omnipresence as opposed to Strauss’s
articulation of a philosophy o f nature that seems to have some persons dialectically
transcend the truth of mythic constructs while the non-dialectical majority of human
beings are tied to the non-eternal world of opinion. To invoke classical authority for this
position one need only turn to Aristotle’s Metaphysics (982b 18-20) where he affirms,
“the lover of myths is in a sense a lover of wisdom.” One does not need classical
authority to hold this position. The mystery of human life is present in myth, as well as
in dialectic.
Second, the vast majority of the world’s faiths understand human beings to be
bound together in a common drama with an end hidden in mystery. This common drama
does not end the tension of political existence but understanding of this common destiny
may act as a check on political programs that are oblivious to this common mystery.
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Strauss’s worldview is accepting of the claims of orthodoxies as potentially true. His
political philosophy, as it attempts to protect the quest for the eternal, may abandon truth
as it fails to confront fraudulent “certainties.” Despite Strauss’s criticism of Spinoza,
Spinoza’s literalistic critique of the Bible was a response to a literalistic offense by those
claiming Biblical authority.117 A rejection of modem biblical criticism, risks returning to
the dark ages in hopes of true enlightenment.
The third and final prejudice I will mention is a preference for openness of
communication. Existence in truth is a laudatory goal and this goal can best be achieved
in open communication. Though society often persecutes those who take positionsopposing present social trends, surrendering the public arena to opinions which are
decidedly false is a sure way to sanction existence in madness. In extreme circumstances
it may become necessary to communicate through esoteric means but to make this the
norm of communication invites the breakdown of communication that empowers
ideological and dogmatic movements. Existence in truth requires an intelligence that is
both critical and affirming in its orientation.
With these prejudices in mind, we can outline the path our study will take.
Chapter 2, “The Road Back to Athens: Heresies, Modem Rationalism, Historicism and
Ideologies” examines some selected texts that are central to understanding the
relationship of Strauss and Voegelin to classical thought. O f particular interest is what I
understand to be the implicit influence of Heideggerian existentialism on Strauss’s

117 Lewis Feuer’s Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958)
offers an interpretation of Spinoza supportive of this understanding.
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formulation of his return to a natural worldview. Hegel’s presence as an influence on
Voegelin’s orientation toward a philosophy of consciousness will also be touched upon.
Having established a tentative ground for their return to classical thought, we will
examine the contexts of classical philosophy in Chapter 3, “The Historic and Poetic
Context of Classical Philosophy.” An examination of the two authors’ treatment of
Thucydides and his relation to the natural world and the divine leaves us with two
competing visions o f the historian. Strauss understands Thucydides to offer keen insight
into the political, whereas Voegelin sees the historian as failing to perceive how
rationalism is not solely concerned with politics but also the moral and spiritual order.
This division of emphasis is continued in their treatment of poetry. Strauss looks to
comic poetry as an inspiration to the Socrates of classical political philosophy, whereas
Voegelin places emphasis on the tragic roots of philosophy. The liberating tone of
Strauss’s presentation of Aristophanean comedy and its relation to Socratic philosophy
will be contrasted to the moral seriousness of the Aeschylean depth o f Voegelin’s
Socrates.
Chapter 4, “Socrates: Savior or Political Philosopher,” will examine the two
men’s divergent readings of Socrates. Strauss’s comic, doubtful Socrates will be
examined as he attempts to negotiate his way through the political world while
preserving his commitment to know. Voegelin’s Socrates as suffering servant and his
struggle against the sophists to save Athens from spiritual and moral disintegration will
balance the political philosopher of Strauss.
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Chapter 5, “Politics: the Embodiment or Disembodiment of Justice,” will present
a critique of Strauss’s tendency to read the Republic and the Laws as works binding the
political and philosophy in an uncomfortable but necessary alliance. The dangers present
in the hopeful skepticism Strauss understands to be the core of philosophy will be
illuminated by emphasizing the tenuous hold such thought has on the political realm.
The weakness of an esoteric philosophy in face of the strong demands of the political will
bring in to doubt whether Strauss’s formulation of political philosophy can withstand the
challenge of the political. Strauss’s interpretation of Platonic political philosophy will be
contrasted with Voegelin’s presentation of an overtly political philosopher and how the
claims of a mysterious beyond are articulated in a spiritual and political struggle
wrestling openly with political reality.
The final chapter, “Conclusion: Truth and Politics,” will reflect on the meaning
for politics of the two thinkers different approaches to Platonic philosophy. We will also
address the seriousness of the issues separating the two men.
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CHAPTER 2

THE ROAD BACK TO ATHENS: HERESIES,
MODERN RATIONALISM, HISTORICISM AND IDEOLOGIES
The criticisms Strauss and Voegelin have of modernity share a common basis in what
many would consider the religious perspective. Strauss's Philosophie und Gesetz (193 5)
characterizes modernity as a bold form of the Greek philosophical position and Jewish heresy
of Epicureanism.1 The formerly modest attempt of individuals to free themselves from the
fear of God becomes the bold proselytizing effort to have all persons face bravely the horrible
fact of God's non-existence. Strauss contends this position is certainly not characteristic of
the medieval rationalism of Maimonides nor the classical rationalism of Plato and further
modem rationalism cannot even refute the religious orthodoxy it stands so adamantly against.
Strauss's study of Spinoza, a pioneer of the modem world, points to the fact that his own case
against orthodoxy was generally won through laughter rather than a serious confrontation
with orthodoxy on its own grounds. With the rediscovery of orthodoxy’s resilience, Strauss
launched a project dedicated to recovering the position of classical rationalism buried beneath
the ridicule of the modem project.
Voegelin's own case against modernity began not on the basis of the radical
skepticism animating Strauss's assault on modem rationalism and his reinvigoration of

1 An English translation of this work is available under the title Philosophy and Law.
Fred Bauman, trans. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987).
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orthodoxy but from a perspective of faith in the spiritual grounds of order in all human
society’s past, present and future. His fifth book, Die Politischen Relizionen (1939), argues
against the secularization of the spirit and the political catastrophes following such a retreat
from the spiritual sources of order.2 Perhaps his most famous contribution to political
science, The New Science of Politics, labels this phenomenon with the term Gnosticism.
Much as Strauss expands the conception of the Jewish heresy of God-fleeing Epicureanism to
accommodate the boldness of modem atheism, Voegelin expands the Christian conception of
Gnosticism as a world-fleeing movement to a reality-fleeing movement dedicated to the
immanent transformation of the world into a realm of perfection.3 The therapy for this
spiritual disease is to be found in concrete resistance to the eclipses of reality perpetrated by
spiritually weak ideological thinkers. For Voegelin, this resistance takes the form of a
philosophy of consciousness and a philosophy of history based to a considerable extent in
classical philosophy. An extended analysis of Strauss's and Voegelin's conception of modem
rationalism will facilitate our understanding of Strauss's embrace of an ahistorical classic
philosophy and Voegelin's embrace of classic philosophy in need of a philosophy of history.
Modem Rationalism
The figure of Max Weber plays a profoundly important role in what both Strauss and
Voegelin understood to be the contours of modem rationalism and modem science. For both
men, Weber represents a serious and committed confrontation with the problem of modem
rationalism. Ultimately, they find Weber's theoretical position, particularly in his handling of

2An English translation of this work is available under the title of Political Religions.
Thomas J. DiNapoli and E.S. Easterly III, trans. (Lewiston. New York: Edwin Melion
Press, 1986).
3 The introduction of Philosophy and Law deals particularly well with this subject.
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the fact/value dichotomy, to be wanting. The rejection of Weber or perhaps following the
contradictions in Weber's fact/value dichotomy plunges both men into theoretical projects of
immense complexity engaging them with the problem of political order.
Strauss's approach to Max Weber unravels the contradictions and mixed feelings of
Weber's thought in order to lay bare the problems of modem rationalism as understood by
one of the great exemplars of the highest achievement of that rationalism, modem science.
Strauss understands Weber to take two highly problematic theoretical positions associated
with the project of modem rationalism. First, Weber rejects natural right, the possibility of
objective and universal norms, on the basis that all human thought is historical and differs
substantially on what it considers to be the good. This situation makes it impossible for
Weber to make scientifically informed decisions on the quality of a position. Second, he
consequently directs his energies toward trying to discern the facts of a situation.4 Strauss
proceeds to attend to Weber's work in order to uncover the theoretical problems that emerge
from his theoretical distinction between facts and values.
Strauss begins his serious investigation o f Weber by examining his commitment to the
scientific project and the "timeless values" represented by that project. He notes Weber does
not elaborate on the problem of these "timeless values" and in light of the following
discussion regarding facts and values so important to Weber, the reader cannot help but to
pay special attention to Strauss's commentary regarding the historical nature of the valuation
of science and the scientific method underlying modem rationalism.5 A careful thinker may
note how modem science potentially subordinates itself to the theoretical position of

4 Leo Strauss Natural Right and History, p. 36.
' Ibid., p. 38.
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historicism by the absence of a coherent hierarchical theory of value. The lack of such a
theory does not indicate the impossibility o f building such a theory within the construct of
modem rationalism. Strauss's position regarding this outcome is not completely without
mystery. Kenneth Hart Green’s presentation of Strauss's position in the light o f Gotthold
Lessing questions whether Strauss's approach to rationalism is as open-ended as his critique
of modem rationalism would indicate. Green suggests that Strauss, much as Lessing, takes a
critical perspective toward both rationalism and orthodoxy. Green postulates that Strauss
solves the problem of modem rationalism through the position of cognitive theism.6 An
intellectual contemplation o f God as the core of Strauss’s return to classical rationalism
would make the erotic force behind the need to philosophize understandable within a
traditional frame work. Such a relationship to God is never articulated by Strauss and his
insistence on the autonomous nature of philosophy brings into doubt whether he understood
the classical position to be tied to the God of Aristotle or Plato. The search for necessary
truth is tied to the person who embodies this hope that the universe is intelligible in his own
passionate questioning. Strauss's failure to articulate adequately a theory of cognitive theism
would indicate that his main concern was not with a rationally knowable deity but the political
environment essential to continue an open-ended investigation of the question o f the whole.
In light of Strauss's return to the ancients and embrace of prudence as the essential difference
between ancient and modem rationalism Hart's claim seems to be stronger than the evidence
merits. It would appear that classical rationalism is susceptible to the same extremes as
modem rationalism with the exception that classical rationalism regulates these extremes to

6 Kenneth Hart Green Jew and Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in the Jewish
Thought of Leo Strauss, p. 27.
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the life o f contemplation. An examination o f Weber's fact-value dichotomy will illustrate the
dangers o f imprudent rationalism.
The distinction Weber lays out between facts and values and the insufficiency of
science to make value judgments is based upon the old distinction between the "Is" and the
"Ought.” Strauss finds these theoretical grounds to be untenable as sufficient grounds for a
value-free science on the basis that if we had true knowledge regarding the "Ought" we
would be able to make value judgments regarding the "Is." Strauss concludes this distinction
is not at the heart of Weber’s value-free science. The true ground of Weber's value freescience is the impossibility of knowing the "Ought." Strauss concludes that Weber’s thesis
ultimately leads to nihilism.7
Having indicated the theoretical shallowness o f Weber’s distinction between facts and
values, Strauss proceeds to deconstruct Weber’s own professed commitments to morality.
Strauss views Weber’s morality as a legacy of his ancestors that is threatened by his science.
Weber's value demonism and his passion for commitment appear to be incapable of
distinguishing between excellence and baseness.8 On these grounds, Strauss finds Weber’s
analysis o f the possible futures of Western civilization in terms of "spiritual revival" or
"mechanized petrifaction" to be morally equivalent in the science of Max Weber.9 From this
point, Strauss goes on to examine Weber's scholarship, with particular attention to Weber’s
study o f capitalism and Calvinism, and discovers its dependence on value choices. Strauss
finds his failure to pursue the question of the truth claims o f capitalism and Calvinism to be a

7 Leo Strauss Natural Right and History, p. 41.
s fld i, pp. 45-48.
9 Ibid,, pp. 49-50.
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serious deficiency.10 From here Strauss goes on to examine Weber's conception that values
are irreconcilable. Having examined the cases presented by Weber to support this contention,
Strauss responds by slyly introducing the question of justice and the distinction between thisworldly values and other woridly-values. He understands Weber’s position regarding the
irresolvable conflict between the "ethics of intention" and "ethics of responsibility" to be based
not on the unresolvable nature of this conflict but instead upon human reason's inability to
solve this conflict between the attempt to be value-free and committed.11 Finally, Strauss
finds Weber himself despairing of the sacrifice of the intellect entailed in his attempt to
preserve the integrity of intellect through rigorous science. Weber is forced to face that his
own decision for science is as baseless as the believer's decision for revelation and yet he sees
the absurd nature of any belief.12
Having left Weber the orphaned child he described him to be after first hearing Martin
Heidegger lecture, Strauss proceeds to bring Weber home to his understanding of how
science brings order to "an infinite and meaningless sequence" through the act of the knowing
subject. Strauss does not believe many would sympathize with Weber's epistemologjcal
theory and hints at a phenomenological study of the commonsense world as a potentially
more fruitful approach to social science. The confirmation of the problems of modem
rationalism and modem science Strauss uncovered in Weber leads him to attempt a return to
a pre-scientific or natural world view. Stewart Humphrey describes this attempt very well in
his article "Natural Right and Philosophy." He characterizes Strauss as a zetetic skeptic

10 Ibid.. pp. 59-66.
“ Ibid.. pp. 69-76.
12 Ibid.. p. 76.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

occupying a middle ground between Stoicism and Academic Skepticism. The retreat from
the disinterested skepticism implied in modem rationalism is an a attempt to live life within
the bounds of a world habitable for man.13 Strauss's analysis of Weber’s rationalism is the
criticism of a kindred spirit trying to maintain the integrity of his own reason but the integrity
of this reason is particularly threatened by the conditions o f the modem world laid bare by
Weber’s own significant achievement of thought. Strauss would pioneer the way back to the
natural world to confront the problem o f historicism Weber attempted unsuccessfully to
escape through his commitment to science.
Strauss's conflict with Weber's theoretical radicalism led him to the necessity of
returning to the phenomenalistic grounds or what he conceived to be the pre-rational grounds
of understanding the order of a society. Voegelin's study of Weber would turn him toward a
metaphysical and ontological understanding o f the grounds of societal order though his
studies would eventually claim to get beyond these categories.14 Strauss's refutation of
Weber by the rationalistic deconstruction of Weber’s arguments leads us to a relativistic abyss
and from that point to the experiences of both the common man and our ancestors.
Voegelin's refutation of Weber will proceed always in the light of the divine ground
represented within what he understands to be the classical and medieval philosophy.
In The New Science of Politics. Voegelin uses the philosophical experiences of Max
Weber to sound the death knell for methodological chauvinism and its claims to being the
criterion of theory and science. Voegelin remarks that the initial fascination with the

13 Ibid.. pp. 76-80. Stewart H. Umphrey "Natural Right and Philosophy" in Leo Strauss:
Political Philosopher and Jewish Thinker, pp. 275-295
14Eric Voegelin “The Tensions in the Reality of Knowledge” in Anamnesis, p. 193.
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methodology of the natural sciences would have been a harmless idiosyncrasy if it had not
combined itself with a fanatical belief that these methods were the sole measure o f theoretical
relevance. The destructiveness of this movement becomes clear when we realize this
approach requires us to neglect entire areas of reality because they are not specifically
susceptible to the "scientific method." Voegelin contends the cost of the methodologist's
project is the loss of the truthful human effort to understand humanity's place in the structure
of reality, the loss o f what Voegelin understands to be the heart of science.15 At this point it
may be useful to present what Voegelin considers to be the criteria for the validity of a
method.
The validity of a method is determined by the success of a method to illuminate the
pre-scientific experience under investigation. For example, quantitative methods may not tell
us much about a Platonic dialogue but may be excellent tools in approaching the problem of
motion in the physical universe. The confidence Voegelin has in these pre-scientific
experiences of order enables him to criticize Weber's thought from the position o f a reality
having a given-structure that sets the criteria of good science. The failure of science
adequately to account for human experiences is the short-coming of the science and not the
short-coming of the human beings and institutions under investigation.16 From the
perspective of his structural realism, Voegelin bears witness to the suicide of methodological
thought as experienced in the scholarly life of Max Weber.
Voegelin analyzes Weber's project as an attempt to gain clarity about social reality.
His focus on typical causal relationships and his allegiance to the ratio of modem science

IS Eric Voegelin The New Science of Politics, pp. 3-5.
" Ibid.. pp. 5-6.
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prevented him from penetrating to the principles of social order and left him with the study of
causality of action. Weber’s insight into the limits of the scientific method in examining
principles enabled him to construct the conditions of theoretical relevance of science in the
concepts of "responsibility" and "demonism.”
Weber's characterization of value choices as beyond reason and rooted in willful or
demonic determination allowed him to neglect the political allegiances of his students as he
attempted to present the political facts to them. Voegelin understands this method to be a
tool of significant pedagogical use in uncovering the consequences of a given course of
action. Illuminating the dreadful consequences of a given course of action could be effective
in awakening a sense of responsibility in a student and thereby persuading the student to
choose a less damaging course of action.
Nevertheless, Weber's description of an ethics of intentionality revealed the problem
with his value-free pedagogy. It would be possible for a student to retreat into a position that
asserted the value of intentions against responsibility subsequently ignoring the consequences
of his or her actions. Voegelin finds this intentionalistic aspect of Weber's theory of ethics to
be the source o f the demonistic nature of values. Nevertheless. Weber's studies pointed back
to the possibility of value judgments and the inherent absurdity o f a value-free science.17
Voegelin uses Weber's study of the relationship between Calvinism and capitalism as
an example of how "value-free" science could force a scientist to make a value judgment
regarding a project that neglected pertinent information. The passionless study of the
Protestant ethic and its relation to economic development could contain the factual evidence

Ibid.. pp. 14-18.
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needed to reject the beliefthat all history is a product of class conflict. A person's demonic
commitment to a position contradicted by the investigation of the facts governing a situation
depends upon his or her ability to willfully obscure the pertinent information. Weber appears
to ignore the essential levels of ignorance necessary for a demonic commitment to a value
position and the conflict this willful ignorance causes between science and values o f the
demonic variety.18
Voegelin blamed Weber's failure to recognize the moral implications of scientific
investigations on his failure to consider the possibility of a science of order. Voegelin's survey
of Weber’s studies of religion uncovers what he believes to be two significant omissions.
Weber's failure to deal with classical Greek thought and pre-Reformation Christianity
prevents him from encountering a rational science of human order. The classic and Christian
sciences did not claim to speak of mere "values" or "beliefs" but based their investigations of
the right order of society upon reason. An attempt to reduce these systems to values would
have to meet their claims to be science and this meeting could only sensibly occur on a
metaphysical plane outside of the positivist's methodological horizon.19
Despite "the positivistic hangover" preventing Weber from becoming concerned with
the science of order toward which his work pointed, he played the role of Moses for
Voegelin. Weber did not return to a science of essence but his sensible preference for
phenomena of significance moved political science away from the irrelevancies of
methodology to a point of theoretical order. Value-free science and a science that referred to
values soon decimated the field of scientific inquiry. Weber viewed the triumph of rationality,

18 Ibid.. pp. 16-19.
9 Ibid.. pp. 17-22.
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at least in its modem variety, as an event to be accepted with regret. For Voegelin, Weber's
lack of attunement to the divine revealed his sufferings to be akin to the sufferings of
Nietzsche. Yet, Weber’s anguish in the desert of modem rationalism and his failure to revolt
as Nietzsche did led Voegelin to comment, "He saw the promised land but was not permitted
to enter it." For Voegelin, the many theoretical inconsistencies within Weber’s positivistic
thought were signs o f a spiritual struggle o f a sensitive and perceptive man seeking a science
of order.20
The project o f modem rationalism is sandwiched by Strauss and Voegelin's respective
critiques of Max Weber’s clarification of value-free science. Strauss frees us from a value-free
science by critiquing the reason which freed us from values. The principle of questioning
Strauss uses to free us is backed up with a natural pre-scientific world which justifies the
questioning of moral relativism. Voegelin captures the moral and spiritual drama of Weber's
life and makes us aware of what makes modem rationalism irrational. The eclipse of the
divine in the thought o f many of the most influential thinkers o f the last three centuries has
broken the link that enables reason to be the ordering part o f a human being's spiritual and
social existence. The following two sections will examine the nature of the deformations
which lie behind modem rationalism. Strauss focuses on historicism as the root of the
relativism enfeebling modem rationalism, whereas Voegelin focuses on the juggling of ideas
divorced from their engendering experiences as the source o f this enfeeblement. The
exploration of the perversion of the theoretical life is central to both of these critiques.

Ibid.. pp. 22-26
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Ffistoricism
For Strauss, the collapse of modem rationalism at the feet of irrational historicism is
one of the great revolutions o f thought. Ironically, if we accept Strauss's interpretation of this
revolution, it began not in Jena but in London. Strauss argues that the great English
conservative, Edmund Burke, defends the virtues of classic philosophy through means less
aligned with the classic perspective than with the ideals of the French Revolution he resists.
Strauss finds Burke's disparagement of theory and his understanding o f the best regime as
manifest in the English constitution to be aligned with the "secularization of providence" best
articulated by Hegel.21
Burke's attempt to find the latent wisdom in the actual eventually results in a political
theory that defends its validity upon prescription rather than a higher power. Strauss sees a
precursor of the Hegelian dictum "the actual and the present is the rational" in Burke's
justification of his prudent rhetoric. Burke's rejection of any standard other than the ancestral
leads his capacity to reflect on the political things to be significantly impaired. Burke led
himself to a position where he is forced to accept a free-flowering of society as the ideal,
regardless of how that society may flower, as opposed to a rational or regular plan in the
tradition of the classics. An understandable rejection of the actual and present as rational led
to the two distinct paths of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Strauss's dissatisfaction with
"doctrinairism" or "existentialism" of these respective attempts to regain the possibility of
meaningful practice led him to seek the grounds necessary for prudential action within the
realm of genuine theory.22 Before we investigate what Strauss understood to be genuine

Leo Strauss Natural Right and History, p p . 14-16,316-318.
- Ibid, pp. 319-321.
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theory, it is necessary to examine the thought of one whom Strauss believed to be the great
thinker of the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's thought offers one of the
most powerful presentations of radical historicism and its chilling political meaning.
Strauss's life work in philosophy can best be understood as wrestling with the
problems articulated in the thought of Martin Heidegger. The depth and profundity of
Heidegger’s readings of classic texts captured Strauss's attention as a youthful scholar.23
Heidegger's allegiance to National Socialism and the alliance of his thought with that
movement awakened Strauss to the problem of "the night of the world." Strauss, who lost
most of his family to the holocaust, resists the temptation to turn away from Heidegger’s
thought in moral disgust and in a truly philosophic spirit takes it seriously while maintaining a
sense of civic responsibility.
Heidegger becomes the most thoughtful advocate of the position characterized by
Strauss as radical historicism. Strauss's analysis of historicism brings us from the denigration
of theory as an autonomous activity by Burke to Hegel's claim that his epoch is an absolute
moment that reveals the historically dependent nature of thought and to Heidegger's
surrender to the fateful nature of the historical dispensation. Strauss treats this movement in
Natural Right and History but his most elaborate published sketch of Heidegger is to be
found in his essay, "An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism," published in The
Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism.24

23 Leo Strauss “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism” in The Rebirth of
Classical Political Rationalism, pp. 27-32.
24 iMff, pp. 27-46.
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Strauss traces Heidegger’s encounter with the serious flaws of existentialist thought.
These flaws largely can be traced to the committed nature of thought that claimed to be
uncommitted. The presence o f Christian concepts in existentialist thought, the presupposition
of eternity as the background of a finite cosmology and the possibility of the arbitrariness of
the ideal of existentialism led Heidegger to reconsider the historical nature of the historical
insight making existentialism possible. Heidegger began to understand existentialism as
belonging to the moment of the West's decline. His reading of Nietzsche led to his hope that
this decline could be reversed by a revitalization of Europe through the transcendent
responsibility of planetary rule. In such a hopeful mood, Heidegger welcomed the National
Socialist Revolution of 1933.25
The delusionary nature of Heidegger’s decision for National Socialism revealed itself
in the course of events that left the world facing the demoralizing victory of either of two
metaphysically equivalent powers, the United States or Soviet Russia. Mastery o f the whole
through technology promised by this victory threatens to leave a world devoid o f meaning
and bound by the lowest common denominator, that is to what Heidegger considers to be a
complete emptiness of life. Heidegger's solution to this problem brings us to the core of his
thought.
The failure of the Russian or American world society to satisfy the highest aspirations
of man opens the door for a revival of culture. This culture, if past experience tells us
anything about culture, must be grounded in religion: the world society can only be

25 Ibid., pp. 38-41.
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humanized by a wodd religion. We can not fabricate such a religion but can only become
receptive to it by thinking deeply about our situation.
Heidegger’s deep thought reveals Greek philosophy to be the foundation of the
technology that tears authenticity from human beings. Strauss states:
Greek philosophy was the attempt to understand the whole. It presupposed
therefore that the whole is intelligible, or that the grounds of the whole are
essentially intelligible and at the disposal of man as man-that they are always,
and therefore in principle accessible to man. This view is the condition of the
possibility of human mastery o f the whole. But that mastery leads, if its
ultimate consequences are drawn, to the ultimate degradation of man...
Rationalism is based on a specific understanding of what being means, viz.,
that to be means primarily to be present, to be ready at hand, therefore that to
be in the highest sense means to be always present, to be always. This basis
of rationalism proves to be a dogmatic assumption. Rationalism itself rests on
nonrational, unevident assumptions; in spite of its seemingly overwhelming
power, rationalism is hollow; rationalism itself rests on something that it
cannot master. A more adequate understanding of being is intimated by the
assertion that to be means to be elusive or to be a mystery. This is the
Eastern understanding of Being. Hence there is no will to master in the East.
We can hope beyond technological world society, we can hope for a genuine
world society, only if we become capable of learning from the East, especially
China.26
The Greek passion to master the whole through rationality and the understanding of the truth
of existence to be always present is irrational. For Heidegger, Being is fundamentally
mysterious, and we can escape the metaphysical world of the Greeks, our own night of the
wodd, only if we are willing to recover the mysterious understanding of Being.
Heidegger understands the Eastern understanding of Being to correlate to an elusive
or mysterious understanding of Being. The development of a world culture must occur at
this level of mystery. The Bible becomes the source o f the elusive and mysterious

26 Ibid., p.43. Heidegger’s conception o f mystery appears to be in opposition to
Voegelin’s understanding of mystery insofar as it is based on what Voegelin terms the
Parousia of Being. We will examine this criticism more fully later in this chapter.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84

understanding o f Being needed to overcome Greek rationalism. Being or the becoming of
beings is the source of religion or any possible gods.27
Strauss offers us an examination of the Heideggerian conception of Being (Seiri) and
being (das Seinde) to present the problem of Heidegger's resolution of the crisis of the West.
The individual beings (das Seinde) do not determine Being. Strauss infers Being cannot be
explained by beings much as causality cannot be explained causally. The relationship between
Being and being is compared by Strauss to the Platonic conception that being is dependent on
Being through participation but he notes that for Plato Being is also a being. Heidegger's
conception of Being is based upon an experience that is dependent upon Being revealing
itself. This revelation consists in revealing that man is a project thrown into conditions that
demand a decision. The failure to make a decision is to live a shallow or drifting life. Greek
philosophy was oblivious to this conception of Being because of the lack of this experience.
The search for knowledge of the eternal or the whole is based upon an oblivion of Being.
The experience of "throwness" places decision or project in a superior position to
knowledge.28
Strauss points out the logical problem of this discovery when he alludes to the fact
that Being coeval with being cannot be the complete ground of man. Heidegger's comments
on our inability to speak on anything prior to man remind Strauss of the medieval arguments
regarding temporal finiteness being compatible with God's eternity and unchangeability on the
basis that time is dependent on motion and thus there could be no time without motion.
Strauss opens the theological and philosophical problems further by asking the question from

-7IWfr. PP- 42-44.
:s Ibid., pp. 44-45.
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whence came Being. Heidegger's answer is "out of nothing every being has being." This
sounds surprisingly like Creatio ex Nihilo but according to Strauss, Heidegger has no place
for the Creator God. Why Strauss argues Heidegger has no place for the Creator God goes
unanswered but we may gather that a lack of commitment to the Law of that Creator God
may stand at the center of this affirmation. Strauss alludes to what seems to be common
knowledge in the present world o f Heideggerian scholarship. Heidegger creates a mode of
thought that applies Christian concepts to Greek philosophy and Strauss did not believe this
synthesis to be possible.29
Strauss's critique of Heidegger leads him to follow the Heideggerian critique of the
West to the sources of the Western tradition. Strauss returns to Orthodoxy30 in the guise of
Jerusalem but mystery is not sufficient for Strauss. Clarity about the fundamental problems
facing man as man leads him to question whether Heidegger's analysis o f Greek philosophy is

29 Ibid.. pp. 45-46. John Caputo attests to what Strauss originally put forth as a tentative
conclusion as a mainstay of critical scholarship regarding Heidegger in his "Heidegger
and Theology" in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Charles Guignon, ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 270-288. Hans Jonas' The Gnostic
Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity, second
edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963) offers a well-developed earlier version o f this
thesis in an Appendix pertaining to Heidegger’s relation to gnosticism.
J0What Strauss meant by orthodoxy is debatable. It is the heart of the debate among
Straussians. West Coast Straussians generally assert Strauss’s teaching about orthodoxy
applied to the unique contribution o f Revelation to the world of a divinely given law.
Jewish Orthodoxy would occupy a privileged position in Strauss’s thought if this were
the case. East Coast Straussians understand orthodoxy to be tied to the problem of
poetry and politics o f the ancient world as well as revelation of the Medieval world. For
purposes o f this study, I believe the position o f the East Coast Straussians is the most
accurate assessment of the meaning of Strauss’s return to orthodoxy. The confusion
regarding this problem is most likely rooted in thefact that Strauss understood his
political community to be the community of his faith. Strauss’s request that Psalm 114
be read at his funeral may hold the key to this debate. See the introduction o f Susan
Orr’s Jerusalem and Athens for an outline of this debate.
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sufficiently truthful about the self-understanding o f Greek rationalism. Strauss discovers a
rationality that knows its own limits and by this act finds a basis on which to oppose the
world society devoid of authenticity that led Heidegger to reject classical rationalism.31 By
taking Heidegger seriously, Strauss found two pillars on which the West could overcome its
decline. Orthodoxy stands out as holding to the noble foundation of faith in the mysterious
God or gods, whereas classical rationalism reveals the limits of thought while illuminating the
fundamental problems facing man. Strauss attempts to battle the threat of dehumanization of
humankind posed by a world unconcerned with the higher things. In the following chapters
dealing with classical Greek thought, we will attempt to see how Strauss incorporates the
insight of Heidegger regarding classical rationalism and examine the political consequences of
a split between the life of theory and action and the effect of the bridge of political philosophy
linking these separate ways of life. We will also encounter the question does Strauss's
historical return to nature as understood by the classics offer a more secure political vision
than Voegelin’s politics of spiritual resistance. But first we must examine Voegelin's forceful
approach to the crisis of the West through his criticism of the ideologies and their origins in
spiritual weakness.
Ideologies
Strauss's serious interpretation of Heidegger opens the door to a reconsideration of
the classics. Voegelin's approach to Heidegger begins directly from a classic and Christian

31 Steve Umphrey's previously cited article "Natural Right and Philosophy" and its
conception of zetetic skepticism give an excellent outline of what elements compose
Strauss’s understanding of classical rationalism. The difficulty in outlining the
implications of zetetic skepticism rests upon the fact it is a way of life and response as
opposed to a set of propositions
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perspective. His most detailed examination confirms the analysis of Hans Jonas regarding
Heidegger's gnosticism.32 Voegelin focuses on Heidegger's replacement of the Parousia of
Christ with the Parousia of Being. The waiting for the transformation of reality by the
coming of Being as immanent is described by Voegelin as the parousiastic phase o f Western
gnosticism to distinguish it from the chiliastic phase of Western gnosticism characteristic of
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.33 The movement to escape primary reality through
making the perfection of the transcendent pole of reality immanent is what Voegelin contends
is the motivating force behind the mass movements and ideologies that have plagued the
twentieth century. For Voegelin, Heidegger's replacement of the ludicrous images of
positivist and socialist supermen by a Being emptied of content is the achievement of his
thought even as it is the failure of his soul to be formed by the transcendent pole o f reality
described by the Greeks in terms ofphilia, eros, pistis, and elpisf4 Nevertheless, Heidegger
is but a footnote in the massive deculturation of the West.
Voegelin vigorously traces the philosophies of many of the modem luminaries of
Western civilization to their gnostic roots. From a Franciscan monastery in the late Middle
Ages to modem liberalism, Voegelin finds the disquieting presence of a process in which
ideas are manipulated to distort experiential reality. Voegelin describes this process by
examining the original experience in the thought of Joachim of Flora and further articulates it

32See Hans Jonas’s previously cited The Gnostic Religion: The Message o f the Alien
God and the Beginnings of Christianity
33 Eric Voegelin Science. Politics and Gnosticism (Washington D.C.: Regenery
Gateway 1968) pp. 46-49. Also see ‘T he German University and German Society” in
the previously cited Published Essays: 1966-1985. pp. 8-10.
34Ibid.. p. 47.
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by examining the contemplative gnosis in Hegel and volitional gnosis in Comte, Marx and
Hitler.
Voegelin's focus on history makes the origin of a phenomenon of great interest to his
analysis. In this spirit, Voegelin finds the twelfth century figure of Joachim of Flora
prefiguring the form of modem Western gnosticism. Through four symbolisms garnered
from a meditative exegesis of Joachim, Voegelin links the thinker to the Enlightenment, the
reaction against the Enlightenment, positivism, Marxism and National Socialism. Joachim's
immanentization of the meaning of history led him to postulate the advent of the age of the
Spirit to complete the cycle begun with the age of the Father and the following age of the
Son. The first symbolism of Joachhic history is the three stages of history illustrated above.
Voegelin finds this construct of history present in Hegel's dialectic of the three stages of
freedom and self-reflective spiritual fulfillment, the Marxian dialectic of the three stages of
primitive communism, class society, and final communism, Comte's theory of a sequence of
theological, metaphysical and scientific phases and even in the less articulate symbolism of the
three empires of Hitler’s Third Reich.35
The Second Joachhic symbolism is the symbolism of the leader. Just as the first age
is led by Moses and the second age is led by Jesus, the third age will have its leader. Voegelin
uncovers the symbolism of the leader in Machiavelli's concept o f the principe, and secularized
versions of the Joachitic spiritual leader in the supermen of Condorcet, Comte, Marx and its
paracletic manifestations in the figures emerging between the early twenties through fifties/6

35 Eric Voegelin The New Science of Politics, pp. 111-112.
36 Ibid.. p. 112
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The third Joachhic symbolism revolves around the prophet who proclaims the good
news of the immanent manifestation of salvation. The prophet and the leader may sometimes
blend but the defining character of this symbolism is its attempt to articulate history as an
intelligible, meaningful whole giving purpose to an immanentist attempt to achieve the
promise o f salvation within history. Voegelin understands this symbolism to correspond with
the role played by gnostic intellectuals in modem civilization. Joachim of Flora is described
by Voegelin as the first instance o f this species which he understands to still be flourishing in
the guise of Heidegger and his spiritual children.37
The fourth Joachhic symbolism is inferred by the symbolism o f the prophet of
transformatioa The fourth symbolism is the final realm of perfection to be achieved by
immanent action. Perfection will be achieved through human action that will magically
manifest the order of the transcendent realm in the here and now. Voegelin notes that
innumerable variations of this idea have manifested themselves in human history including its
presence in various medieval and Renaissance sects along with its modem manifestations in
the ideologies of Marxism, fascism, nazism and liberalism.38 The manipulation of the idea of
history to point toward the immanent realization of a realm of perfection is the root of great
hopes bringing with them only disaster.
The idea or eidos of history is dependent upon the soteriological differentiation
achieved by Christianity. Once man breaks beyond the rhythm of existence and the realm of
temporal successes and Mures, he can discover perfection through grace in the beyond.
Transferring this perfection to the immanent realm changes the Christian focus on a beyond to

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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the present and creates an eidos of history. Voegelin formulates the existential value of such
an eidos forcefully. He states:
Again there is no eidos of history, because the eschatological supemature is
not a nature in the philosophical, immanent sense. The problem of an eidos in
history, hence, arises only when Christian transcendental fulfillment becomes
immanentized. Such an immanentist hypostasis of the eschalon, however, is a
theoretical fallacy. Things are not things, nor do they have essences, by
arbitrary declaration. The course of history as a whole is no object of
experience; history has no eidos, because the course of history extends into
the unknown future. The meaning of history, thus, is an illusion; and this
illusionary eidos is created by treating a symbol o f faith as if it were a
proposition concerning an object of immanent experience.39
If Voegelin's assessment of history as a symbol-experience o f faith is correct, Strauss's radical
approach to historicism rejects history as a theoretical/political idea and not the mysterious
adventure of faith Voegelin understands to be reflected in the symbol-experience of history.
The cultural relativism that so morally confuses a society that it is unable to refute cannibalism
emerges from an understanding of the different norms present both within and across time.
The natural perspective of the classic philosophers attempts to grasp what is everywhere and
always true. The historical perspective which elevates pragmatic history to the level of truth
objectifies that which cannot be objectified. Strauss's journey through the second historical
cave of shadows does not appear to be cognizant of history as anything but a hypostatized
history.
Voegelin argues that there are three deformations of the Christian eschaton involving
the immanentization of the teleological and axiological dimensions of that experience. The
teleological immanentization involves the acceptance of a view of continual progress toward
the immanent transformation of history. The Encyclopedists and their faith in the continual

39Ibid., p. 120.
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collection of knowledge as being a saving process of humankind are an illustration of this
progressivist mentality. The immanentization of the axiological dimension involves the
creation of a perfect reality best illustrated by the tradition o f utopianism. Sir Thomas More's
work, Utopia, is an example of this genre in which the thinker is still fundamentally aware of
the limits of reality preventing the realization of his dream world. Voegelin further discusses
various social idealisms as the elimination of war, the abolition of unequal property
distribution and other such projects he considers to be products of theoretical illiteracy.
Finally, Voegelin discusses the full immanentization of the Christian eschaton under the
heading of activist mysticism. Activist mysticism focuses both on the process transfiguring
reality into a state of immanent perfection and the state of perfection to be achieved. Both
the teleological and the axiological deformations tend to end through a process of
development in a variety of activist mysticisms. The ideological mass movements of the
twentieth century are good examples of activist mysticisms.40
Strauss's assertion that the core of Classical thought is Utopic opens up the possibility
o f Strauss being a participant in the deformation of the axiological axis o f the Christian
eschaton represented by Sir Thomas More's Utopia. We will examine this problem further in
Chapter V. This evaluation of Strauss's thought is dependent upon the cogency of Voegelin's
thought which in turn rests upon the achievement and critique of Hegelian thought. The
problem of ideas becomes clearest in Voegelin's conflict with Hegel and the road back to an
adequate theory of consciousness.

40Ibid.. pp. 120-121.
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Voegelin places the Hegelian project in the midst of a formative project undertaken
by German thinkers to restore the experiential basis o f consciousness encrusted with centuries
o f thinking in the intentionalist subject-object mode.41 The disturbance caused by the
hegemony of the intentionalist subject-object mode o f thought can be traced to William of
Ockham's doctrine that substance is inaccessible to reason. This doctrine became the
foundation for modem rationalism and its affection for value-free science, as well as the
impetus for Kant's critique of pure reason and its demonstration of the unknowability of the
thing in itself.42 Hegel's philosophy can best be understood as an attempt to recover an
understanding of the structure of consciousness from the realm of the unknowable to which it
was confined by William of Ockham and his descendants.
Voegelin understands the nature of Hegel's work to be ambiguous. On one hand,
Voegelin admires Hegel's recovery of the experiential source of symbolization and his
identification of the fundamental problems of consciousness. On the other hand, Voegelin
criticizes Hegel's willful eclipse of the transcendent pole of consciousness which he
understands to be an act of sorcery and deformation o f the Platonic symbol oiperiagoge4j
A brief summary of some highlights of his analysis o f Hegel and their implications for his
study of ideologies will be of special use in laying the foundation for a comparison of the
differing foundations of Straussian and Voegelinian thought.

41Eric Voegelin In Search o f Order, p. 48.
42Eric Voegelin Studies in the History of Ideas in the archives of the Eric Voegelin
Institute soon to be published by Louisiana University State Press, Book 13, pp. 20112039.
43 Eric Voegelin In Search o f Order, p. 61.
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What leads one person to accept existence under God and another to close their
existence to an open experience of the divine must ultimately remain a mystery. Nevertheless,
an analysis of the structures of closure and openness is a possibility. Hegel's rebellion against
God clothed itself in an act of remembrance and recovery. The world of dogmatic orthodoxy
surrounding Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx and Heidegger transformed God into a thing to be
manipulated as a thing as opposed to being experienced as a formative presence. Hegel's
great achievement was to recognize the paradoxical structure of consciousness in terms of
both a thing reality and a formative reality or what Voegelin terms the It-reality. Hegel's
attempt to collapse thing reality and It reality into one comprehensive reality capable of out
comprehending the comprehensive reality overshadowed his achievement. The participant in
reality thereby becomes the master o f reality. Voegelin finds this program present in Hegel's
work in the deformation o f the Platonic periagoge, as well as Hegel's transformation o f his
remembrance of the structure of reality into the completion o f history that ends in the
absolute knowledge of Hegel's system o f science.44
Voegelin's understanding o f the structure of consciousness and the nature of
participatory reality made him particularly sensitive to Hegel's elimination o f the pull or
helkein in Plato's symbol-experience of the periagoge and replacing it with an absolutely
immanent motivation.45 Further, Hegel's closure of the mystery of history through his
absolute knowledge did not correlate with a tensional theory of consciousness articulated in
terms of transcendent and immanent indexes beyond such absolute knowledge. The

44 Ibid.. pp. 54-70.
45Voegelin examines the structure o f Hegel’s immanent motivation in “On Hegel: A
Study in Sorcery” in the previously cited Published Essays: 1966-1985. pp. 213-255
offers substantial evidence that Hegel’s goal is self-deification.
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constitution o f the individual's consciousness reflected the structure of reality. Failure to
accept the paradoxical nature of consciousness and the reflective distance that sheds light on
this structure can have deadly side-effects as individuals attempt to erase first reality through
political action.46 The holocausts associated with the delusionary mass movements of
National Socialism and Communism are well-known but an exaggerated immanent
egalitarianism or an ideology of economic progressivism could have equally disastrous results
as primaiy reality is replaced with the rhetoric of a dream-world.
The Decisive Problem
The paths taken by Strauss and Voegelin in their respective critiques o f modernity
sound remarkably similar when we encounter their heresiologies. Strauss's claim that modem
rationalism could be perceived as a bold Epicureanism and Voegelin's claim that modernity is
characterized by an immanentized version of gnosticism may cause skeptical modem readers
concern. But the intellectual rigor each man gives to exploring the structures of rationality
and the problematic task of understanding reality gives a weight to their inquiries. Strauss's
zetetic skepticism walks the line between the doubtful nature of human wisdom and political
necessity, but it is linked to a conception o f the Platonic ideas which locates intelligibility of
nature within this elusive concept. Voegelin points to the structure of reality knowable by
reason and to the mysterious divine presence that gives a formative order to that structure.
For Strauss, Voegelin may miss the natural perspective that is tolerant of man’s imperfect
political forms. For Voegelin, Strauss refuses to apperceive the divine presence constituting
rationality and embraces a potentially deformed conception of the Platonic Ideas by

16Eric Voegelin The New Science of Politics, pp. 54-70.
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conceiving a reality potentially mastered by reason alone. Strauss's commitment to a politics
o f natural right makes the eclipse of history necessary to return to the natural cave or the
position of ahistorical philosophy. Voegelin cannot dismiss the historical perspective because
it is as essential to illuminating the human condition o f participation in a mysterious reality
binding humanity together in a spiritual drama.
The abolition of the perspective given by temporality and its legacy of the history of
humankind's struggle for place in a world not exhausted by material reality parallels the
demonization of a temporally coexistent society in order to justify one's own societal identity.
The apparent acquiescence of the philosopher toward orthodox or natural society, whatever
the substance of that society may be, may protect the philosopher and even allow Straussian
philosophy to flourish for those with the rare philosophical gift, but the cost of living in the
closed society may be the loss o f a universal humanity rooted in a legacy of spiritual
achievement.
The preceding characterization of Strauss's thought could be considered to be naive
regarding both the nature of politics and the nature o f philosophy. Politics is the realm of
commitment and opinion. All political positions are naturally deficient of knowledge of what
is best given that a political position is a position of action as opposed to theory. Philosophy
is fundamentally uncommitted except to the pursuit o f the knowledge that is essential to the
good life. It may be possible to face the more or less satisfactory solutions for the
fundamental problems of human existence, but philosophy is nonetheless a commitment to the
quest for knowledge of the whole and must remain uncommitted to any solution but the truth
of the quest itself. The paradox between political commitment and philosophical openness
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must be bridged to allow philosophy's quest to continue unhampered by the demands of
political society. Political philosophy is the armor that makes philosophy in its original sense
possible, and it subsequently becomes the project of Strauss. The prudence o f classical
philosophy animates his formulation of the morally sound choice between Jerusalem and
Athens. Strauss's perspective as both Jew and philosopher gives a substance to this
formulation that a purely theoretical position would lack. But the fact that Strauss's
philosophy occurs in a world of competing religious and political beliefs uncovers the
problems of generalizing Strauss's formulation of uncommitted philosophy and committed
politics. Nevertheless, Strauss's approach to reality may illuminate a world o f political
orthodoxy accepted by both citizen and skeptical philosopher according to their respective
ways or perhaps in the Straussian formulation, according to their natures.
If dogma or doctrinal orthodoxy is a deformation of experiential reality as Voegelin
believes it to be, it is a deformation for both an individual and a society. Offering
philosophical support to an orthodox position is disingenuous if philosophy understands the
principles of reality to contradict the orthodox formulation of order. Strauss can accept
inadequate symbolizations of order by acknowledging the necessarily inadequate
philosophical grounds of all political orders. An individual can be a philosopher but a political
society of philosophers is against the constitution of nature. This situation corresponds with
Strauss's attempt to separate theory and practice in order to restore the integrity of both
positions. Theoretical practice threatens to become tyrannical and practical theory threatens
to lose sight of the higher things illuminated by theory. The paradoxical structure of the
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natural hierarchy of man and the necessity of that paradox is the ultimate grounding of
Straussian philosophy.
Voegelin's own understanding of the paradoxical structure of consciousness is a close
parallel to this understanding o f nature except it clearly goes to the divine and mysterious
ground of being as the comprehending reality of a consciousness present in a reality made
luminous through the primordial structures of reality symbolized as man, God, world and
society. Voegelin understands the structure of reality to be constant even as that structure is
represented by new symbolic forms. Myth, Philosophy and Revelation are equivalent, if
differently differentiated attempts to articulate reality experienced from the perspectives of
participants within comprehending reality. The equivalencies of these symbols are the
historical testimony to the spiritual core of human existence. By neglecting the constant
presence of this adventure of the spirit as it is articulated through various symbols is to risk
the reification o f symbol-experiences of man’s search for order into objects of his suppression
and alienation. Forms that abandon a perspectival and ultimately questioning relationship to a
formative though mysterious ground of reality are inadequate as truthful representations o f a
society's existence within reality. Whether it is an Hegelian system or a dogmatic
representation o f reality, the claim to absolute Truth is patently false. From this perspective,
Strauss's surface level acceptance of the claims of orthodoxy versus philosophy is dangerous
insofar delusional reality is dangerous to the health o f a society. Strauss may need a more
adequate mode o f interpreting the spiritual quest of human beings if these dangers are to be
avoided or Voegelin may need to make a political peace with imperfect political forms.
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The decisive problem for determining whether Strauss's position or Voegelin's
position better illuminates political reality and the legitimate options facing political persons is
the question of the nature o f truth. For Strauss, the truth for the philosopher is potentially
different from the truth of the gentleman or the truth o f the person of faith. The philosopher’s
duty is to understand those differences and how they relate to the philosophic life. For
Voegelin, the structure of reality facing the philosopher is the same structure confronting
every human being regardless of the historical time, place or position held by that human life.
The philosopher’s duty is to articulate the structure of reality and how it is illuminated or
obscured by human experiences and symbolizations throughout time. The question confronts
us: Are truths qualitatively different for different human beings? Strauss's attempt to resist
relativism by a return to the ancients appears to open itself to a natural relativism that
indicates truth varies from individual to individual by the nature of the comprehending reality
that defines the best for each person and situation. Voegelin's articulation of a theory of
differentiation places each individual under the difficult but formative demand o f existing in
truth by not eclipsing the perspectival nature of all human being within the divine
comprehending reality and illuminating the common ground of this perspectival reality in the
various legitimate symbol-experiences of political order throughout human history.
If the presence of the transcendent pole of reality is not a constant illuminating the
human condition, the Straussian position appears to offer all that can be expected from a
reason unformed by divine presence. But the eros of the philosopher seems to indicate a pole
of reality which is not only sought but also pulls. If this is necessarily so, Strauss's
interpretation of classical philosophy is unlike the Voegelinian understanding. The absence of
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a pull in Strauss's understanding of classic philosophy would indicate substantial differences
between the two thinkers from the very beginnings of their thought. Moreover, their different
interpretations of religious phenomena give the political theorist much to ponder. Voegelin's
position regarding orthodoxies as deformative symbolizations of primary reality offers us
protection from tyrannical human institutions where Strauss may be all too subtle. The
following examination of the two thinkers' presentation of the origins of classical Greek
thought will illuminate the practical implications of a political philosophy grounded in
fundamental mystery versus a political philosophy that separates the life of questioning from
the natural world of politics.
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CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORIC AND POETIC CONTEXT OF CLASSIC PHILOSOPHY
A comparative study o f Strauss's and Voegelin's conception of classical Greek
thought is substantially difficult because o f the different directions their scholarship follows
when confronted with the problem of the Platonic dialogues. Thomas Pangle understands
Voegelin to begin his study of Plato in the light of an Augustinian meditation on the
"pregivens" of human existence. Among these "pregivens" are included man's knowledge of
himself as being, willing and knowing. For Augustine this reality is articulated within the holy
trinity in the construct Father-Being; Son-the recognizable order, and Spirit-the process of
history. Another important Augustinian construct is the God beyond time behind the
dimensions of creation, order and dynamism.1 This solid foundation of "pregivens" allows
Voegelin to approach Plato's dialogues as efforts of resistance to representational forms that
eclipse these "pregivens." However, it would be a serious exegetical mistake to translate
these "pregivens" into a Voegelinian dogma. Voegelin's attentiveness to the Christian
symbolisms occurs in the act of recovering the experiential grounds enabling him to articulate
the grounds of consciousness making myth, philosophy and faith representative o f human
participation in a world where meaning is shrouded in mystery. Voegelin's encounter with the
symbol-experiences of Christianity informs his investigation of the classical experience but it
does not exhaust it. Voegelin journeys through the record of the human search o f order until
his life ends in question of Quod Dens dicitur 2 Voegelin's discussion of the non-existent

1Thomas Pangle “Platonic Political Science in Strauss and Voegelin” in Faith and
Political Philosophy, p. 83.
2Eric Voegelin "Quod Deus Dicitur" in Published Essays: 1966-1985. pp. 376-394.

1.00
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ground and his comment to Robert Heilman about the non-existence of God but nonetheless
His necessity capture a mystic's ascent to the divine, transcendent ground in a very poignant
manner.3 Despite these important qualifications the term "pregivens" remains a useful tool to
understand Voegelin's approach to the human response to the essentially mysterious
experience of existence.
Strauss's response to Voegelin's discussion o f "pregivens" is to articulate what
Socratic ignorance means as far as the divine is concerned. He states:
Socrates knew that he knew nothing—this, if you will, is the Platonic teaching.
But one cannot know that one does not know, if one does not [also] know
what one does not know-that is to say, if one does not know what the actual
questions and their rank of priority are. And Socrates knew that hen
anagkaion is delonn or skopein. That, surely, is much less than a system, but
also considerably more than the "maintenance of existence" and "divine
faith."4
For Strauss's Socrates, the one thing necessary appears to be the life of questioning and the
clarity that questioning brings to the most important problems facing a human life. Strauss is
not willing to let go of the attitude the ancients had regarding the difficulties connected with
human sophia5 Strauss's approach to the symbols of the divine involves accepting the
political nature o f their claims but remaining open to question the truth of their content.
Voegelin's approach to religious claims would appear to Strauss to be that Voegelin
understands the authors of religious commandments better than the authors understood
themselves. Socratic ignorance for Strauss stops short of religious claims. Socratic

3 Voegelin's discussion of question and mystery in The Ecumenic Age, pp. 316-330.
Robert Heilman's quotation o f Voegelin regarding the non-existence of God and his
necessity can be found in “Eric Voegelin: Reminiscences” in The Southern Review.
Volume 32, Number 1 (Winter 1996) p. 164.
4Ibid.. p. 90.
5Ibid.. p. 89.
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ignorance for Voegelin occurs in the In-Between of symbol and experience. Strauss’s
emphasis on a dialectic engaging the natural world of politics and Voegelin’s commitment to
the ordering presence of a divine Beyond manifested in the Platonic myth is clarified by the
different course of classical studies undertaken by both men. Voegelin places the Platonic
dialogues within their context as the equivalent successor to the ordering force of the cult of
tragedy, particularly the tragedian Aeschylus.6 Strauss contends that the dialogues are not
merely a product of tragedy or political order but are a dialectic o f tragedy and comedy or the
political and doubt about the political and its religious supports.7

Subsequently,

Voegelin's study of the classics focuses on the attempts of spiritually sensitive individuals to
articulate the symbols of an order capable of resisting the eclipse o f a formative reality
engendered by the political crisis of the Hellenic community, whereas Strauss explores the
fundamental tensions between political society and the philosophic life. An understanding of
these differences will require a presentation of the two men's approaches to the issues of
history, poetry, philosophy, nature and the divine contained within their analyses of
Thucydides, Aeschylus, and Aristophanes. These presentations will be by no means
exhaustive of the content of their analyses of the classics but will lay the foundations for
understanding the implications of accepting, rejecting or perhaps remaining undecided about
the "pregivens" Voegelin found so persuasively presented by Augustine.

6Ibid., p. 85.
7Ibid., p. 90.
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Thucydides: Political History,
the Natural World and the Divine
Thucydides is in many respects the natural starting point for investigating the
philosophies of history of two men concerned with the political order animating the human
world. IBs articulate presentation o f the great crisis of the Hellenic world illuminates the
natural order in movement and or spiritual disorder moving toward catastrophe. Thucydides'
presentation of the Hellenic world in crisis allows us to see the environment that spurred
philosophy to contend with poetry for authority within the polis. Voegelin and Strauss
attempt to understand Thucydides' work in its relationship to classic philosophy.
Both Strauss and Voegelin approach Thucydides as a thinker who lacks something
which classical philosophy has. Strauss understands Thucydides as dealing with the question
o f the best historical regime, whereas classical political philosophy deals with what is simply
the best regime.8 This difference between the political philosopher and the political historian
is minimized as Strauss raises the possibility of something preventing Thucydides from
ascending to the question of the best regime. He does not tell us what that something could
be. The Platonic question with which Strauss ends his discussion of The City and Man. quod
sit dens, places the Thucydidean history within the context of philosophy.9

8Leo Strauss "Thucydides: The Meaning o f Political History" in The Rebirth o f Classical
Political Rationalism, pp. 97-102. The emphasis on the differences between Plato and
Thucydides occurs in a work that Strauss had not published in his life time. His later
published works appear to emphasize the agreement between Plato and Thucydides to a
greater extent than any possible non-trivial disagreement between the two authors.
Strauss argues Thucydides vividly draws a picture of the pre-philosophic world which is
the starting point for classical philosophy.
9Leo Strauss The City and Man fChicago: Rand McNally, 1964) p. 241.
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Voegelin's interpretation of Thucydides focuses upon the historian's use of the
empirical method of Hippocratic medicine and how this approach to political science results
in the description of the disorder of society but offers no cure of that disorder. Voegelin,
while reflecting on the military disasters Thucydides considers to be accidental, speaks of
Thucydides' interpretation in the following way:
Reflections of this kind show an uncleamess in the mind of Thucydides
concerning the connection between rationality and ethos. Apparently his
sense was numbed, like that of his sophistic contemporaries, and he could not
see that the sphere o f power and pragmatic rationalism is not autonomous but
part of human existence which as a whole includes the rationality of spiritual
and moral order. If the controlling order of spirit and morality breaks down,
the formation of ends in the pragmatic order will be controlled by the
irrationality of passions; the co-ordination of means and ends may continue
to be rational but action nevertheless will become irrational because the ends
no longer make sense in terms o f spiritual and moral order.10
For Voegelin, Plato and the differentiation of the soul would clarify what remained obscure in
Thucydides' description of the greatest movement.
Strauss is not so harsh on the political historian Thucydides. Strauss's mode of
reading a text is perhaps more attentive to silences and the causes o f silences present in
Thucydides' history. The presentation o f the divine within Thucydides leads Strauss to the
problematic formulation that the divine is first for the citizen but the city will ignore the divine
law when in the throes of the most extreme crises. The political seems to transcend both the
divine and the citizen in the most dire existential situations. The nature of reality compels
actions that go beyond the formulation o f order set by both gods and human beings. The
refutation of the Melian Ambassadors by the Athenians raises this problem to the highest
degree. Human opinions regarding the divine are refuted in the Melian dialogue and its

10 Eric Voegelin The World of the Polis, p. 363.
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aftermath but the inadequate presentation o f the divine by the Melians does not eliminate the
question quod sit dens. The dialogues of War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians
approach the problems illustrated by the Platonic dialogues. The political historian and the
political philosopher share a common field in that they complement one another as opposed
to refitting or challenging one another.11
The journey through opinions and their contradictions brings us to a point where a
natural world is disclosed, a world of opinions pointing to a world beyond opinions.. The
political historian avoids the relativism of historicism through attending to opinions and
witnessing the refutation of these opinions in both thought and deed. The failure of Nikias,
the success of Alcibiades and the massacre o f the Melians raise profound questions about the
essence of justice and its relation to both the divine and the political.12 For Strauss, the
political present appears to be the surest path to this natural knowledge. Voegelin finds his
surest footing in the panoramic view of history that can compare a state of disorder and the
formulation of that disorder with representations of historical order. History and the trail of
symbols testifying to spiritual struggles for order are a vital component to understanding the
problem of man’s existence in the In-Between. Memory may be the most socially effective
testament to man’s spiritual destiny and his need to grapple with immanent necessities. The
perspective of history is sometimes necessary to disclose the contents of right order given that

“ Leo Strauss The City and Man. p. 143.
12Strauss's "Preliminary Observations on the Gods in Thucydides' Work" in Studies in
Platonic Political Philosophy brings forth many contradictions regarding the gods and the
Peloponnesian War. The failure o f pious Nikias and the success o f impious Alkibiades
raise particular questions about the role o f the divine in human affairs. Voegelin's
comment in The World of the Polis. p . 363, about the undirected nature of reason behind
the Athenian military campaigns is one possible interpretation of the state of affairs
presented by Strauss.
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the struggle for existence in truth is not always fully represented in the political discourse of
an age. Insensitive to this spiritual component of history, Strauss moves history to the realm
of the political and through this movement he believes he gains keener insight into what is the
one thing needful for the good life.
Strauss's reflections at the end o f his essay "Thucydides: The Meaning of Political
History" begin to reveal the outlines of his philosophy of history and where it begins to
deviate from Voegelin's interpretation of the historical experience. Strauss focuses on the
transition from political history to civilizational history. He states:
This change finds its clearest expression in the fact that whereas for classical
philosophy the comprehensive theme of social science is the best regime, the
comprehensive theme of modem social science is civilization or culture. If
we ask our contemporaries what constitutes a culture or a civilization, we do
not receive a clear answer. Instead we are told how we could tell one
civilization from another. Civilizations, we are told, can be distinguished
from each other most clearly by the differences of artistic styles. This means
that civilizations are distinguished from each other least ambiguously by
something which is never in the focus of interest of societies: societies do not
wage war and do not make revolutions on account of differences of artistic
style. The orientation by civilizations thus appears to be based on a
remarkable estrangement from those life-and-death issues which animate
societies and keep them in motion. What presents itself as an enormous
progress, as an enormous enlargement of our views, is in fact the outcome of
the oblivion of the most fundamental things, and ultimately of the oblivion of
the one thing needful. History is still primarily political history.13
Strauss's words ring with a rejection of Heidegger's conception of art being "a becoming and
happening o f truth" and the strand o f modernity so powerfully represented by the thoughts of
one of our century's deepest thinkers.14 Yet, his defense of politics as central and the
emergence o f philosophy as the one thing needful in the world of politics places him in a

13Leo Strauss The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, p. 102.
14Martin Heidegger "The Origin o f the Work of Art" in Basic Writings. David Krell, ed.
(San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1977), pp. 196-199.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107

curious position versus Eric Voegelin and his understanding of what is an adequate
representation o f reality.
For Voegelin, history is not simply political history. History has a profound spiritual
dimension that transcends the rise and fall of factions characteristic o f political history.
Philosophy is not the only means to articulate this reality but shares the historical stage with a
wide range of experience-symbolizations of right order. The Cult o f Tragedy, a Taoist
meditation and the Vision of the Resurrected share a grounding in truth with philosophy even
though they are not all equal in terms of how clearly they present reality.15 The political
history of Thucydides presents a world without a transcendent source of order. The
fundamentals of Thucydides are insufficient substantially and are not capable of adequately
articulating man's existence in truth. Voegelin's attention to both the cult of Tragedy and the
Platonic dialogue indicates his measure for right order. A close comparative examination of
their treatment of the topics poetry and philosophy will reveal the subtle differences between
the two men's understandings of the roots of philosophy.
The Politics of Poetry: The Comic Poet
or the Cult of Tragedy
The problem of the ordering power of poetry animates both Strauss's and Voegelin's
inquiries into the classical world. Strauss understands the poetic method to be inferior to
philosophy on the same grounds as Aristophanes presents the follies o f Socrates. Political
philosophy is more political than is poetry. Voegelin views poetry to be a more compact
order equivalent to philosophy but subordinate to philosophy as a less differentiated insight

15Eric Voegelin “Response to Professor Altizer’s ‘A New History and a New but
Ancient God?’” in Published Essays: 1966-1985, p. 294.
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into the order of the universe. A reasonable analysis of these positions requires an
investigation of Strauss's presentation of the poet who comes closest to Socrates and
philosophy, Aristophanes, and Voegelin's presentation of the poet who comes closest to the
Platonic differentiation of the soul, Aeschylus. Their respective accents on a comic and tragic
poet lay the foundation for the philosophical insight that transcends history and the
philosophical insight that is tied to history and the possible differentiations of order which can
see beyond the myth of nature.
Strauss's most extensive study of poetry is his work Socrates and Aristophanes.
Apart from his reflections on poetiy in his exegesis of the works of Plato, this work can be
considered to be Strauss's definitive treatise on poetry. Notably, Strauss selects a comic poet
as his subject. The selection of Aristophanes as the representative of poetry has many good
reasons, not the least of which is his presentation o f the founder of the philosophic way of life.
Nonetheless, the ultimate grounds for selecting Aristophanes as the representative o f poetry
probably lies in the fact that Strauss viewed philosophy to be slightly more akin to comedy
than tragedy. Subsequently, the comic poet would be the form of the poet closest to the
philosopher. The study of the comic poet has the greatest potential to illuminate the
philosophic way of life.
Strauss begins his study of Aristophanes with an unusual hypothesis. He wonders
whether The Clouds is not an attack by an enemy on Socrates but rather a warning from a
friend. The definition of comedy from Plato's Philebus points Strauss in this direction. The
presentation of Aristophanes in the Symposium is another element Strauss uses to paint a
picture of friendship between Socrates and Aristophanes. According to Strauss, the comic
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action of The Clouds is a mixture of Aristophanes' admiration and envy of the young
Socrates. Socrates' independence from the crowd captures the imagination of the comic poet
but this independence may ultimately be a source of grief for Socrates as the crowd refuses to
be ignored.16 The Clouds is a cry for Socrates to turn from his purely theoretical study of
nature in favor of the prudential consideration of what makes that study possible. Socrates’
natural philosophy must first be political philosophy.
The story and moral o f The Clouds are too well known to require repetition but a
particular moment in The Clouds is of immense importance to Strauss's understanding of
philosophy and requires special attention. The debate between the Unjust and Just Speech is
the moment in Aristophanes' poetry that approaches the dialectics of a Platonic dialogue.
Strauss's analysis of this situation begins with attention to the traditional moral of Socrates'
lack of appreciation of the city but proceeds to uncover a depth in the debate that reveals a
Platonic moment in The Clouds. Strauss states:
But Socrates has no awareness of his dependence on the city. There is only
one argument of the Just Speech that the Unjust Speech does not meet: The
Just Speech says to his opponent that the city feeds him. The same
accusation can justly be brought against the Aristophanean Socrates, who
also does not show the slightest sign of civic responsibility. He has the defect
of the pure theoretician; he lacks phronesis. He cannot imitate life properly;
he is a-Music. This lack of prudence shows itself in his whole management of
the Strepsiades incident; this student of nature does not properly consider
nature in its practically most important respect: the natural differences among
men.... Nothing is sacred to him because nothing can withstand his logos; but
he forgets the power o f that alogon which is the basis o f the family and hence
of the city; he forgets the fact that he is at the mercy of force, of superior
force, or that force is the ultima ratio, the ultimate logos of the city.... The
just Speech that is a character in the play is justly defeated by the Unjust
Speech: The true Just Speech is the Clouds. The former Just Speech is
based on ancestral opinions; the true Just Speech is based on knowledge of
16Leo Strauss Socrates and Aristophanes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966)
pp. 5-6.
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the nature of man. The true Just Speech, too, is not effective without the use
of human force, but it sets that force in motion—Socrates' doctrine destroys
not the city but only his "think-tank," or at most Socrates himself. He is the
plaything of things—"the Clouds"—that he has in a way created but that he
does not comprehend.17
Through the dialectics of a comedy, Aristophanes demonstrates the superiority of poetry to
his friend's investigation o f nature, but Strauss cites the thought of one of the most famous
dialecticians to begin to refute Aristophanes' claim of superiority to Socrates.
Strauss speaks of how Hegel presents the Aristophanean comedy as the moment
when the individual consciousness achieves full self-consciousness, "the triumph of'the
subjectivity in its infinite security.'" Strauss questions the import of Hegel's insight by raising
the conditions necessary to this triumph. He states, "But we must note that what Hegel calls
the triumph of subjectivity is achieved in the Aristophanean comedy only by virtue of the
knowledge of nature, i.e., the opposite of self-consciousness."18 The questions that animated
the young Socrates appear to be essential to the triumph of the poet. From this perspective,
Strauss goes on to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the position of the comic poet.
The political-theological problem is the central arena for both Socrates and
Aristophanes. Aristophanes is honored by the city for the impiety he presents, whereas the
impiety of Socrates results in his receiving the death sentence from the city. The particular
impiety presented in the Birds leads Strauss to question the superiority of the poet versus
continent Socrates. The triumph of a sexual deviant in overthrowing the gods and his
erstwhile companion's retreat from the enterprise presents Aristophanes's conception of the

17Ibid.. p. 49.
'"Leo Strauss "The Problem of Socrates" in The Rebirth of Classical Political
Rationalism, p. 116.
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just life as "the retired life, life on the farm, enjoying the pleasures of farm life, enjoying the
pleasures of the body, especially love."19 The association between the eros for political
dominion and the eros of the body with impiety opens the space for a Socratic investigation
of the poet's conception of justice. The discussion of the decline of regimes in Book VDI and
EXof the Republic support Strauss's subtle contention that this poetic moment is the point at
which philosophy's superiority to poetry becomes visible, yet Strauss is driven to investigate
further the difference between Socrates’ perilous impiety and the safe impiety of
Aristophanes.
Strauss's exegesis of the Birds revolves around the question o f how Aristophanes is
superior to Socrates. He explains the acceptability of Aristophanean impiety versus the
unacceptability of the impiety of young Socrates in the following way:
The difference between Socrates' action and Peisthetairos' action will then
throw light on the difference between Socrates and Aristophanes.
Peisthetairos' action is not simply shocking because o f the manifest
impossibility of building a city in the air and such like things; Socrates' denial
of the existence of the gods can be simply shocking because that denial is
manifestly possible. Peisthetairos' action presupposes not only the existence
of the Olympian gods but the necessity of the city looking up to gods. It is
Hue that he goes beyond enlarging the recognized pantheon and replaces the
recognized pantheon by a new one; yet, on the other hand, he opposes
father-bearing and expels the astronomer, radically differing from Socrates,
Peisthetairos acts in accordance with the fundamental requirements of the
city. It is for this reason that Aristophanes teaches the just things through that
hero's triumph. In other words, that impossibility which Aristophanes in
general respects is the impossibility of successfully denying the fundamental
requirements of the city.20
The criminal nature of young Socrates' impiety rests apparently on its plausibility. The
acceptable nature of Aristophanes' impiety rests upon its implausibility. The city's need of

19Ibid.. p. 117.
:oLeo Strauss Socrates and Aristophanes, p. 193.
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gods and Aristophanes' acceptance o f this political need makes his position superior to a
Socrates who denies the city's fundamental need of a higher sanction. Aristophanes'
acceptance of the fundamental requirements of the city, political necessity or perhaps
perceived political necessity, appears to establish the superiority of poetry to philosophy but
Strauss's further probing of the Birds uncovers a curiously apolitical stance of the poet.
Strauss's famous attention to silences is brought to good use in his examination of the
Birds. In the departure of Peisthetairos' companion, Euelipides, Strauss hears the voice of
Aristophanes. Euelipides is a rustic who apparently values the sensual pleasures of the retired
life. He does not desire to rule but only to be left to himself. His departure from
Peisthetairos is what Strauss contends to be the poet's disagreement with the revolution
against the gods and the necessary political involvement that entails. Strauss contends,
"Euelipides is in his way as blind to the need for political life as Socrates. The difference
between the two heroes of the Birds corresponds to the difference between the poet and his
role as citizen, between wisdom and the city."21 Through this exegesis, Strauss brings poetry
and philosophy into the same position versus the city. The poet's faith in pleasure in the
private world as the alternative to the political world opens the door to charges that the poet
is less attentive to the political than the philosopher. The claim poetry makes based on its
political and musical superiority against philosophy is shaken by uncovering the divisions
within the poet's presentation. The failure of the poet to follow the path indicated by these
divisions allows philosophy to achieve its ascendancy.

21 Ibid, p. 194
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According to Strauss's understanding, the young Socrates rebuked by Aristophanes is
replaced by a mature Socrates who radicalizes poetic moments and enables philosophy to
claim a superior position to poetry. Strauss describes this Socrates:
The Xenophontic and Platonic Socrates differ from the Aristophanean
Socrates in almost all the aforementioned respects. He is a man of the
greatest practical wisdom, or at the very least of the greatest longing for it
(Phaedo 68c2); he is the only truly political Athenian; he respects not only
the fundamental requirements of the city but all her laws; he is the best of
citizens and in particular a model soldier, he is the unrivaled master in judging
human beings and in handling them, in knowing souls and in guiding them;
he is the erotic man par excellence and a devotee o f the Muses, especially of
the highest Muse; he is o f infinite patience with stupidity and o f never failing
urbanity. Accordingly the wisdom of the Platonic Socrates is superior to the
wisdom of the poets: the truth discerned by the poets must be integrated into
the all-comprehensive truth with which the philosopher is concerned; or the
true knowledge of the souls, and hence of the soul, is the core of
cosmology.22
Socrates' appropriateness combines with a quest for the truth to make him at once political
and erotic. His knowledge of souls and his guidance of these souls brings him to the core of
cosmology. The poet seeks to retreat to a life of pleasure, whereas the philosopher pleasures
in the presence of truth and his role in the manifestation o f that truth. The philosopher’s
decision for the best life as the life of questioning brings him near to the comic poet's distance
from the city but the presence of those who have an answer to the question of the best life
brings the philosopher to the necessity of political philosophy and his subsequent commitment
to tragedy. The philosopher understands the nature of the city and can subsequently achieve
the peace denied the poet by his dependency on the city. The rigorous way of the
philosopher appears to be the path between comic and tragic poetry. Reflecting upon the
final scene of the Symposium when Socrates comes close to making this point leads us to

" I b id .. p. 314.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

understand philosophy to be a test of endurance and eros. Philosophy is the question that
should only cease at the end of a man's life but as the Symposium demonstrates other factors
may stop the questioning.
Voegelin does not accord Aristophanes the same exalted position the poet holds in
Strauss's understanding of the birth of philosophy. Voegelin does not read dialectics in
Aristophanes' work. The nuances of tragedy are lost in the work of a poet who understands
complex works of art in a naturalistic way. Voegelin contends Aristophanes' attitude..." is the
attitude of contemporary literary critics who classify Thomas Mann's Magic Mountain as a
story about life in a sanitarium, or condemn James Joyce's Ulysses as 'immoral' or 'indecent.'
Aristophanes takes the attitude o f the audience for granted—and Euripidean tragedies
performed before an audience o f this kind may indeed have unwholesome effects."23
Voegelin goes on to examine the positive political reception of Aristophanes' Frogs and the
direct political exhortation contained within that work. "The exhortation was considered a
patriotic feat meriting rewards. To be sure, it is an afterglow of a great period that a political
speech can have a particularly strong effect if presented incidental to a literary work of
distinction, but it is no more than an afterglow, and the time is ripe for teaching1through
direct discursive treatment of politics."24 Aristophanes is seen in the light of historic decline
as opposed to dialectical ascent. The achievement of Socrates/Plato would not be attuned
with the "afterglow" o f order but with order itself. Voegelin's treatment of the cult of tragedy
and its ordering role in the polis reveals the historical ground of the Socratic/Platonic
differentiation.

23Eric Voegelin The World of the Polis. p. 245.
Ibid.
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Voegelin understands the truth of tragedy to be action as it is exemplified in the
movement o f the soul of a mature, responsible man toward decision. Aeschylus' Suppliants
functions as Voegelin's point of meditative concentration necessary to descend into the depth
of the soul ordering the community of fifth century Athens. The dramatic decision of King
Pelasgus to protect the Danaides from the Aegyptians represented a break from the clarity of
the Homeric epic where a decision could be reached through either utilitarian calculation or
counsel, divine or human. The descent into the soul is required to make a decision where the
order of themis or righteousness is in conflict with itself. Only through allying oneself with
dike or justice can one act. Voegelin states, "A negative decision, an evasion through
utilitarian calculus, or a mere insensitiveness toward the issue, would not be considered
action."25
The double sense o f dike as both a higher law and an act of concrete decision
animates Voegelin's reflection on the ordering role of tragedy in a democracy. Voegelin
argues:
Even if the audience is not an assembly of heroes, the spectators must at least
be disposed to recognize tragic action as paradigmatic. The heroic soulsearching and suffering of consequences must be experienced as the cult of
Dike and the fate o f the hero must arouse the shudder of his own fate in the
soul of the spectator—even if he himself should succumb to his weakness in a
similar situation. The meaning of tragedy as a state-cult must be sought in
such representative suffering. The binding of the soul to its own fate through
representative suffering rather than the Aristotelian catharsis through pity and
fear, is the function of tragedy26
The fragility of an order based on a people's willingness to be bound to suffering is taken into
account by Voegelin as he reflects upon the presentation by later tragedies of the demonic

^ Ibid.. p. 251.
26Ibid.
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capriciousness of the gods. King Pelasgus' success in persuading his people to follow Jovian
justice reveals the centrality o f persuasion to the maintenance o f order but the possibility of
failure in persuasive efforts opens up the very real possibility of disorder. Voegelin reflects,
"When Peitho, persuasion in this pregnant sense, is no longer socially effective, the political
order of the democracy which must rest on Dike will disintegrate and give way to the
nightmarish disorder that we find described by Thucydides."27 Voegelin's liberal usage of
terms such as "demonic" and "nightmarish" reveals an existential certitude about the order
that can be obtained by an individual soul. Voegelinian "pregivens" seem to animate his
discussion of the truth revealed by tragedy. The complications o f the battle for order of the
soul are discovered in Voegelin's exegesis of another work of Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound.
The Prometheus trilogy is argued by Voegelin to represent "the historical drama of
the soul." Voegelin does not understand the Promethean tragedy as one justifying man's
rebellion against god but as a tale warning against an excess of authadia, a term he defines as
brazen, shameless, conceited, self-reliant self-satisfaction. The madness of Prometheus'
rejection of the gods leads to the harsh punishment o f Jovian justice. The harshness of the
punishment reveals the weakness of a Justice that emerges in time. Zeus is required to be
harsh because o f the newness o f his regime.
Voegelin speculates upon the nature of the order of Zeus while meditating on the
excess of pity leading to Prometheus' downfall. Prometheus sinned through an excess of pity
for man and a lack of fear of the gods; nonetheless, pity in its right proportion is an essential
element of right order. Zeus' lack of pity for Prometheus reveals the demonic foundations of

Ibid, p. 252.
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his order. "The traits that mark the historicity of his order, traits that will bring about its fall,
are visible even now. Zeus had to rely on the help of some of the Titans for conquering the
others. As a consequence there is something demonic in the foundation of his own rule,
represented in the victimization of Prometheus by Power and Force."28 Voegelin believes
that Aeschylus would have resolved the conflict between Promethean pride and Jovian justice
through a reconciliation that would bind both forces through the growth of wisdom brought
about by suffering. Such a reconciliation would be action in the tragic sense.
Voegelin ties history, as it emerged in the Hellenic experience, to tragedy. He states:
The experience o f history grows out of tragedy. Only when the ideas of a
completely human soul, of the reflective descent into its depth, of a decision
that is drawn from its depth, and of an action that is the responsibility of man,
are fully developed, can the meaning of tragic action radiate over, and
illuminate, the order of human existence in society. The social order itself
acquires the hue o f tragedy when it is understood as the work of man, as an
order wrested by man from the demonic forces o f disorder, as a precarious
incarnation of Dike achieved and preserved by the efforts of tragic action.
The course of human affairs becomes a course of history when the order of
the soul becomes the ordering force of society. For only then can the rise and
fall of a polity be experienced in terms of a growing or disintegrating
psyche.29
For Voegelin, Hellenic spiritual history is the story of the soul in its struggle for order against
the demonic forces of disorder. Only when the soul has been articulated as the arena of
action can the destiny of a polity be experienced as a spiritual event dependent upon the order
of the citizens' souls. The descent into the divine depths of dike present in the soul is
understood by Voegelin as a people's tragic effort to secure existence under God. Voegelin

28 Ibid, p. 262.
29Ibid, pp. 262-263.
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gains this perspective by his knowledge of the form of other societies that expressed their
existence in the medium of history.
Voegelin places the Hellenic experience o f tragedy with respects to differentiation
between the organic cosmological symbolism o f Chinese historiography and universal
symbolism of existence under God in the Israelite historiography.30 He understands the
Hellenic descent into the soul as an intermediate stage between the cosmological world where
gods walk among men and the soteriological world where God reveals himself to man.31
Voegelin's study of tragedy occurs within a horizon defined by his understanding of the
changes occurring between a compact cosmological worldview and a more differentiated
worldview.
Though the explanation of the moment o f tragedy occurs within the horizon of
revelation, Voegelin will eventually bring revelation into the horizon of a more differentiated
variety of tragedy. When speaking o f Aeschylus, Voegelin indicates the direction of his
study:
The qualifications should not detract from the greatness of Aeschylus. The
revelation of God to man in history comes where God wills. If Aeschylus
was no Moses for his people, he nevertheless discovered for it the psyche as
the source of meaningful order for the polis in history. If he did not bring the
law from Sinai, he laid the foundations for a philosophy of history. For
Plato's philosophy of history derived from Aeschylean tragedy....32
Voegelin's particular reading of tragedy was made possible through his familiarity with the
differentiations of both classic philosophy and Christianity. The development of his

30 Eric Voegelin "What Is History" in What Is History and Other Late Unpublished
Writings, pp. 13-51.
31Eric Voegelin New Science of Politics, pp. 76-80.
32Eric Voegelin The World of the Polis. p. 264.
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philosophy of history focused on bringing noetic clarity to the spiritual drama of humanity.
The tensional structure of reality clarified in this philosophy is one o f Voegelin’s most
significant achievements. The need for struggle and decision binds the cosmological,
anthropological and soteriological worlds with a thread of tragedy. Gregor Sebba, a ftiend
and colleague of Voegelin, reflects on how the truth of tragedy manifests itself in the "the
myth of the American presidency" with particular attention to President Kennedy's decision
regarding the Bay of Pigs and President Johnson's decision regarding Vietnam and this
reflection best illustrates the binding power of tragedy across the various symbolizations
characteristic of the search for order.

He states:

This "myth of the presidency" proves, then, to be a model of exemplary
behavior like the ones Aeschylus invented in his plays. But now, in the
twentieth century, the figures on the political stage are not larger-than-life
heroes and demigods, but ordinary middle-class Americans, faultlessly
dressed top-ranking experts, rationalists of the first water, smart politicians,
sober calculators—no matter which side they represent. All of them are
needed when it comes to the great decisions. Something else is needed, too:
the ability to descend into the depths of understanding true order. Because
the decisions recur with the terrible inevitability of Greek tragedy."3
This commonsensical and hopeful reflection regarding the needs of our present political
representatives illustrates how even in the late twentieth century we are bound to the
demands of decision. The differences between a philosophy attuned to tragedy and a
philosophy attuned to comedy may clarify the different understandings of philosophy in
Strauss and Voegelin.
Tragedy would eventually die as the representative action o f the Athenian people as
the polis disintegrated amidst the disorder of the Peleponnesian war. The disintegration of

33Gregor Sebba "Greek Tragedy and the Search for Truth" in The Collected Essays of
Gregor Sebba: Truth, History and Imagination, pp. 161-162.
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the polis' ordering authority left the Hellenic world in the chaos of social catastrophe. The
political history of Thucydides captured the corruption of the Athenian ethos in the Melian
dialogue. Euripides presided over the death of tragedy as he illustrated the suicide of the
Athenian soul in his Troiades. In the play victory is turned into defeat as impiety and the
ensuing wrath of the gods ends an otherwise heroic adventure.34 Authority would be
transferred from the cult of tragedy and the political leaders of Athens to the philosopher and
his "direct discursive treatment o f politics." Socrates/Plato would act as the saviors of the
Greek community in its time of distress through the ordering force of philosophy and its call
for decision. But before we go on to examine Socratic/Platonic philosophy in the thought of
Strauss and Voegelin, we should pause to ponder their respective embrace of the comic and
tragic roots of philosophy.
The great German writer Thomas Mann offers insight into the nature of comedy
through his work Doctor Faustus. In Doctor Faustus Mann's hero, Adrian, attempts to
escape from an exaggerated feeling for comedy. It is argued by Ronald Hayman, a
biographer of Mann, that "the need to laugh comes from the inability to love, and the need to
parody from the incapacity for commitment. "jS Does Strauss's understanding of philosophy
as being slightly more akin to comedy than tragedy imply a lack of love or an incapacity for
commitment? Certainly a close reading of Strauss often finds a lack of commitment to the
material at hand. A brief comment in one of his commentaries on Thucydides, what some
may understand to be part of an intellectual history, indicates the ambiguity with which
Strauss approaches his work. He states, "If someone were to draw the conclusion that

34Eric Voegelin The World o f the Polis. pp. 265-266.
35 Ronald Hayman Thomas Mann: A Biography (New York: Scribner, 1995), p. 506.
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intellectual history is an absurd attempt to present descriptively what is by nature incapable of
being described, I would be forced to agree with that man. Fortunately for us students of
intellectual history, there is no such man."36
Strauss’s playful pondering neglected Voegelin’s rejection o f the history of ideas as it
was in embodied in the project of Order and History.37 Voegelin’s analogical approach to the
symbols-experiences o f order apparently did not appeal to Strauss who was more concerned
with what was necessary. O f course the symbolic nature of man’s communication of his
experience of right order may be necessary. Nevertheless, Strauss, like his Socrates,
distanced himself from this problem through doubt. This doubt demonstrates a certain lack of
commitment but Strauss's emphasis on the role of eros in Socratic/Platonic philosophy
indicates a passionate commitment to this lack of commitment.
Strauss reveals the nature of his slightly comic philosophy at the end of a commentary
on the Euthvphron:
A slight bias in favor of laughing and against weeping seems to be essential to
philosophy. For the beginning of philosophy as the philosopher understood
it is not the fear of the Lord, but wonder. Its spirit is not hope and fear and
trembling, but serenity on the basis of resignation. To that serenity, laughing
is a little bit more akin than weeping. Whether the Bible or philosophy is
right is of course the only question which ultimately matters. But in order to
understand that question one must first see philosophy as it is. One must not
see it from the outset through Biblical glasses. Wherever each o f us may
stand, no respectable purpose is served by trying to prove that we eat the
cake and have it. Socrates used all his powers to awaken those who can
36Leo Strauss The Rebirth o f Classic Political Rationalism, p. 91.
31Eric Voegelin’s Autobiographical Reflections, pp. 62-69, outlines a rejection of a
history of ideas as an inadequate vehicle for dealing with the variety of modes of political
order expressed throughout human history. Voegelin’s affirming embrace of the truth
claims of these differing symbolisms is quite different from Strauss’s skepticism about
the particular’s link to the eternal.
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think out of the slumber of thoughtlessness. We ill follow his example if we
use his authority for putting ourselves to sleep.38
The sense of resignation that engenders serenity within the philosopher's soul is brought about
by a sense of wakeful wonder which liberates the philosopher from his limited perspective.
The possibility of liberation offers the philosopher a retreat to the isle of the blessed away
from the unrepentant world of politics. Edward Ballard characterizes comic liberation in the
following manner
Beneath the conformist, as Nietzsche insisted, there lives a satyr. Comedy
tears off the foolish mask o f conformity and indulges for a brief but relieving
interval the equally foolish satyr. This catharsis yields an insight into the less
respectable but ever present animal-like basis of the human being. Thus it
purges folly by means of folly and brings man and his milieu into an easier and
perhaps more fruitful harmony. Comedy deprecates the traditional mores,
and by means of this permissive irreverence it preserves them. Comedy, like
tragedy, is a self-corrective action. Hence John Meredith could speak of
comedy as the “ultimate civilizer.”39
The civilizing effect of comedy is centered in a deep questioning o f the ultimacy o f the
ultimate concerns of both conventional and natural man. Liberation from transient concerns
and attention to what is not transient is the heart of philosophy, whereas political philosophy
assures this liberation does not disrupt the social order. The possibility of this liberation
stands starkly in contrast to a slightly tragic philosophy that has decision and resistance as its
central components.

38Leo Strauss "On the Euthyphron" in The Rebirth o f Classical Political Rationalism, p.
206.
39Edward Ballard “Sense of the Comic,” p. 468 in Volume 1 o f 5 Volumes in the
previously cited Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies o f Selected Pivotal Ideas.
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Voegelin understood tragedy to be the descent into the soul and the coming to a
decision by a mature man. The transcendental nature of the order of the soul does not permit
a lack of commitment or a failure to decide. Voegelin elaborates:
The movement of a soul toward the truth of being does not abolish the
demonic reality. The order of the soul is nothing on which one can sit down
and be happy ever after. The discovery of truth by the mystic-philosophers,
and still more the Christian revelation, can become a source of serious
disorder if it is misunderstood as an ordering force that effectively governs
society and history. From such misunderstandings result the psychologically
understandable, but intellectually deplorable 'great' problems of theodicy, such
as the reconciliation of the all-too-present evil in the world with the
omnipotence and goodness of God. In problems of this kind there is implied
the speculative fallacy that the transcendental order, which is sensed in the
orienting movements of the soul, is a world-immanent order, realizing itself in
society independent of the life of the soul. In brief the discovery may
produce an intoxication which lets man forget that the world is what it is.40
Voegelin's certainty regarding the presence of an ordering force which has its effect at the
point of the human soul leads his philosophy to be dominated by a concern not to misinterpret
the presence o f this ordering force in immanentist terms. The structurally similar construct of
this interpretation of the transcendent source of order to the Straussian construct of the comic
realm of theory and the tragic realm of action should not lead this interpretation to be
confused with the uncommitted position Strauss's philosopher takes with regard to the truth
of worldly affairs. Voegelin presents the human situation as one of struggle against the very
real forces of demonism through a movement toward the ordering presence of transcendent
reality. The "all-too-present evil in the world" that could be considered to be the legitimate
grounds of Straussian doubt is countered by Voegelin's vocal proclamation of the very real
spiritual problems involved in the search for order.

J0Eric Voegelin The World o f the Polis. p. 255.
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As we move toward the discussion of classical philosophy, we are prepared to
encounter two persuasive presentations of the Socratic/Platonic way. Strauss will present
classical philosophy as a hopeful, skeptical inquiry into the natural grounds of human society
and excellence. Voegelin will elaborate on how classical philosophy attuned itself to the pole
of transcendent order in its attempts to order Hellenic society through the myth of nature and
the divine measure. Strauss's natural horizon brings his Socrates/Plato quite close to the
Athenian political community, whereas Voegelin's transcendental horizon uncovers a battle
between the traditional forces of Athenian order and the Socrates'/Plato's new order of the
soul. Strauss's construal of history as political or a second natural cave results in a
moderately conservative Socrates/Plato. Voegelin's understanding of history as a spiritual
event leads him to understand Socrates/Plato in historically revolutionary terms.
Socrates/Plato represents the advent of a new order that supplants the old order. The
following chapter will clarify the difference between a spiritual and tragic Socrates and a
natural and comic Socrates in their differing approaches to the challenges of the political.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 4

SOCRATES: SAVIOR OR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER
Philosophy's kinship to poetry is the starting point for both thinkers understanding of
philosophy's nature. Strauss asserts philosophy's absolute superiority to poetry. He states:
From Plato's point of view the life that is not philosophic is either obviously
incapable of solving the human problem, or else it does solve the human
problem in a wholly inadequate or absurd manner. In the first case it is the
theme o f tragedy. In the second case it is a theme of comedy. From here we
may understand why it is not seen to be directed toward philosophy.
Autonomous poetry presents nonphilosophic life as autonomous. Yet by
articulating the cardinal problem o f human life as it comes to sight within the
nonphilosophic life, poetry prepares for the philosophic life. Poetry is
legitimate only as ministerial to the life of understanding.1
Poetry is essentially an inadequate solution to the problem of life but its ability to clarify and
ennoble the passions of life makes it a precursor to philosophy. Strauss views philosophy as
one possible solution to the problem o f the best life. If the content of the best life is not a
given, then questioning after that content is de facto the best life. Yet, we are reminded of
Strauss's characterization of philosophy as slightly more comic than tragic and may wonder
whether Straussian philosophy subsequently is a slightly inadequate or absurd solution to the
human problem. Nevertheless, the blend of comedy and tragedy within Strauss's conception
of philosophy may make philosophy a superior solution to its separate tragic and comic
components. Strauss's discussion of Socrates and Plato illuminates the problem of a slightly

1Leo Strauss "The Problem of Socrates" in The Rebirth of Classical Political Philosophy, p.
183.
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comic classical philosophy bounded by a decidedly serious human political community. This
problem is translated into the problem of natural right.
Though Strauss's natural right teaching is certainly problematic, leading some to even
classify him as a Nietzschean,2 it has a strong affinity to classical philosophy. According to
Strauss, the surface of things is not inconsequential and in light of this epistemological
ground, it becomes possible to give his natural right teaching a definite formulation. Strauss
deems the life o f questioning to be the best life given man's essential ignorance but this life of
questioning is given substance in the direction of classic thought. In an attempt to elucidate
the concept of natural right from the erring interpretations of natural right by Averroes and
Thomas, Strauss formulates Aristotle's natural right teaching and perhaps the classic natural
right teaching in the following manner. He speculates:
One is tempted to make the following suggestion: When speaking of natural
right, Aristotle does not primarily think of any general propositions but rather
of concrete decisions. All action is concerned with particular situations.
Hence justice and natural right reside, as it were, in concrete decisions rather
than general rules. It is much easier to see clearly, in most cases, that this
particular act of killing was just than to state clearly the specific difference
between just killings as such and unjust killings as such. A law which solves
justly a problem peculiar to a given country at a given time may be said to be
just to a higher degree than any general rule of natural law which, because of
its generality, may prevent a just decision in a given case. In every human
conflict there exists the possibility of a just decision based on full
consideration of all the circumstances, a decision demanded by the situation.
Natural right thus understood is obviously mutable. Yet one can hardly deny
that in all concrete decisions general principles are implied and presupposed.3
2 Shadia Drury The Political Ideas o f Leo Strauss.
3 Leo Strauss Natural Right and History, p. 159.
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The supremacy of philosophy over poetry is in this crucial insight. The Socratic way of life is
the quest for appropriate action according to universal truths within particular circumstances4
Though we may dispute whether it is possible for any human being to ever have cognitive
access to all the circumstances, this disputation does not invalidate the possibility of a just
decision existing within the context of reflective or Socratic ignorance. For Strauss,
autonomous poetry does not achieve this clarity of vision.
In contrast to Strauss, Voegelin does not speak of philosophy as being absolutely
superior to the preceding cult of tragedy. The emergence of Socrates/Plato is an event which
is a response to the disintegration of the ordering authority o f the cult of tragedy through the
political crisis known to us as the Peloponnesian war. Voegelin contends:
The tension of order and passion that had been mastered by the cult of
tragedy had broken into the open conflict between Socrates and Athens. The
cult had become senseless because from now on tragedy had only one subject
matter, the fate of Socrates. Insofar as the Platonic dialogue was animated by
the tension between Socrates and Athens, it was in the history of Hellenic
symbolic forms the successor to Aeschylean tragedy under the new political
conditions.5
The failure of the Athenian community to experience the drama of Dike as the drama of their
souls was the moment when Athens lost touch with the divine reality which acted as the basis
of their community. For Voegelin, the drama of Socrates/Plato is an attempt to regain
contact with the ground of social order. Voegelin's final commentary on the Timaeus places

4 Voegelin is in general accordance with this position and articulates a philosophy very similar
to this in his discussion of natural right in “What Is Right By Nature?” in Anamnesis, p. 63.
5 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, volume 3 of 5 volumes in Order and History (Baton
Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1957) p. 13.
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Plato's myth within the symbolic form of afid es quaerens intellection engendering the
experience of "divine reality as irruption of ordering force from the Beyond into the
existential struggle for order.”6 This understanding of philosophy places philosophy as a
divine-human effort to symbolize the experience of the paradoxic tension in the formative
reality encompassing human political community. Before we proceed to investigate the fruits
of a Straussian or Voegelinian interpretation o f classic philosophy, it may be useful to clarify
Voegelin's understanding of the subject matter of his philosophic investigations.
Voegelin has characterized human existence as being constituted by three dimensions:
Thing reality, It-reality and Reflective distance.7 Thing reality is concerned with intentionality
or objective reality. It-reality is concerned with luminosity or how the human position is
articulated in terms of a relation to society, God and the world. Reflective distance is the
capability to see the commonality of past, present and future symbolisms which make the
fullness of reality luminous through different means. Voegelin elaborates on the symbolism of
reflective distance. He states:
As we have seen, the plurality of diversified instances was observed and the
observation induced reflective responses; and the events of differentiation
were not simply present in reflective consciousness, but were accompanied by
reflection on the phenomenon of differentiation and on the new
configurations of truth in history created by it. Whatever the order of
history may ultimately be, there is a history of order because the truth o f
consciousness is documenting itself as a historical process through the
reflectiveness of symbolizing consciousness.
The history o f
consciousness, as I formulated it, is internally cognitive.*

6 Eric Voegelin In Search of Order, p. 97.
7 IbidL, pp. 14-16; 44.
8 Ibid, p. 44.
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These different poles of reality create substantial tension as a human life attempts to order
itself in accordance with the demands o f a multi-dimensional reality. Gerhart Niemeyer offers
an excellent description of this situation with particular attention to the It-reality. He states:
"Tension" is how Voegelin characterizes this participatory relation: tension
which, because of the inequality o f the partners, must not be resolved in either
direction. Voegelin's terminology here varies. He speaks of "tension"
between the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, the effable
and the ineffable, the human and the divine. "Tension" is dissolved, or
inadmissibly distorted, when it is removed from the living experience and
transferred to something like the field o f possession, or control. This
happens, at the beginning, through a hypostatization of the "poles" of the
tension, so that at either end there appears something like things which one
could separate and deal with as if they were objects. Hence consciousness
and the openness to experience are different aspects o f the same reality. And
the "tension" of participation is not an idiosyncratic and solipsistic reality but
one which is, when experienced and manifested in language, recognizable and
sharable among human beings, hence capable o f representation.9
The study of structures that articulate or eclipse this tensional reality is the core of Voegelin's
investigation. Voegelin's historical studies are a painstaking examination of empirical
evidence as it is evaluated within the framework of the tensional process of reality and,
paradoxically, the tensional process of reality is an articulation of Voegelin's empirical
investigations o f the process of order in history. Voegelin's statement that "the order of
history emerges from the history of order" is autobiographically as well as historically
grounded.

9 Gerhart Niemeyer "The Fullness of the Quest" in Eric Voegelin's Search for Order in
History Stephen A. McKnight, ed. (Lanham, Maryland: University of America Press, 1987),
p. 208.
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We may now articulate what was alluded to earlier as Voegelin's experience o f the
"pregivens" o f order. Ms own late writings may best capture the fullness of the implications
of the centrality of the divine. He argues:
There is no epiphany of structure in reality without a structuring force beyond
the manifest structure; there is no revelation of divine ordering force in the
quest of truth without a divine reality beyond the manifest structure; there is
no revelation o f divine reality beyond the manifestation o f its order in the
event... The super-constant above the constants is not a principle of order
whose proper application will dissolve the disorder of Cosmic order, but the
experience of the paradoxic tension in formative reality.... Between the God
who reveals himself in his presence in time and the God who remains the
experienced but unknown reality beyond time.10
Voegelin's search for truth in the presence of a "formative reality" beyond time manifested
within time and his belief that this presence does not assure the triumph of order within
history form the central core of Voegelin's philosophy. The mysterious God that is at once
present and transcendent is the experience that places Voegelin in opposition to those
political movements seeking to bring ultimate meaning to immanent reality. The experience
o f mystery is the core experience defining Voegelin's philosophy of history and his approach
to political philosophy. Ms investigation of Socrates/Plato is an important part of what we
might call Voegelin's spiritual realism but the historical evidence does not allow him to accept
the form of Socrates/Plato as the sole legitimate symbolization of this spiritual realism.
Both Strauss and Voegelin understand classical philosophy to be a philosophy of decision.
Strauss emphasizes the intellectual ascent to truth and the possibility o f the mind mastering
reality where Voegelin emphasizes both the spiritual descent to decision and the ascent to

10 Eric Voegelin In Search of Order, p. 107.
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transcendent truth as being equivalent experiences of a formative order transcending and
constituting human-divine reason. Strauss's understanding of the philosophic life leads to a
life lived by sense perception and reason. Voegelin's understanding of the insight of the
classical philosophers leads to a life lived in openness to a formative order that transcends
thing reality. Divinity has a questionable status in Strauss's discussion of classical philosophy
and political order, whereas the experience o f divinity and its symbolization is the core of
Voegelin's discussion of classical philosophy and political order. A brief survey o f some
pertinent sections of their commentaries on Socrates will reveal two distinct interpretations o f
classical philosophy.
The Subordination of the Divine
and the Sovereignty o f Ideas
Strauss's interpretation of the Euthvphron confronts the problem of the interpretation
of the divine within the context of human society. The dialogue is a conversation between
Euthyphron, a man who claims knowledge of things divine, and Socrates, a man who claims
human ignorance about the most important things and the consequent need for philosophy.
Strauss's analysis o f the dialogue points both toward philosophy and orthodoxy though the
possibility of orthodoxy for the thoughtful person is brought into doubt.
Strauss begins his account of the Euthvphron with a warning of the troubling nature
of the unpopular half-truth contained about piety within the Euthvphron. The gods will be
demoted within the context of Strauss's analysis of the work and this can be amazingly
problematic, but he is quick to comfort the reader with the following assurance. He states:
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Now, it is most unsatisfactory if we are first forced to think and then receive
no other reward than an irritating provisional result. Plato gives us two kinds
of comfort: first, thinking itself may be said to be the most satisfying activity
regardless o f the character of the result. Secondly, if we should believe that
the result is more important than the way to the result, Plato's moral character
is the guarantee that the final result, or what he regarded as the complete
account of piety, would be absolutely satisfactory and in no way irritating.11
Strauss defends both the act of Platonic philosophy and the outcome o f that philosophy.
Strauss's discussion of the Euthvphron clarifies the relationship between traditional piety and
philosophy by showing that the pleasure of philosophy is not at odds with the political goal of
piety.12
Socrates rejects Euthyphron's conception of piety as doing what the gods do on the
basis that the gods command human beings to be pious by doing what the gods tell them to
do and not by imitating them. Strauss states, "The authority to which he [Euthyphron]
appeals reflates him. He ought to return to orthodoxy."13 Though Strauss believes Socrates’
refutation of Euthyphron implies he should return to orthodoxy, he understands the madness
of Euthyphron to have some sense. Strauss understands orthodoxy or at least Athenian
orthodoxy to have inherent flaws which make it untenable. He states, "We have no choice
but to go forward to Socrates."14

11 Leo Strauss "On the Euthyphron" in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, p. 187.
12 Strauss’s teaching regarding this relationship parallels the teaching o f Spinoza. See
Benedict de Spinoza’s A Theologico-Political Treatise. R. H. M. Elwes, trans. (New
York: Dover Publications, 1951) for this and other interesting parallels and differences
between the two thinkers.
13 Leo Strauss “On the Euthyphron” in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, p. 198.
14 Ibid, p. 199.
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Why must we go forward? Socrates sees profound problems with the sovereignty of
the divinities of Athens. Socrates stands by the ideas as being above the gods. Euthyphron's
allegiance to acting as the gods is an allegiance to passion as opposed to reason. Strauss
states, "Socrates is the only one who recognizes as first things such beings as can in no sense
be conceived of as having been made and making other things."15 He goes on, "ifthe primary
beings are the gods, and not ideas, whatever is good or just will be good or just because the
gods love it, and for no other reason. The primary act is not knowledge or understanding but
without knowledge or understanding, i.e., blind desire."16 Strauss retreats from this
possibility and argues for the primacy of intelligibility over desire. His argument becomes
strained as he is forced to confront the fact that the life of knowing is based on passion.
Strauss understands the necessity of the ideas being prior to the gods if human
attempts to make sense out of reality are to have any grounds other than revelation. He
argues:
But knowledge, genuine knowledge, is the knowledge o f the unchangeable,
o f the necessary, of intelligible necessity, of ideas. That of which knowledge
is knowledge, is prior. The ideas are prior to knowledge of the ideas. There
cannot be knowledge if there is no primacy of the ideas. Therefore, if one
denies the primacy of ideas one denies the possibility of knowledge.17
The inferiority of the gods to the ideas is necessary if the life of philosophy is possible. The
ideas precede the warring factions o f the deities, but how does piety make sense in a world

15Jbid, p. 200.
16Ibid, pp. 201-202.
17 Ibid.
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constituted by the possibility o f knowing? Strauss turns toward political grounds or the
fundamental grounds of human existence to explain the role of piety.
If persons can have contact with the ideas directly why would they need divine
intermediaries to bolster the rational truth? Strauss turns to the issue of justice to uncover
piety's role in the city. He contends:
The primary object of the legislative art is the just. And it is as part of justice
that piety is defined in the third and last definition. Piety is justice towards the
gods, just as justice in the narrower sense is justice towards men. Justice
towards men is good. We have already seen that. What is doubtful is the
status of piety, or justice towards the gods. It would seem that the need for
piety can best be understood from the deficiency or the limitation o f justice
towards men. Now, the most serious deficiency of justice towards men is
that it does not have sufficient sanction in the eyes of irrational people. It is
this sanction that is supplied by piety and by the gods. But in order to fulfill
this function, piety must be in the service of justice in the narrower sense.
Justice in the narrower sense is primarily law-abidingness, or obedience to the
law... It is here that Socrates agrees with orthodoxy against the heretic,
Euthyphron.18
For Strauss, the majority of persons have their closest contact with justice through the laws.
Piety can only serve justice if it attends to justice in the most narrow sense. Strauss's
understanding of Socrates'/Plato’s ascent to the ideas is intertwined with sense experience to
such a degree that he is obliged to uphold the grounds o f the original encounter with justice in
order to apprehend justice in a broader sense. The irrational deities defend the rational justice
which would otherwise be powerless to control the vast majority of irrational or perhaps subphilosophic persons. The force of orthodoxy lays the foundation for the ascent to justice

18 Ibifr, pp. 203-204.
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through preserving political order and pointing toward the ideas for those willing to walk the
path of dialectic to what is true always.
Socrates' subordination of the deities and elevation of the ideas is the triumph of
rationality over divinity but is there not something divine about the ideas? Strauss does not
articulate a philosophy of the divinity of the ideas and seems to indicate their triumph involves
a depreciation o f divinity. The eternal, unchanging ideas rule silently over human affairs as
their perfection is either realized or missed by chance in the realm of mortals. The role of the
gods is comparable to the absence o f the soul from this important Platonic dialogue. Strauss
speculates, "Plato has indicated the half-truth character of the message conveyed through the
Euthvphron by never using... the term soul. Through the emphasis on the ideas and the
silence about the soul, Plato creates the appearance that there is no place for the gods. Plato
probably would have justified this half-truth by the consideration that the ideas are at any rate
above the soul."19 Strauss's interpretation of Socrates/Plato seems to present all human
experiences in terms of the ideas while offering the philosopher a place of serenity in his or
her contemplation of the unchangeable reality that directs the changeable quest for right. The
rational are the potential masters of reality insofar that they understand the fundamental
problems confronting man as man while the irrational are subordinated to the demands of
peace and order.

19 Ibid, p. 205
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The Consequences of the Ideas:
The Philosopher and the Gentleman
According to Strauss, Socrates' decision for the intelligibility of the whole or nature
rested upon "noetic heterogeneity.” He states:
Socrates is distinguished from all philosophers who preceded him by the fact
that he sees the core of the whole, or o f nature, in noetic heterogeneity. The
whole is not one, nor homogeneous, but heterogeneous.
Yet the
heterogeneity is not sensible heterogeneity, like the four elements, for
example, but noetic heterogeneity, essential heterogeneity. It is for this
reason that Socrates founded political science. Only if there is essential
heterogeneity can there be an essential difference between political things and
things which are not political. The discoveiy of noetic heterogeneity permits
one to let things be what they are and takes away the compulsion to reduce
essential differences to something common. The discoveiy of noetic
heterogeneity means the vindication of what one could call common sense.
Socrates called it a return from madness to sanity or sobriety, or to use the
Greek term, sophrosyne, which I would translate as moderation. Socrates
discovered the paradoxical feet that, in a way, the most important truth is the
most obvious truth, or the truth of the surface.20
Much of Strauss's interpretation of the Socratic way of life rests upon a conception of
essential differences that are discernible on the surface. The philosopher is of an essentially
different character than the gentleman. Ideas are essentially different from other elements
within reality given that they are neither created nor create. These essential differences enable
the philosopher to at once transcend the political and serve the political. Strauss's
examination of Xenophon's Socrates reveals certain facets of the relationship between both
the philosopher and the gentleman and the tensions between philosophy and politics.

20 Leo Strauss "The Problem of Socrates" The Rebirth o f Classical Political Rationalism, p.
142.
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Strauss's treatment o f Xenophon as what appears to be the most reliable source for
establishing Socrates' character is a dramatic contrast to what Strauss understands to be the
modem prejudice against Xenophon.21 This prejudice is based upon the modem blindness to
an art of writing and speech that is characteristic of a man with a strong sense of shame.
Strauss contends, "A man who possesses a strong sense of shame will refrain as much as
possible from hearing, seeing and speaking of the ugly, the evil and the bad."22 Strauss goes
on to quote Xenophon, "It is noble and just and pious and more pleasant to remember the
good things rather than the bad ones."23 Such an understanding of Xenophon creates a
curious dissonance among readers expecting the Xenophontic corpus to reveal an
unblemished image of Socrates leading the reader to seriously consider the omissions. We
are confronted with the possibility that some vice or failing hides behind every gap in the
Xenophontic discourse and Strauss's interpretation of Xenophon's Socrates.
Strauss begins his interpretation of Xenophon's Socrates by examining Xenophon's
defense of Socrates' justice and piety. Strauss ultimately finds Xenophon's arguments for
Socratic innocence to be lacking the certitude of proof and goes so far as to assert, "we have
come to realize that Socrates' legal justice and his legal piety could not be proven, or that
Socrates was not unqualifiedly just." Strauss goes on to qualify this potentially damning
statement. He states, "This, however, is perfectly compatible with the fact that he possessed
translegal justice, which consists in benefiting one's fellow men. Socrates benefited his fellow

21 Ibid, pp. 126-127.
22 Ibid.. p. 128.
23 Ibid.
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men to the highest degree by leading them to excellence or to virtue of which the individual in
question was capable."24 Socrates'justice is dependent upon his ability to recognize natures
that are different from his own. But how is the radical life of questioning reconcilable with an
excellence within a nature not amenable to the excellence of radical questioning?
Socratic ignorance is bounded by the height of intelligibility and the ground of
politics. Socratic ignorance is not absolute ignorance but works within the parameters which
make questioning meaningful. Under these particular conditions, Xenophon’s interpretation
o f Socrates' understanding of politics begins to make sense.
By examining the Oeconomicus and The Education of Cvrus. Strauss illuminates
Xenophon's teaching regarding Socrates' understanding of the political. He states:
The crucial result o f Socrates' analysis of the political, as Xenophon presents
it, is that the political is essentially imperfect, the essence of the political being
the dilution o f wisdom by folly. Hence the claim of the political to be beyond
the peak, or to be simply the highest proves to be unfounded. Man's true
excellence or virtue exists beyond the political, or is transpolitical.
Xenophon's Socrates is the representative of man's transpolitical excellence,
whereas his Cyrus is the representative o f that life which is highest if the
principle which is characteristic of the political is adhered to and thought
through. The polarity of Socrates and Cyrus corresponds to the fundamental
tension between philosophy and the polis.25
Noetic heterogeneity comes shining through as the distinctly different categories of
philosophy and the polis are contrasted by Strauss. The bloody action undertaken by Cyrus
in the name o f political justice in Xenophon's Anabasis indicates a harshness that is lacking in
a Socrates who defined justice as doing no harm. The life of theory has a self-sufficiency and

24 Ibid.. p. 138.
25 Ib ii, pp. 147-148.
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justice that distinguishes it from the life o f political action but nonetheless the transpolitical
excellence achieved by Socrates depends upon surviving in a world of friends and foes.
Socratic rhetoric, as an attempt to gain agreement, is an attempt to eliminate the foes through
persuasion rather than force.
The relationship between the political man or the gentleman and Socrates is most
clearly elaborated in Xenophon's Oeconomicus. Strauss argues that the education of young
Critobulus in the economic art acts as the context in which the relationship between Socrates
and the gentleman or the political man is most clearly articulated. Socrates leams the art of
perfect gentlemanship through a discussion with the gentleman Ischomachus. Strauss
contends that the art of the gentleman does not require intellectual effort and can be learned
by simply listening. He states, "Ordinary morality consists not in knowing, but in doing,
whereas regards the highest morality, the transpolitical morality, virtue is knowledge."26 The
distinction between these two moralities is illustrated best by the scandalous affair that
overcame the teacher of gentlemanship, Ischomachus. The dilution of wisdom by folly is the
ever present hazard that can wreck the life of the gentleman. Gentlemanly principles can fail
when they encounter an ungentlemanly nature. Socrates' problems with his wife, though
certainly less severe than Ischomachus' marital difficulties, are reflective of the problems
inherent when good principles meet inexhaustible nature. The difference between the
philosopher and the gentleman is that the philosopher has the refuge of the Ideas, a realm
separated from the chaos of political life, whereas the gentleman participates in this reality

26 M l, P- 149.
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only through his association with the philosopher. The serenity made possible by the
philosopher's association with Ideas appears to be the superiority of the philosophic life to the
life of the gentleman but this serenity can only be maintained if the philosopher can come to
an agreement with the city to insure his refuge is not disturbed by the folly of the non
philosophers. The philosopher must become the political philosopher and through rhetoric
create harmony between the philosopher and the city.
An illustration of this activity is contained in Strauss's interpretation of Socrates'
economic teaching within Xenophon's Oeconomicus. In the dialogue Socrates is attempting
to teach Critobulus the art of farming in order to enable him to gain the knowledge necessary
to become a perfect gentleman. The irony of the dialogue manifests itself in the fact that
Socrates is very poor and thus disqualifies himself from being a perfect gentleman. The
teacher of gentlemen does not aspire to be a gentleman.27 Socrates' political philosophy
allows him to appear as an advocate for both the city and philosophy. If Critobulus were of
the philosophic nature, the example of Socrates would lead him to a dialectics behind the
rhetoric and perhaps to the philosophic way of life. If Critobulus is a gentleman by nature,
Socrates' teaching will prepare him for that life.
The concept of noetic heterogeneity, a belief in essential difference, enables Strauss to
formulate the Socratic teaching in a form which is politically prudent and intellectually open.
Strauss's sparing explicit commentary on the Ideas and the philosophical life apart from the
political life point towards the fundamental requirements embedded in a reality bordered by

27 Ibid.. p. 149.
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intelligibility and nature. The existence o f the irrational passions and the continuance o f the
hegemony of the rational passions requires a pious bow toward the city and its prejudices to
make the mixture of wisdom and folly as much in favor of wisdom as is feasible.
Strauss's emphasis on sense data and the quest for an explanation o f the whole as
being the goal of philosophy places a premium on the knowability of reality. This knowability
secures the nobility of the life dedicated to mastering reality. The Ideas appear to secure this
knowability and with it the nobility of the philosophic life as being essentially the best life.
Strauss's separation of the theoretical way of life from the political way of life indicates a
fundamental limit to the best life. A close examination of Strauss's treatment of two of Plato's
political dialogues will clarify the relationship between philosophy and politics. Chapter Five
will develop this theme but before we come to this substantial task we have yet to present
Voegelin's understanding o f the fundamentals of Socratic philosophy.
Socrates and the Divine Measure
Voegelin's first extensive treatment of Socrates in Order and History occurs in
Chapter Eleven, "The Sophists" of The World of the Polis. Voegelin deduces the essence of
Socrates' message by examining closely the structure of the arguments presented by the
persons Socrates presumably opposed, the Sophists. After uncovering the seed of the divine
measure in Plato's dialogue, The Protagoras, where Socrates questions the teaching of the
sophist Protagoras that virtue can be taught by raising the possibility that virtue is one,
Voegelin proceeds to examine the state of theoretical chaos which eclipsed the divine
measure of human existence and replaced it with the measure of an immanent nature.
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One familiar with Voegelin's popular work, The New Science of Politics, would not
be shocked by the general outline of his analysis of the pre-Socratics and their articulation o f a
tensional reality and how this reality is eclipsed by the teachers known as the sophists.
Voegelin further reminds us that many of the sophists' teachings were very important parts o f
the classic science o f politics as presented by Plato. This component of Voegelin's
interpretation of Plato is very much in tune with Strauss's interpretation of natural right as it
was presented above. Nevertheless, the agreement o f many of the sophists' teachings with
Plato should not lead the reader to forget the decisive difference between Plato and the
Sophists. Voegelin states:
Plato opposed his "God is the Measure" deliberately as the counter-formula
to Protagoras' "Man is the Measure." In sophistic thought, we may say
succinctly, there was missing the link between the well-observed and
classified phenomena o f ethics and politics and the "invisible measure" that
radiates order into the soul. The opposition to a world of thought without
spiritual order was repeatedly expressed by Plato at critical junctures of his
work. In particular he quoted twice, as a target for criticism, a set of
agnostic, if not atheistic, propositions that may well have come from a
sophistic source.28
Voegelin's interpretation of classic philosophy revolves entirely around the reality of the
transcendent experience in the philosophy of Plato. Voegelin goes so far as to hypothesize
that most of the sophistic writings from the classic period disappeared on the grounds that
they lacked the transcendent component which is central to the act of philosophizing.
Voegelin's attention to the importance of transcendence to philosophy leads him to
take the very unStraussian position that Plato's life work or philosophy is a type of theology.

28 Eric Voegelin The World of the Polis. pp. 273-274.
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He asserts, "After the destruction of philosophy through the sophists, its reconstruction had
to stress the Deus-mensura of the philosophers; and the new philosophy had to be clearly a
type of theology1."29 Plato's theology is in opposition to two distinct trends emerging in the
thought of the sophists. These trends include the use of the term nature, physis, in the
discussion of essential humanity in place of such terms as logos or nous and the immanent
direction in which essential humanity is sought.
Voegelin examines the fragments of the sophist Hippias' thought to uncover the
nature of a sophistic conception of physis. Voegelin emphasizes that the sophistic conception
of nature is not related to the conception of nature held by the mystic philosophers. He
states, "'nature' in this passage does not refer to an essence that is common to all men and
makes them equal in the Heraclitean sense." Instead, Voegelin argues that Hippias’
understanding of nature refers to kinship through likeness. The likeness of the wise
establishes a hierarchy in which the wise are governed by the sphere oiphysis and the unwise
are governed by nomos. Entry into the community of the wise appears to be dependent upon
knowledge of the nature of things. Voegelin considers Hippias' formulation to be "the
declaration of a republique de savant."30
Voegelin understands Hippias' effort to be a movement toward the immanentization
of order. He argues, "Hippias' evocation has its place in the history of order as the attempt to
transfer the idea of a community of mankind from the level of the mystic-philosopher to the

29 Ibid, p. 275.
30 Ibid, pp. 282-283.
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level of the encyclopedic intellectuals." The transfer o f the order of human community from
the level of the soul to the level of empirical information is a counter-movement to the
achievement o f the mystic-philosopher. Voegelin describes this eclipsed legacy of the mysticphilosophers in the following terms:
A Xenophantic movement toward the realissimum, or a Heraclitean
exploration of the deep logos, is an event in the soul of the solitary thinker. It
results in the insight into the existence of the community among men through
the universal spirit that is living in them all. The mystic-philosopher has no
information to tender, he can only communicate the discovery which he has
made in his soul, hoping that much communication will stir up parallel
discoveries in the souls of others. If he has this effect on others, he will have
actualized the existing community to the extent of his effects. Nothing
follows from this adventure with regard to social organization directly,
though indirectly the differentiation of the life of the soul in a great number of
men in a community may have the effect of changing the mores, and
ultimately the institutions of a society, because the hierarchy of purposes for
individual action has changed.31
Voegelin's eloquent testimony to the community o f mankind through the universal spirit living
in each human being is a marvelous clarification of what existence in truth means. The
message of the mystic-philosopher orients us towards a ground of order but does not dictate
a plan for immanent order. The information gathered by the sophists may be useful for the
concrete problems of human society as long as the fascination with external information does
not destroy the substance of the soul.
For Voegelin, a narrowly constructed empiricism misses the actual ground of human
community. Nature becomes a register of opaque, external manifestations and does not
penetrate the depth of the soul. In light of this truncated view of nature, "teaching, therefore,

31 IWd, p. 287.
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must become information about things and training in skills; learning cannot be the intimate
movement in which a slumbering soul awakens to a differentiated, mature soul." The
consequences of this thinning out of teaching are quickly illuminated by Voegelin. He states:
The result o f such teaching is not spiritual growth within a concrete
community but the peculiar formation of a new supercommunity "by nature"
beyond the historically concrete societies of the nontos. The community "by
nature" of the encyclopedic sages is a figuration of the community of mankind
but it is not this community itself. The obvious danger of such a
development, if the community of intellectuals should become socially
effective, is the destruction of spiritual substance and its replacement by
external information which cannot build the order of the soul and society.32
The destruction of the spiritual substance of society is facilitated by the atrophy of the divine
Nomos and its replacement by the idea of Physis as an autonomous source of order in
competition with nomos. Voegelin traces the atrophy of the divine law to the teaching of the
great sophist Protagoras.
Protagoras professed to be a teacher of the art of politics and in his role as a traveling
teacher he so focused on the concrete political environment that he rejected a transcendent
measure. His teaching focused on the historical laws of the polis in order to guide his
students to political success. Protagoras is characterized by Voegelin as "the type of thinker
who is a skeptic, or agnostic, with regard to transcendent reality and, at the same time, a
conservative with regard to historical order." Voegelin believes the position of Protagoras to
be inherently unstable. Voegelin states:
The attitude of conservative skepticism is unstable on principle; it can be
preserved only under the condition that the theoretical question of validity
and its source will not be raised. A more inquisitive mind will not be satisfied
32 Ibid.. pp. 283-284.
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with such abstinence. And as soon as the question is raised the position will
dissolve either into the immanentist dogmatism o f the sophists of the second
generation, making Physis the new source of authority, or into the restoration
of the problems of transcendence as we have seen it in the opposition of
Socrates to the sophist in Plato's Protagoras3j
Voegelin's genealogy of the problem of nomos and physis presents us with a compelling
picture of the eclipse of essential reality. Strauss's interpretation of Plato's philosophy of the
Ideas and nature begins to take form as an articulation of a position between immanentist
dogmatism and a pursuit of the problems of transcendence. Socrates' friendship for the
sophists is emphasized above his opposition to the sophists by Strauss. The parallels of
Voegelin's description of the teaching of the sophists with the teachings of Strauss may begin
to explain the theoretically perplexing zetetic skepticism described by Stewart Umphrey in his
essay "Natural Right and Philosophy."34 Strauss's conception of Socratic philosophy as a life
of sense perception and the dialectics of categorization differs from Voegelin's interpretation
of the content of Socratic philosophy.
Voegelin's examination of the dialogue Protagoras illuminates Socrates by
understanding his life as a resistance to sophistic skepticism and immanentist dogmatism.
Voegelin's reading of Protagoras finds Socrates' encounter with the great sophist Protagoras

33 Ibid, pp. 308-309.
j4 Stewart H. Umphreys "Natural Right and Philosophy" in Leo Strauss: Political
Philosopher and Jewish Thinker, pp. 76-80, elaborates Strauss's position as a position
realizing the necessity of natural right but also understanding the problematic nature o f the
construct of natural right. Strauss's failure to articulate or address the divine ground of
natural right, except perhaps by silence, makes a comparison between himself and Protagoras
not altogether unfair. Strauss's dogmatic interpretation o f religious symbols and his emphasis
on nature when talking about the differences of men may place him within the parameters of
the "skeptical conservative" described by Voegelin.
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to be the point where Plato reveals the meaning of the unity of virtue and knowledge. The
famous Socratic teaching of the unity of virtue and knowledge is achieved once the art of
measurement is established to be virtue. The concept becomes relativistic and somewhat
senseless in terms of virtue if the Protagorean thesis holds that the measure of all things is
man. Each person would be incapable of teaching virtue if the sole measure of excellence
was the individual human being as each individual human being would be the judge of his
own self-construed excellence. Virtue can be taught only in light of a less relativistic
standard, the Platonic formulation that God is the measure. Voegelin states, "Whatever the
formulations of the historic' Socrates may have been, the essence of his identification of virtue
with knowledge, as a principle in opposition to the Sophists, makes sense only if the
distortions of time were meant to be corrected by the love of the measure that is out of
time."j5 The divine measure is the standard by which Voegelin understood the Socratic
resistance to the sophists. The next section will examine how the divine measure manifested
itself in Socrates' resistance to the corruption of his age.
Resistance and the Saving Mission of Socrates
Voegelin's Socrates is the paradigmatic life presented by Plato to reveal the shift of
authority from the city to the philosopher. The order of wisdom becomes the analogue of
cosmic order/6 This presentation of Socrates as a bearer of order certainly appears more
serious than the presentation of a Socrates who is made more prudent from the guidance of a

35 Eric Voegelin The World of the Polis. pp. 285-291.
' 6 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, p. 6.
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comic poet.37 It is perhaps important to note that the seriousness of an argument does not
prove or disprove the truthfulness of an argument, but it does present the existential tone in
which the argument is made. The question of whether life is more serious/tragic or comic
must at least for now remain open as we venture to uncover the nature of the Socrates that
will live a tragedy so true that his life and death will lead to an articulation of an order of
wisdom thoroughly differentiated from the previous cosmic order.
As we attempt to construct Voegelin's Socrates, we encounter an interesting fact.
Voegelin concedes that the reconstruction of an "historical" Socrates seems to be an
impossible task due to the lack of primaiy sources.38 Voegelin chooses to tell the story of
philosophy by reconstructing the drama of Socrates by focusing on Socrates' most gifted
student and future articulator o f the order of wisdom, Plato. Voegelin states, "The Socrates
who formed Plato was the Socrates as seen by Plato. "j9
The Voegelinian Socrates is the Platonic Socrates in the midst of a Voegelinian
meditative exegesis. An apparently trivial but perhaps significant pattern pervades Voegelin's

37 Leo Strauss Aristophanes and Socrates, pp. 3-8.
jS Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, pp. 6-7. Voegelin suggests the reader investigate the
Socratic problem by examining Werner Jaeger's chapter "The Memory of Socrates" in Paidia:
The Ideals of Greek Culture. II (New York, 1943), A.E. Taylor’s Socrates (New York,
1932), Olof Gigoris Sokrates: Sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschicte and Romano Guardini's
Per Tod des Sokrates (Dusseldorf and Munich, 1952). Voegelin is more generous in his
acknowledgement of classical scholarship in his writings regarding the classics than Strauss.
Strauss's pain-staking analysis of the text leaves little room for the critical commentaries of
others. Strauss's way of reading a text relied quite heavily on his own understanding of
natural right and philosophy and departed from traditional scholarship. Voegelin's own
scholarship appears to enthusiastically build upon the discoveries o f contemporary scholars
and scientists.
39 Ibid.. p. 7.
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work on the classical philosophers. Each section that begins the investigation of the
philosopher's experiential wrestling with the world and the beyond begins with a biographical
presentation of the life of the philosopher. It is not uncommon to use a story as a conceit to
capture the interest of a reader but in Voegelin's case these stories take on philosophical
import. A person is bom and dies in a world that is an arena of struggle for existence in truth
and a legitimate social order must represent this omnipresent fact. The presentation of a life
and its smuggle towards justice becomes the truest motif of philosophy. The contemplative
life is for both the contemplation o f that which is of ultimate concern and right action in the
world.40
The story of Socrates begins with the story of Plato. Voegelin begins his chapter
"Plato and Socrates" with the most humane image, Plato and his family lineage. The details
of social class and Plato's relation to the great statesman, Solon, bring our attention to a man
bom into an existence that is uncertain but permeated with a sense of right order. The origin
of the name Plato reminds us of the nature of existence in human society. Plato could either
refer to his robust figure, the breadth of his forehead or the platitudinous nature of his
arguments. The great are subject to the same affection or ridicule that confronts each
member of a community. Perhaps each member of the community is subject to the same
moral dilemmas, though perhaps o f a different magnitude, that confront the great? The stage
is set to investigate an articulation o f great import.

40 In Eric Voegelin's In Search o f Order. Ellis Sandoz's introduction, pp. 5-12, gives a
synopsis of this aspect of Voegelin's thought.
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Voegelin quickly conies to confront the question that presents itself in the
investigation of a man of noble birth who chooses to become a philosopher. Why would the
young Plato choose the life of philosophy and not the life of a politician? Perhaps the
troubled times of Plato's life may have failed to afford him the opportunity for a political
career? Voegelin cites the Seventh Letter and its discussion of how Plato's way to a political
career was blocked by certain affairs o f the polis. The injustice o f the Thirty Tyrants
disillusioned the young Plato, and he was especially shocked by the attempts o f the Thirty
Tyrants to involve citizens in criminal actions. Socrates' resistance to the Thirty impressed
the young Plato with the justness of Socrates, but politics would soon disillusion the young
Plato as "the justest man" is charged by the democratic regime that replaced the Tyrants with
impiety and sentenced to death.
The breakdown of political order and justice plunged Plato into contemplation o f
how the political situation of Athens could be improved. Voegelin's Plato took politics very
seriously. Plato's meditation revealed that only a "miraculous occurrence" could resolve the
crisis of the poleis. This "miraculous occurrence" would be the coincidence of philosophy
and power. Voegelin argues that the Platonic dialogue Gorgias is the dialogue in which Plato
captures legitimate authority from the city and transfers that authority to the philosopher, but
we will more thoroughly investigate this argument later in this section. The rulership of
philosopher-kings became the focus of Plato's effort to reform Hellas. He began his efforts
by trying to bring about this miraculous occurrence within a Greek polis in Sicily but met
with the resistance of an unphilosophic, young tyrant. Plato's failure in the arena of Hellenic
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politics is not of utmost importance for Voegelin. Instead his legacy o f the love of wisdom
and the authority of the life in search o f wisdom becomes the key to measure the importance
and impact of Plato's life work. In a later chapter we will investigate the full articulation of
the authority of wisdom but for now we will attempt to follow Voegelin's investigation of the
beginnings of the philosophic and authoritative life in "the paradigmatic life and death of
Socrates." How Voegelin understands the paradigmatic Socrates will shed light upon the
meaning of the contemplative life and how that life evolved in the meditations of Plato.
Voegelin begins his investigation of the Platonic Socrates in the Socratic dialogue of
arguably the highest drama, the Apology. The direction of Voegelin's inquiry is made clear
by the first sentence of his analysis. He states, "The divine regenerative force of order,
transmitted by Socrates to Plato, had come to Socrates from the omphalos of Hellas, from
Delphi."41 Voegelin's first words on the Platonic Socrates begin with both the recognition of
the divine regenerative force of the Socratic dialogue and its origins within the historically
sacred center of Hellenic civilization, Delphi. Socrates' mission as philosopher begins through
the impetus of the oracle of Delphi's assertion that no one was wiser than Socrates. The
famed Socratic ignorance made this answer puzzling to Socrates and led him to investigate
its verity by engaging in conversations with men who were reputed to be wise. Socrates'
conversations led him to uncover the essential ignorance regarding what is truly "good and
beautiful" among those presumed to be wise. Worse yet, their ignorance was combined with
an immeasurable pride that led them to pretend knowledge which they did not possess.

41 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, pp. 6-7
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Socratic ignorance became the center piece of wisdom at its best among men. Socrates'
investigation of divine pronouncements and uncovering their verity is the grounds of the piety
of the new order of wisdom. It would not be an unfair assessment to argue that the Platonic
Socrates as understood by Voegelin enters into a dialogue with the divine.
This dialogue with the divine and the irritation it causes the proud is at the root of
Socrates' indictment for impiety (asbeia). The irony of this charge becomes the focus of the
Voegelinian analysis o f the life of Socrates. Voegelin proclaims, "The man who stands before
them accused of asbeia is the true servant of divine order, sent by the Delphian god to save
the impious accusers.1,42 The order of questioning becomes the way o f resisting the
rottenness that had become socially predominant in the polis confronting the divinely
appointed Socrates. Voegelin carries this motif through to its exact meaning by examining
the trial o f Socrates as, in essence, three actions contained within the drama. Voegelin
contends, "In the speeches of the defense three actions are going on at the same time: the
trial of Socrates ending in his condemnation; the trial of Athens ending in the rejection of the
savior, and the separation of Socrates from the polis ending in the solitude of his death."4"
Voegelin views the trial of Socrates as Socrates' successful refutation of the
accusation of impiety. This accusation is determined to be unfounded on the grounds that a
man who serves the god o f Delphi cannot be impious. The Socratic mission to reform the
polis through discovering the essential ignorance of its citizenry has divine sanction from the

42 Jbid, p. 8.
43 Ibid.
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highest source of sacred authority within the Hellenic world. Further, Socrates rejects the
charge of impiety through his own personal connection to the divine, the Daimonion or the
divine voice that guided Socrates to desist from dangerous or perhaps impious undertakings.
It is noteworthy that Voegelin comments only negatively regarding the charge against
Socrates that he introduced new gods into the city. Apparently Voegelin's understanding of
the process of differentiation makes this type of impiety unlikely. It is only possible to make
the transcendent realm more or less clear or perhaps eclipse this realm but philosophy as
founded by Socrates does not attempt to eclipse reality. Socrates articulates a clearer picture
o f reality and the subsequent charges against him regarding the introduction o f new gods into
the city are nonsensical.
The Thucydidean description of the disorder of the Hellenic world is recollected by
Voegelin to reconstruct the moral situation confronting Socrates. It was no longer possible
to speak o f constitutional reforms because of the depth of the corruption that had grasped the
polis. Voegelin asserts:
The direct appeal to the individual citizen had become necessary; and the
pathos of the Periclean Funeral Oration had become the reforming will of the
devoted citizen. Power and spirit had separated in the polis so far that a
reunion through ordinary means o f political action had become impossible.
Socrates speaks as the representative of the divine power of Hellas; and he
stresses the irony that he, the only Athenian who believes in the gods to such
a degree that he follows their orders and risks his life, is accused of impiety by
the very men whose disbelief in things divine is reason for decay.44

44 Ibid.. pp. 8-9
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Voegelin once again points to the divine nature of the mission of Socrates and the source of
social disorder in a "disbelief in things divine." The mixture of the conception of the "divine
power of Hellas" with "belief1presents an interesting component o f Voegelin's meditation on
order. Culture appears to be able to become a vessel of the most high and the sanctity of that
vessel revolves around the "belief' of its participants in the divine nature contained within a
given cultural order. The conviction of Socrates is ultimately a failure to believe in the
relation of a culture to its divine source. As Voegelin recounts the verdict of guilty, he
alludes to the fact that the import o f this verdict and its meaning for Hellenic culture is not far
from the minds of at least a minority of the jury. Nevertheless, the jury's verdict o f 281 guilty
and 219 not guilty moves this momentous drama to its second action, the trial of Athens.
The rejection of a society’s spiritual roots is the rejection of a society's sense of
legitimacy. Voegelin states: "The manifestation of the Delphian god in Socrates had been
revealed, as well as his mission for the polis. Now the people had judged Socrates, and the
gods had condemned the people."45 The second action of the trial is how Socrates confronts
his condemnation and manifests the judgment of the gods. Socrates reveals the gods'
judgment as he is asked to make a counter-proposal to his sentence o f death so that the jury
may decide upon his punishment. Socrates returns to the spiritual roots of his culture as he
uses almost verbatim the Xenophantic formula that demands for the philosophers an honor
that has been reserved for the greatest benefactors of the city, a place at the public table in the
Prytaneion. The Socrates of Voegelin makes this demand as a final call to justice for the city.

45 Ibid, p. 9
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Voegelin notes, "the situation has changed from the first insight into the order of wisdom and
a reproach by the mystic-philosopher, to the inexorable call to duty by the savior who, facing
death, acts as the instrument of God."46
Voegelin argues that this Socratic assertion is serious though Socrates realizes the
unlikelihood that his just demand will be met by an unjust city. The request is in many
respects the essence of tragedy. The hope for justice is destroyed by persons cold to the
questions o f justice. The coldness of the jury to the justness of the Socratic proposal forces
Socrates to consider another alternative more in the spirit of the jury's condemnation.
Socrates refuses to consider either jail or exile for both would be an admission of guilt and
that would be an injustice Socrates could not impose upon himself. Yet in obedience to the
law Socrates proposes a minimum fine for his offense. Socrates is condemned by the court to
death and with the pronouncement o f his death sentence Athens repudiates the sacred and
growing roots of its order. The Socrates who sought to save the city is sacrificed by those
who appear to be dead to the spiritual issues at hand and to the tragedy that is unfolding
before them.
Voegelin's analysis of the third action of the Apology. Socrates' separation from
Athens and his revelation of the order that governed his actions. The futility of the acts of the
unjust to avoid the censure of Socrates is the final theme of the Apology. Socrates assures
the jurors who found him guilty that they had incurred a sad fame as the men who killed
Socrates, but he makes it clear to them that others would come and demand an account of the

46 Ibid.
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jurors' actions. Socrates spoke separately to the jurors who found him guilty and assured
them that his sentence contained the divine sanction by telling them that his Daimonion did
not warn him away from the course that had brought him to this moment. Voegelin's
treatment of the Apology ends with an uncovering of the meaning of the order founded by
Socrates. He states:
The Apology concludes with the great theme that will run through the work
of Plato: "And now it is time for us to go, I to die, and you to live." The
philosopher's life toward death and the judgment in eternity separates from
the life of the dead souls. And then the pathos of the moment is relieved by
the last irony of Socratic ignorance: "Who of us takes the better way, is
hidden to all except to the God.”47
The idea of souls that are dead to questioning and standards that are beyond the issues of
personal comfort or political convenience acts as the central theme of the Platonic dialogues
as they are understood by Voegelin. The participatory nature of order as the meeting of the
soul and the divine becomes the theme that enables Voegelin to view the Platonic dialogues
as the new bearer of socially effective order not only in Hellas but for humanity. The political
cult of tragedy that animated Athens by uniting power and spirit is replaced by the drama and
myth of the Socratic soul. The anthropological differentiation represents the clarity of human
responsibility for political order and makes the demand that the order of the soul should
become an issue for each human being.
Voegelin enters into a preliminary investigation of why the dialogue becomes the
symbolic form for the new order of wisdom. He initially examines the issue of Aeschylus'

47 Ibid.. p. 10.
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influence on Plato and uncovers the Aeschylean problem o f Peitho, the persuasive imposition
of right order on the passions. Voegelin alludes to the struggle for Dike as it unfolds in the
Aeschylean Prometheus. He believes the solution to this struggle lies in the direction of
redemption through the representative suffering of Heracles. He articulates the drama of the
soul as "the substance of the process of history." Interiority becomes essential for an effective
order under Dike, and when the people no longer experience the drama of Dike as the drama
of their own souls the order becomes pragmatically non-authoritative. The ensuing chaos
creates social disorder and as the disorder is resisted, senselessness permeates the previous
symbols of order. Voegelin states:
The tension of order and passion that had been mastered by the cult of
tragedy had broken into the open conflict between Socrates and Athens. The
cult had become senseless because from now on tragedy had only one subject
matter, the fate of Socrates. In so far as the Platonic dialogue was animated
by the tension between Socrates and Athens, it was in the history of Hellenic
symbolic forms the successor to Aeschylean tragedy under the new political
conditions.48
The dialogue of the lone philosopher with the city evolves as the symbolically accurate
representation of right order when the citizenry is no longer moved by the experience of Dike
as authoritative. The political conditions symbolically represented by the Melian dialogue
crushed the authoritativeness of the political cult of tragedy and transferred authority away
from the city towards a man who would resist the unmysterious and closed formulations of
Athenian statesmen and generals.

48 Ibid.. p. 11.
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But we, along with Voegelin, may ask, are compelled to ask, why does tragedy and
later the Platonic dialogue emerge and become representative of right order? Voegelin seeks
the authoritative nature of the symbolic forms of tragedy and philosophy within Aeschylus'
and Plato's understanding of society as an order of the soul and the order of the soul as a
social order of forces. Struggle or the Agon o f forces demands the dramatic presentation of
this struggle. Voegelin speaks favorably of the dramatic conception of order when he
comments on the conditions necessary to replace the dramatic form with a nondramatic form.
He states:
For the present we shall only stress the conception of order as an Agon of
forces that will not give way to a nondramatic conception until the victory for
wisdom and justice is achieved. Only when the tension of conflict has
subsided and the new order is established can its expression assume the form
of a static dogma or a metaphysical proposition. Tendencies in this direction
are to be observed in the late work of Plato; and the nondramatic form breaks
through in the esoteric work of Aristotle. This victory of the new order has,
however, the unsatisfactory consequence that the "bad man" of the dramatic
play gets lost.49
The form of drama leaves open the possibility o f evil, whereas the nondramatic form
presumes a triumph that is inevitable. The drama is in some sense a refusal to succumb to a
theodicy and is a testimony to the tragic nature o f existence.
The movement from the cult of tragedy to the tragedy of Socrates is a movement
from public discourse to discourse with the private citizen. The dialogue stands opposed to
oration and rhetoric because it demands an openness to truth and denies the validity of the
injustice that is exoterically presented within public rhetoric. According to Voegelin, the

49 Ibid.
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dialogue restores the common order of the spirit that is destroyed by the privatization of
rhetoric. However, the effectiveness of the dialogue against the disorder of oration occurs on
the existential level and it is not necessarily effective. Voegelin states:
In the concrete situation, among the living, however, the law of the dialogue
cannot be enforced. The opponent will not listen at all, or he will respond
with rhetoric and thereby break the possibility of communication, or he will
enter the argument but not be moved existentially even when he is beaten
intellectually. The order o f Athens was not regenerated either by Socrates or
Plato. Socrates had to die in the attempt. And Dike achieved no victory. Is
the dialogue a futile gesture after all?50
The uncertainty of success underscores the tragic nature of the dialogue. Nevertheless, the
presence of persuasive or existentially compelling forces establishes the authority of the
dialogue and the necessity of its tragic sense. These forces, Thanatos, Eros and Dike are the
governing motifs of the Socratic life, the life in search of truth.
Voegelin describes Thanatos as a liberating force. He contends, "Thanatos is the
force that orders the soul of the living, for it makes them desirous of stripping themselves of
everything that is not noble and just."51 By referring to the myth of the Judgment of the Dead
in both the Gorgias and the Republic. Voegelin develops the conception of how death strips
away earthly achievements and presents human beings before judges who see through the
human artifices that hide the injustices of the unjust. The dialogue acts as a "mythical
judgment" and is a fulfillment of Socrates' promise that the questioning that annoyed the
Athenian jurors would not halt with his death. The effectiveness of the dialogue is dependent

50 IMA, P- 12.
51 Ibid.
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upon its ability to touch the common core of humanity. The trial of Athens is continued on
through the medium o f the dialogue and its appeal to a humanity stripped of baseness by its
meditation on death. The illness of life is cured in the mythic death of the Judgment of the
Dead. Despite its cathartic power, Thanatos does not act alone. Eros or love plays an
important part in the order evoked by the drama of Socrates.
The political import of the dialogue emerges as the passion that can draw persons
together to act in history. The power of the Socratic Eros begins to work within the
community of friends. Voegelin declares, "To create existential community through
developing the other man's true humanity in the image of his own—that is the work of
Socratic Eros."32 Voegelin goes on to describe this process:
The older man, Socrates, speaks to the younger man and, through the power
o f his soul, awakens in him the echoing desire for the Good. The Idea of the
Good, evoked in the communion of the dialogue, fills the souls of those who
participate in the evocative act. And thus it becomes the sacramental bond
between them and creates the nucleus of a new society.53
Within this sacramental bond begins the Platonic attempt to form a theocratic Hellenic state.
A spiritual hierarchy emerges in response to the power of the erotic relationship and with this
hierarchy the foundation of a new political order animates the Hellenic world. The life of
Socrates becomes politically present through the master work of the Platonic dialogue.
Transpolitical grounds, the idea of the Good, become the constitutive force of an attempt of

52 Ibid.. p. 13.
53 Ibid.
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the post-Peloponnesian war Hellenic world to restore the cult of Dike as existentially
authoritative.
After describing the positive program o f the Platonic project governed by the
paradigmatic life of Socrates, Voegelin goes on to examine the influence of the Platonic eros
within the political community o f the Hellenes. The movement of the erotic relationship of
the friends and Plato's attempts to make the Idea authoritative within the world is described in
two instances: Plato's relationship with Sicily in the West and his relationship with Hermias in
the East. Each highlights the drama of the unfolding of the new order of wisdom.
Voegelin begins his meditation on eros and the world with Plato's Sicilian connection.
He notes that Plato's political dealings with Sicily are not a continuous action and begin and
end with the happenings of chance. Further, Voegelin points out that the vast corpus of
Plato's political thought was formulated prior to his experience in the politics of Sicily.
Plato's political efforts are representative of his mature thought.
According to Voegelin, Plato's mature thought focuses upon the divine, the divine in
man and the love of that divine element that creates political order. Voegelin examines the
Seventh Letter as the constitution emerging from the divine eroticism that orients a political
community toward right action. The Seventh Letter recounts an attempt to resurrect the
erotic relationship between Plato and Dion within a community of friends after the
disheartening event of the assassination of Dion. This community will lie upon the grounds of
a mutual pursuit of excellence and the authority o f persuasion. If persuasion has no effect,
the philosopher, like the physician, will cease to prescribe treatment.
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The Platonic mission to Sicily revolves around Plato's attempt to educate the young
ruler Dionysius II in such a way as to make him capable o f becoming the center of the
friendship of excellence that is essential to a well-ordered community. Dionysius' rejection of
the hard road to intelligence and temperance embodied in the Seventh Letter destroys the
erotic union essential to the regeneration of the polis. The divinity of this undertaking is
traced by Voegelin to the Phaedrus and its description o f the pre-existent souls of lovers.
Divinity and order are intertwined in this erotic tale. Voegelin states, "They search
their own souls: and they find their own divine nature in their fascinated gaze at the nature of
the god in the beloved."54 He goes on in his commentary on the Phaedrus to elaborate the
relation of lovers to the political order. Within Plato's work Voegelin discovers:
Not all souls, however, have followed the same god in their pre-existence.
And only those who have followed Zeus are the chosen instruments for
actualizing the god o f political order in society. The symbol the "sons o f
Zeus" has its experiential basis in the eroticism of the philosopher-ruler.55
The erotic and divine relationship with Dion is even more firmly alluded to by Hildebrandt's
observation that within the Phaedrus the genitive for Zeus is used as opposed to the
nominative leading to the construct Dios dion. The divine, friendship and political order are
articulated to such a degree that the cosmological representation of order is differentiated into
an anthropological representation of that order.
The implications of a community based upon erotic bonds is a questioning of the
fixed construct of order. An open construct of order is implied by Plato's warnings regarding

54 Ibid.. p. 18.
35 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

163

the writing down of his teachings. Voegelin points to the Sixth and Seventh Letters as
sources for this particular twist of this Platonic teaching. He cites, "Therefore I have never
written anything on it [i.e., on the essence of philosophy], and that is the reason why there is
not and never will be any writings by Plato himself but those which go by his name, are by
Socrates who has become beautiful and young."56 The imitation of Socrates and the divinely
erotic relationship between Socrates and Plato once again becomes the focus of Voegelin's
inquuy into the epoch of history defined by the differentiation of philosophy. The eastern
reach of this eroticism becomes the final focus of Voegelin's investigation of "Plato and
Socrates."
The Sixth Letter to Hermias of Atameus is Voegelin's focus as he examines
Platonism's historic destiny in the East. The Sixth Letter is the founding document of a
wedding between philosophy and rulership. This wedding involves two students from Plato's
Academy, Erastus and Coriscus, and the prince Hermias. Apparently through the advice of
the Platonists, Hermias moderated his tyranny and increased the size of his realm by attracting
other regions to join his dominion. Evidence for a Platonic circle in this region is significant
given the fact that Aristotle and Xenocrates joined Erastus and Coriscus in Assos. Voegelin
notes the strength of this circle by pointing to the likelihood of Aristotle being married to the
niece of the ruler, Hermias.
The great hope of a Hellenic federation that was rooted in the Platonic meditations is
revealed by Hermias’ efforts on behalf of Macedonia and his final words as he was crucified

56 Ibid, p. 20.
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by the Persian Satrap upon discovery o f his role in preparing the way for Hellenic hegemony
in Asia. He requested, "Tell my friends and companions that I have done nothing unworthy
of philosophy or weak."57 His last request has particular power within the context of erotic
friendship, the loving quest of the philosopher and the attempt to bring these movements into
pragmatic history by founding a theocratic Hellenic state.
Historically, Platonism, if not Platonism rightly understood, laid the grounds for the
imitatio Achillis undertaken by the most famous student of Aristotle. We may infer from
Voegelin's presentation that the political climate of the eastern Mediterranean created by
Platonism played an important role in opening the way for the first attempt to conquer the
world. The status of this concupiscential quest can be gathered by Voegelin's reference to the
sense of the letter that began the quest for an Hellenic empire. He elaborates:
The philosopher and the king have, indeed, entered into the existential
communion o f philia. Their bond is the faith that was kindled by Plato. In
his name they should cling to each other, and to his healing power they
should refer any strains on their bond. We see emerging in outline the
conception of an Hellenic theocratic empire o f federated communities of
Platonists with its center in the Academy. The sacred symbol of the union
between the companions is the Letter, to be read and re-read in communion.
The rite of reading it and swearing to it should be celebrated in the mood of
suspense between seriousness and play which is the appropriate mood toward
a myth. And they should swear by the guiding god as well as by the father of
the guide and author—a theological symbolism which at this period of Plato's
life probably signifies the divine forces of the Timaeiis, that is. nous-inpsyche and the Demiurge.38

57 Ibid.. p. 21.
58 Ibid.. p. 23.
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The preservation o f friendship promised by the mystic philosopher is argued to be rooted in
divine forces. The abandonment of moderation along with the abandonment o f faith in the
beyond implicit in an attempt at universal conquest is indicative o f the direction of a Platonic
criticism of Alexander's attempt to conquer the world. In a certain sense this critique is
contained within the drama o f the Gorgias where the philosopher confronts the politician.
Existential authority remains within the hands of the philosopher and not the politician despite
the dramatic changes of the political climate. A close examination of the Gorgias will reveal
the order of the paradigmatic Socrates.
The Gorgias holds a special place within the Platonic corpus for Voegelin. In the
Gorgias, Plato uses the paradigmatic Socrates as the moving force to transfer representational
authority from the politicians and people of Athens to himself. The necessity of this transfer
of authority is revealed through the unfolding of the dialogue.
Voegelin clearly presents what is at stake in the Gorgias. He states, "the substance of
man is at stake, not a philosophical problem in the modem sense."59 In the midst of an
intellectual climate that is enraptured with a project of deconstruction, the question regarding
what is this substance of man or is there even such a thing as a substance of man becomes
extremely problematic. For Voegelin, the problem confronting the Platonic Socrates is not of
the type of question confronting our modem philosophy. Instead, the Platonic Socrates
forces Gorgias, an intellectual of his time, to face the heaviest of all existential questions,

59 Ittd . p. 24.
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"who are you?," and this intellectual is not spared the rigors of a moral universe. This
dialogue, like the Republic, will revolve around the question ofjustice.
Voegelin begins by focusing on the comedy of the drama by attending to Gorgias’
embarrassment by his hard-hearted and thick-witted student, Polus. Gorgias’ failings as a
teacher ofjustice are betrayed by the failing of his student to distinguish between existential
honesty and intellectual debate. The requirement of existential honesty is imposed upon
Polus by Socrates' refusal to be subject to the existential insensitivity of rhetorical debate.
Voegelin notes, "Polus will have to restrain the prolixity of speech (makrologia) in which he
indulged earlier, because the interminable flow of suave cliches in his speech makes discussion
impossible. The condition o f Socrates touches upon a problem, familiar to all o f us who have
had experiences with rightist or leftist intellectuals."60 Socrates' easy handling o f Polus after
his own threat to leave unless Polus participated in dialogue as opposed to monologue
understandably has a comic effect, especially for a person who had to endure similar
experiential torments. The comedy ends with Socrates' philosophical triumph over Polus and
Polus' refusal to accept the results of the ethically and philosophically sound position that a
person should avoid injustice for his own enlightened self-interest.
Polus' refusal to be existentially moved by the argument for justice turns the dialogue
towards the spiritually significant moment when Callicles, the public representative of the
corrupt Athenian order, enters the debate. Callicles begins this important movement with the
observation that if Socrates is right then the present social order of Athens is wrong. Callicles

60 Ibid, p. 26
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and his love o f the people of Athens represent the bad eros described in the Republic.
whereas Socrates and his love of truth represent the good eros.61 The clash of philosophies
of existence will unfold within the dialogue but why would Socrates engage in a battle that
promises the same results as the previous discussion with Polus?
If communication is to take place and community is to be restored, Voegelin argues
that this debate must go deeper than an agreement regarding principles of conduct or the level
of politics. The level of communication must lie deeper than the level of politics. This level,
which underlies the political, is the level of pathos. Voegelin describes Plato's conception of
pathos as "what men have in common, however variable it may be in its aspects and
intensities. Pathos designates a passive experience, not an action; it is what happens to man,
what he suffers, what befalls him fatefully and what touches him in his existential core—as for
instance the experiences of Eros (481c-d)."62 The possibility of uncovering this binding force
opens the possibility to find a common ground of authority. At the level of pathos, the rules
of political struggle are suspended. Voegelin states, "however false and grotesque the
intellectual position may be, the pathos at the core has the truth of an immediate experience.
If one can penetrate to this core and reawaken in a man the awareness of his conditio
hxanana, communication in an existential sense becomes possible."6"
The ineffectiveness of Socrates' appeals to both Polus and Callicles uncovers an
existential issue o f immense importance. The common experiences of human beings can be

61 Ibid, p. 26.
62 Ibid.. p . 29.
63 Ibid, P 30.
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rejected as authoritative by those holding political power. By this act, they appear to forfeit
their humanity. Voegelin asks what is the appropriate response to persons who have turned
away from human community? Plato's Gorgias makes a powerful statement by rejecting the
extermination of the meivfaeasts as the means of maintaining a community rooted in shared
experiences. The Gorgias resolves the breakdown of political society by an appeal to the core
experiences of humanity. Voegelin elaborates:
The conclusion of the Gorgias formulates the conditions under which the
community of mankind can be maintained even when on the level of concrete
society it has broken down. The condition is the faith in the transcendental
community of man. The incrustation o f the evildoer that remains
impenetrable to the human appeal will fall off in death and leave the soul
naked before the eternal judge. The order that has been broken in life will be
restored in afterlife. In the logique chi coeiir the Judgement of the Dead is the
answer to the failure of communication in life.64
The prevalence of the judgment myth throughout different times and different communities
opens our minds to examine how this myth can restore the bonds of human community that
have been shattered by concrete political actions, but we must first understand what this myth
stands against.
Voegelin claims that Callicles is the representative of the inverted philosophy of
existence that stands against the Socratic order of wisdom that is enforced by the existential
power of the Judgment of the Dead. Attention to the structure o f the debate between
Callicles and Socrates is important because it contains many of the issues that stand between
Strauss and Voegelin.

64 Ibid.
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For Callicles, nature is the primary reality and by asserting the authority ofphysis man
fulfills the meaning of his life. In many respects, Callicles1position is the position of the tyrant
but as Socrates reminds him, his position is philosophically weak because (1) the weak many
can be stronger than the strong few or one and (2) the cowardly man can have greater
pleasure than the courageous man. These facts bring the rationality of Callicles1preference
for the unjust life of power politics into serious doubt. After Callicles is forced to admit the
difference between the good and bad pleasures, he is subjected to the full force of the
argument for the eros o f Socrates. Voegelin summarizes this argument in quite an effective
manner. He states:
Only if the soul is well-ordered can it be called lawful (<nomimos) (504d); and
only if it has the right order (nomos) is it capable of entering into communion
(koinonia) (507e). The pathos is no more than a precondition for
community; in order to actualize it, the Eros must be oriented towards the
Good (agathon) and the disturbing passions must be restrained by
Sophrosyne. If the lusts are unrestrained, man will lead the life of a robber
(lestes). Such a man cannot be the friend (prosphiles) of God or other men,
for he is incapable of communion, and who is incapable of communion is
incapable of friendship (philia) (507e). Friendship, philia, is Plato's term for
the state of existential community. Philia is the existential bond among men;
and it is the bond as well between Heaven and Earth, man and God. Because
philia and order pervade everything, the universe is called kosmos (order) and
not disorder or license (akosmia, akolasia) (508a).65
The egotism of the corrupt statesman is an insufficient ground for human community. Order
is founded upon sturdier grounds and on the authority of these sturdier grounds the dialogue
continues.

65 Ibid, p. 36.
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On the strength of the preceding argument, Socrates presents the three evils that a
man should avoid. These evils are: (1) it is bad to suffer injustice; (2) it is worse to commit
injustice; and (3) it is worst to remain in the disorder of the soul which is created by doing
injustice and not to experience the restoration o f order through punishment. These precepts
eventually lead Socrates to the conclusion that cooperating with "the powers that be" as
comipt as they are is a misfortune to be avoided. Callicles fails to entice Socrates with
promises of benefit and raises the stakes by alluding to the death that awaits the
uncooperative. Voegelin brings our attention to the dynamics of the situation. He states,
"The situation is fascinating for those among us who find ourselves in the Platonic position
and who recognize in the men with whom we associate today the intellectual pimps for power
who will connive in our murder tomorrow."66
The pervading presence of corruption within the Athenian polis makes Callicles
representative of the decaying society. The criteria for goodness and badness are revealed to
be defined in terms o f advancing or decomposing the order of existence. On the basis of this
definition, Voegelin contends that the authority of spiritual representation shifts to SocratesPlato. He states:
This last formulation, by which Plato claims for himself the true statesmanship
of his time, is important in several respects. In the construction of the
Gorgias, this claim destroys the authority of Callicles to give advice to
anybody with regard to public conduct. The man who stands convicted as
the accomplice of tyrannical murderers and as the corrupter of his country,
does not represent spiritual order, and nobody is obliged to show respect to
his word. The authority of public order lies with Socrates. With regard to
the relation o f Plato to Athens the claim stigmatizes the politicians who are
66 Ibid, P 37
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obsessed by the "love of the people" {dement Eros, 513c) as the "adversaries"
{antistasiotes, 513c) of the existential order represented by Socrates-Plato;
the authoritative order is transferred from the people of Athens and its leaders
to the one man Plato. Surprising as this move may seem to many, Plato's
claim has proved historically quite sound. The order represented by Callicles
has gone down in ignominy; the order represented by Plato has survived
Athens and is still one of the most important ingredients in the order of the
soul of those men who have not renounced the traditions o f Western
civilization.67
The order that is based merely upon the appearances of earthly goods makes way for the
order that asserts a transpolitical grounds to the order of human society. Voegelin's analysis
of the Judgment of the Dead illuminates the direction of the transpolitical grounds of order.
Perhaps the most important thing to state about Voegelin’s understanding of the
Judgment of the Dead is the last thing Voegelin mentions about this myth in his chapter
concerning the Gorgias. The Judgment o f the Dead should not be taken as a dogmatic
symbol for fear that the Judgment and its curing punishments may result in dogmatic
derailments similar to some instances of Calvinism that look at the predestination of the soul
as a grounds for avoiding the painfril search for right action in the here and now because the
fate of the soul is already sealed.68 Voegelin contends that this myth must be understood
existentially and through his interpretation of the Judgment he recreates the drama of the soul
that he believes is the central theme of the life of Socrates and the dialogues of Plato.
The transpolitical grounds that enable Plato to claim political authority for himself lay
in the uncovering of the existential comiption of Athens and her statesmen. The drama o f the

67 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
68 fojA. p. 45.
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soul stands prior to the order of political society. The uncovering of the corruption of
Callicles leads Socrates to assert that there are fates worse than death and he illustrates these
fetes through a myth that promises justice.
Socrates calls upon the mythology of Hellas to develop a myth with existential
authority. He begins with recalling the order of the past that made injustice possible, the
judgment o f the dead in this lifetime. He states how judging when both the judges and the
judged were alive was precarious because the judges could be deceived by the clothes of the
judged. However, this weakness was eliminated by the decree of Zeus that all would be
judged after death by the dead sons of Zeus. Injustice would be appropriately punished
when the purity or corruption of a soul stood apart from its worldly achievements and the
judges themselves were disinterested in the opinions of men. We may wonder how this myth
works in a non-dogmatic fashion. What are the existential issues clarified by this judgment?
By returning to the Phaedrus. Voegelin discovers the existential workings of the
Judgment o f the Dead. The sons of Zeus are revealed to be the philosophers who followed
Zeus in the preexistence. The philosophers are the source o f authority in the New Age. The
play with the symbols life and death brings a powerful meaning to a myth that may be easily
dismissed as a dogmatic symbolism o f no existential importance.
Voegelin states, "Death can mean either the entombment of the soul in its earthly
body, or the shedding of the body. Life can mean either earthly existence, or freedom of the
soul from the frenzy of the body."69 The ambiguity of these symbols leads to a myth that has

69 Ibid.. p. 42.
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the ability to penetrate the corruption of Athenian society. Leaders, such as Callicles, are
dead insofar that they are entombed in the body of their passions. Philosophers, such as
Socrates and Plato, are alive insofar that they are free of the tomb of the passions.

It is

interesting that Voegelin, a man who defined the essence of modernity as gnosticism, does
not emphasize the gnostic possibilities of this Platonic symbolism.70 Perhaps the experiential
linkage of thanatos, eros, and dike and the ambiguity of the symbols life and death maintain a
tension that prevents the collapse of immanent and transcendent poles of reality into a dogma
of immanence or transcendence. Voegelin illustrates this tension through his explication of
the life of Socrates. He states:
The life and death of Socrates were the decisive events in the discovery and
liberation o f the soul. The soul of Socrates was oriented towards the
Agathon through its eroticism; and the Agathon invaded the soul with its
eternal substance, thereby creating the autonomous order of the soul beyond
the passions of the body.... The life of Socrates was the great model of the
liberation of the soul through the invasion of death into earthly existence; and
the imitatio Socratis had become the order of life for his followers, and above
all for Plato. Only now, when the Sons of Zeus have died, when death
embraces them in life, is the catharsis of the soul revealed as the true meaning
of life; and only the souls who have died have the clearness of view which
enables them to judge the "living." The authority of the judges, thus, is the
authority of death over life.71
A hierarchy of values emerges as a standard of authority reveals itself or is intuited by
Socrates-Plato. Life in view of death brings into question the pleasures typically associated
with life. This transpolitical view allows justice to be restored and perhaps only with the

70 Hans Gadamer’s “Philosophizing in Opposition: Strauss and Voegelin on
Communication and Science,” p. 253, mentions the alien nature of the world in Plato
and how it differs from the gnostic experience.
71 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, p. 43
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guidance of persons who are attuned to this standard o f justice by their death to the earthly
passions may a just political order be manifested. But what about those who refuse to die to
their earthly passions?
Voegelin argues that the old myth that offered an order where the soul was in the
world is made decadent by greed and reason. The Socratic-Platonic articulation of
philosophy makes it an honest impossibility to retreat into the old order. Voegelin states, "To
bury oneself in the tomb of bodily existence (the escape of Callicles) is of no avail; the way
from the old myth leads, not to the darkness of nature, but to the life of the soul; and the soul
must die and divested of its body, stand before its judge."72 The positive appeal of Socrates is
to embrace the new order that seeks excellence apart from the pleasures of the hedonist. The
struggle to exist in truth is well worth the effort for it wall lead to eiidaimonia in this life and
after death, but it entails a price and that price is the price of justice. With this revelation, the
clarity of Socrates' connection with tragedy and the wisdom of suffering is articulated.
The Socratic-Platonic definition of justice that sets forth that it is bad to suffer
injustice, it is worse to do injustice, and it is worse yet to do injustice and go unpunished,
leads the person who would be just to the difficult position of embracing punishment and its
purifying power. Voegelin contends:
Those who are touchable by it are those whose misdeeds (hamartemata) are
curable; they are able to undergo the purification by pain and suffering.... In
this idea of the catharsis through suffering in this world or the next, there can
again be felt the Aeschylean touch of the wisdom through suffering as the
great law of the psyche for gods and men.73
72 Ibid.
73 Ib ii, pp. 44-45.
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The painful action o f questioning of one's actions within the context o f death and in the
presence of the Good is the requirement o f the state of blessed happiness. Those closing
themselves off to this new articulation are sentenced by Plato to eternal condemnation.
Voegelin interprets what this eternal condemnation means in existential terms. He states:
In the symbolism of the myth eternal condemnation is the correlate to the
refusal of communication on the level of the myth of the soul; eternal
condemnation means in existential terms, self-excommunication. The
revelation of the divinity in history moves on; the authority rests with the men
who live in friendship with God; the criminal can achieve nothing but the
perdition of his soul.74
The discovery of the Platonic Socrates is that the new order of wisdom and the soul that is
articulated with that wisdom cannot be ignored. Decision is mandatory and the action of
decision is not without cost. Suffering or spiritual death stand before each soul. It does not
appear that Voegelin's articulation of classic philosophy permits a non-tragic decision.
The drama o f this tragedy is made clear by Voegelin's reflections on natural right in
his work Anamnesis. He states:
In this identification of truth with the concrete, there emerges the almost
forgotten knowledge of the philosopher, that ethics is not a matter of moral
principles, nor a retreat from the complexities of the world, nor a contraction
o f existence into eschatological expectation or readiness, but a matter of the
truth of existence in the reality of action in concrete situations. What matters
is not correct principles about what is right by nature in an immutable
generality, nor the acute consciousness of the tension between immutable
truth and its mutable application (possibly even with tragic overtones), but the
changeability, the kineton itselfj and the methods to lift it to the reality of
truth. The truth of existence is attained where it becomes concrete, i.e.. in
action.75
74 Ibid.. p. 45.
75 Eric Voegelin Anamnesis, p. 63.
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Though a tragical meditation may confront the philosopher, the focus of philosophy as
understood by both Voegelin and his Socrates-Plato is the attainment of truth through acts of
participation that make the truth of existence concrete. The movements that make this
possible whether they are a Platonic dialogue, a mystic's meditations, or a cosmological
speculation have the authority of concrete engagement with the most serious problems of
existence. Political authority is legitimated insofar that the source of political authority is
open to the existential truth confronting its citizens. Voegelin's meditation on Socrates
articulates this reality and brings into question a picture of Socrates as a philosopher of
decadence and presents us with a savior who brings the souls of Athenians to life through
death. This compelling meditation places philosophy in an equivalent position to the great
religious insights of human history. We may wonder whether this vision accurately represents
the philosophic life?
Is the Socratic life, the life of the suffering servant? Leo Strauss, while believing the
hope of modernity lies with a revival o f classic philosophy, would heartily disagree with the
presentation of Socrates as the suffering servant. We are compelled to look further to see
what alternative perspective makes philosophy a refuge from the crisis of modernity, if it is
not in a mystic meditation and action guided by that meditation.
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Agnostic Philosophy and Divine Presence
Strauss's emphasis on intelligibility gives us little comfort in a world where Nietzsche
brought into question the usefulness of truth.76 His method of raising questions after each
significant solution presented by Socrates/Plato could inspire the reader towards a deeper
understanding of the fundamental problems or turn him away from questioning as such.
Strauss's natural right teaching promises to protect us from the retreat from questioning
which can dissolve into inflexible dogmatism. In this sense, Strauss's teaching is superior to
the modem teaching that has derailed into an immanent dogmatism.
Yet, if we tear Strauss's teachings into two parts, an esoteric skepticism and an
exoteric natural right teaching, we are confronted by Voegelin's critique of the sophists. A
conservative skepticism can either derail into an immanent dogmatism or evolve into a study
of the problems of transcendence. In a similar manner, a natural right teaching can derail into
the egotism of a Callicles or evolve into a check against the dogmatic excesses of a society.
As the various interpretations of Strauss indicate, his teaching is not clear enough to prevent
his works from being interpreted in a variety of radically different ways. Strauss's dominant
teaching of prudence and his insistence on the radical gap between the life of philosophy and
the city offer a modest protection against the corruption of a regime by irresponsible
speculation. His skeptical presentation of the philosophical life offers a warning to those who

76 Friedrich Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil. Walter Kaufman, trans., (New York.
Vintage Books, 1989) with particular emphasis on sections 1-5 advances this line of
argumentation.
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seek political solutions from theory. His natural right teaching protects the formative
elements within a regime. Nevertheless, his failure to ground the philosophic life and the life
of the gentleman in a divine ground makes both philosophical life and political life subject to
doubt regarding their ultimate importance and through this doubt open to the challenge of
demonic eros.
Strauss is remarkably comfortable with the problems his philosophy presents. He
contends:
Philosophy as such is nothing other than the real consciousness of the
problems, that is to say, o f the fundamental and comprehensive problems. It
is impossible to think about these problems without being attracted to a
solution, toward one or the other of certain rare typical solutions. However,
as long as there is no wisdom, but only the search for wisdom, the evidence
of all these solutions is necessarily smaller than the evidence o f the problems.
As a result, the philosopher ceases to be a philosopher from the moment that
his "subjective certitude" o f the truth o f a solution becomes stronger than the
consciousness that he may have of the problematic character o f this solution.
At this moment the sectarian is bom.77
On the surface, Strauss's formulation o f the nature of philosophy is not unfriendly to
Voegelin's conception of philosophy.78 Yet, Strauss's failure to articulate the formative
nature of the intelligible reality confronting the philosopher leaves open the possibility of
omitting the intelligible presence that protects us from the spiritual oblivion and makes
philosophy more than a Sysphian quest. Strauss's conception of philosophy is essentially

77 Leo Strauss cited in Stanley Rosen's "Leo Strauss and the Quarrel Between the Ancients
and the Modems," in Leo Strauss's Thought ed. Alan Udoff (Boulder Lynne Rienner,
1991), p. 160.
78 Voegelin's discussion of the "Question and Mystery" in the structure o f reality located in
the final chapter of the Ecumenic Age, pp. 316-330, offers an equivalent presentation of
Strauss's formulation of philosophy
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agnostic.79 Is the agnostic conclusion of Strauss’s Socrates not a defacto acknowledgment
of the mysterious structure of reality?
Strauss's defense of the city reveals a preference for order against the potential chaos
of theory. The opinions of persons are the essence of the political. Strauss's rhetorical
embrace o f the classic conception of political order offers an apparently firm ground to bridge
the gap between philosophy and the city. In a letter to Karl Lowith, Strauss asserts:
I really believe... that the perfect political order, as Plato and Aristotle have
sketched it, is the perfect political order. Or do you believe in the worldstate? If it is true that genuine unity is only possible through knowledge of
the truth or through the search for the truth, then there is a genuine unity of
all men only on the basis of the popularized final teaching of philosophy (and
naturally this does not exist) or if all men are philosophers (not Ph.D.'s, etc.)—
which likewise is not the case. Therefore, there can only be closed societies,
that is states. But if that is so, then one can show from political
considerations that the small city-state is in principle superior to the large
state or to the territorial-feudal state. I know very well that it cannot be
restored; but the famous atomic bombs—not to mention at all cities with a
million inhabitants, gadgets, funeral homes, "ideologies"-shows that the
contemporary solution, that is, the completely modem solution is contra
naturam*0
Strauss theoretically embraces the city-state as articulated by the classic philosophers as the
perfect or ideal political order. His reading o f the classics as a presentation of the perfect
political order requires careful attention to what he perceives to be the content of the classic
teaching. His treatment of the Republic as a utopia opens up the question of what the perfect

79 This indecision has its parallel in the ''balance of consciousness" discussed by Voegelin in
The Ecumenic Age, pp. 227-238. The possibility of eclipsing the transcendent pole of reality
is a dominant possibility in an approach to philosophy which does not question in the
direction o f the transcendent.
80 Leo Strauss to Karl Lowith, 15 August 1946, "Correspondence Concerning Modernity:
Karl Lowith and Leo Strauss" in Independent Journal of Philosophy 4 (1983), pp. 107-109.
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form of political order entails. Voegelin's critique of utopianism contained in his New Science
ofPolitics promises to reveal the instability of an ethic or philosophy that is based upon utopic
hopes.
The exoteric classic natural right teaching of Strauss and his zetetic skepticism are
confronted by a Voegelin who tenaciously refuses to break a connection to the divine ground
of reality including both philosophy and Christianity. The Mystery affirmed by Voegelin's
attention to the divine ground as non-existent reality presents an important dimension to a
truly human life. The science of order can only exist in a world constituted by both
transcendent and immanent tensions. Voegelin seeks not to restore a political science which
is a return to the principles of the classic philosophers but hopes to restore a political science
which is a legitimate response to the empirical evidence available including the historic
struggle for order in a tensional reality represented by classical philosophy. He states:
By restoration of political science is meant a return to the consciousness of
principles, not perhaps a return to the specific content of an earlier attempt.
One cannot restore political science today through Platonism,
Augustinianism, or Hegelianism. Much can be learned, to be sure, from the
earlier philosophers concerning the range of problems, as well as concerning
their theoretical treatment; but the very historicity of human existence, that is,
the unfolding of the typical in meaningful concreteness, precludes a valid
reformulation of principles through return to a former concreteness. Hence,
political science cannot be restored to the dignity of a theoretical science in
the strict sense by means o f a literary renaissance o f philosophical
achievements of the past; the principles must be regained by a work of
theoretization which starts from the concrete, historical situation of the age,
taking into account the full amplitude of our empirical knowledge.81

81 Eric Voegelin The New Science ofPolitics. pp. 2-3.
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Voegelin's focus on the concrete struggle for order within particular circumstances forms his
interpretation of Socrates/Plato and the other classics of history. The historical nature of the
study is saved from historicism by Voegelin's faith in the tensional structure of reality that
remains a constant through the course of history even as different elements of that reality are
articulated more or less clearly in different epochs. The scholar's duty is to save these
articulated insights from oblivion. The effectiveness of the presence o f formative reality is
preserved by this historically informed scholarship. Voegelin's interpretation of the Republic
naturally follows this line of inquiry.
The following chapter will examine the differences between Strauss and Voegelin's
interpretations of the political. In Strauss's interpretation we are likely to uncover elements of
a utopic approach to the human condition. The shortcomings of this approach may turn us
toward Voegelin's fuller articulation of the problem of order. Voegelin's articulation of
philosophy points toward mystery and the consequent requirements of political
representation. His presentation o f a philosophy of mystery will be shown to be a sturdier
ground for the questioning life both men believe to be central to the philosophic life.
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CHAPTER 5

POLITICS: THE EMBODIMENT OR DISEMBODIMENT OF JUSTICE
The competing interpretations presented by Strauss and Voegelin of the Republic
represent what could be considered a surprising reversal of the philosophical positions held by
the two men. Voegelin's closeness to the Christian tradition and his insistence on the
experiential equivalence of philosophy and revelation would lead one to expect an
interpretation of Plato's Republic which would be in accordance with an Augustinian view of
history.1 Strauss's embrace of the classical tradition in preference to faith based alternatives
would lead the reader to expect a defense of the polis to animate his interpretation of Plato's
representative political work. Both men startle the reader by interpreting the Republic in a
way which would seem incompatible with the appearance of their respective projects. The
man who warns us against immanentizing the eschaton speaks warmly of embodying justice.
The man who speaks fervently for natural right raises serious questions regarding the
fulfillment of natural right through the rulership of philosophers.2 Clarity regarding the two
men's philosophy o f politics requires us to wrestle with their problematic teachings about the
meaning of Plato's Republic.

1Kenneth Keulman’s The Balance of Consciousness: Eric Voegelin’s Political Theory.
p. 153 discusses Voegelin’s emphasis of the eschatological direction of Voegelin’s
historical thought and how this orientation creates similar problems for Voegelin
regarding a distancing from the political that confronted Augustine and Paul. Voegelin’s
treatment of Plato as a spiritually sensitive thinker actively engaged with the political
problems o f his time may counter this interpretation o f Voegelin’s politics as
fundamentally a politics of disengagement.
2 Thomas Pangle’s “Platonic Political Science in Strauss and Voegelin,” p. 338 offers
insight into the limited charm o f the political for the philosopher.
182
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The Satire of the Righteous or
the Irony of the Perplexed
An understanding of the use of irony by Plato is the likely key to unraveling the two
men's respective interpretations o f the Republic. Without irony an understanding of irony, an
interpretation of Plato's Republic can easily degenerate into the work of a masterful
totalitarian as it is described by Karl Popper in volume I of his The Open Society and Its
Enemies.3 Both Strauss and Voegelin reject such a reading as a grotesque misreading of
Plato.4 Uncovering irony in the appropriate places provides the foundation for rejecting a
surface-level reading o f the Republic.
Strauss deals most directly with subject of irony but his dealing with the subject
places us in grave doubt about having knowledge about the Socratic way of life. When
Strauss speaks of understanding the teaching of the Platonic dialogue he raises the
problematic fact that the obvious spokesman for Plato was a master of irony. He states:
....To speak through the mouth of a man who is notorious for his irony seems
to be tantamount to not asserting anything. Could it be true that Plato, like
his Socrates, the master of the knowledge of ignorance, did not assert
anything, i.e. did not have a teaching.5
This momentary insight into Strauss's understanding of the Platonic teaching is quickly
qualified. He asserts:

3 Karl Popper The Open Society and Its Enemies, volume 1 of 2 volumes (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963).
4 The two men’s low opinion o f Karl Popper and his scholarship can be obtained by
reading “letter 29” and “letter 30” in Faith and Political Philosophy, pp. 66-69.
5 Leo Strauss The City and Man. pp. 50-51.
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Let us then assume that the Platonic dialogues do not convey a teaching, but,
being a monument to Socrates, present the Socratic way of life as a model.
Yet they cannot tell us: live as Socrates lived. For Socrates' life was
rendered possible by his possession o f a "demonic" gift and we do not possess
such a gift. The dialogues must then tell us: live as Socrates tells you to live;
live as Socrates teaches you to live. The assumption that the Platonic
dialogues do not convey a teaching is absurd.6
If we remember Strauss's discussion of the appropriate relationship between men and the
gods in the Euthvphron. we may recognize a parallel between the relationship of Socrates and
his students and the relationship o f mortals and the gods.7 An examination of what Strauss
understands to be Socrates' "demonic gift" may help us to understand Socrates' authoritative
position.
Strauss's discussion of the daimonion in his "Plato's Apology of Socrates and Crito"
in his Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy sheds light upon what separates Socrates from
the common man. As Strauss describes the daimonion, the reader may come to understand it
as the diplomatic defense of Socratic eros. Strauss elaborates:
Socrates has recourse to his daimonion after the recourse to his being
erotikos was of no avail; his daimonion replaces his being erotikos because it
fulfills the same fimction-because it is the same. Socrates cannot profitably be
together with people who are not promising, who are not attractive to him.
But not a few who are not attractive to him are attracted by him. He cannot
well explain his refusal to be together with them by saying that he does not
"love" them: he refers to a mysterious power to which everyone must bow
and which cannot be asked questions; recourse to the daimonion is the
forbidding, the denying aspect of Socrates' nature, o f his natural inclinations;
its full or true aspect is his eros as explained in the Symposium: eros is
daimonic, not divine.8
6 Ibid.. p. 51.
See the discussion of the Euthvphron in chapter 4 o f this work and Leo Strauss's The
Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, pp. 197-200.
8 Leo Strauss Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, pp. 46-47.
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A changing of a divine voice into human passion is certainly suspect; nevertheless, a selfmoving passion is the heart of the Straussian Socrates and Plato and this passion is sufficient
to place a man in a relationship to his fellow men equivalent to the relationship of gods and
mortals. A man’s love or loves are at the center of the philosophic ascent and control o f the
passions by the highest passion is at the heart of philosophy. Irony is clarified within this
framework.
The nature of irony in the Platonic dialogue is meant to account for the differences
between human beings. The Platonic dialogue must be capable of saying different things to
different people. Presumably Socrates speaks differently to different people in order to
improve them. The Platonic dialogue is constituted by the fiction o f logographic necessity or
a perfection that is uncommon to events in ordinary life and therefore can illuminate how
improvement is brought about through word, deed and nature. O f course if this is to take
place, the philosopher must have knowledge of what is better and worse. Almost all students
of Strauss's work are familiar with the teaching that the philosophic life is the best life and
thus the measure of man.
Socrates' treatment of austere Adeimantus in his lecture on drama demonstrates the
Socratic art of improvement. Adeimantus speaks only of tragedy when defining drama but
Socrates quickly reminds him not to forget comedy. Strauss's attention to comedy reminds
us of his bias towards comedy in understanding the nature of philosophy. His reading of the
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Republic will support this interpretation. He asserts this relation as he does throughout his
corpus with the following words:
Socrates left us no example of weeping, but, on the other side, he left us
example o f laughing. The relation of weeping and laughing is similar to that
of tragedy and comedy. We may therefore say that the Socratic conversation
and hence the Platonic dialogue is slightly more akin to comedy than to
tragedy. This kinship is noticeable also in Plato's Republic which is manifestly
akin to Aristophanes' Assembly o f Women.9
A comic interpretation for those capable of bearing this interpretation of the Republic is the
goal of the irony of Strauss's Socrates. The Republic is to reveal the nature o f political things
and by revealing their nature the Republic is to supply "the most magnificent cure ever
devised for every form of political ambition."10 Strauss's Plato diminishes what can be
achieved within the context o f political society. Eric Voegelin's understanding o f Platonic
irony is not a diminishment o f the political as such but instead a comprehension o f the course
of politics within a spiritually decaying Athens.
For Voegelin, satire becomes the supreme category of Plato's irony. Voegelin's
treatment of the Phoenician tale reveals the sublimity of this satire. The Phoenician tale or
what is better known as the myth of metals is presented by Plato as a "Big Lie". The "Big
Lie" is that all men are brothers endowed by the gods with different capabilities. Voegelin's
interpretation of the "Big Lie" appears almost commonsensical but deserves repetition. He
states:
When from the introductory hedgings and warnings we now turn to the
contents o f the "lie," the satirical intention of the Tale becomes clear. For
9 Leo Strauss The City and Man. p. 61.
10 Ibid. p. 65.
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what is that event that happened in many places in the past but did not
happen recently, that story that once could be told and believed but would be
difficult to believe if somebody told it today; what is that "Big Lie"? It is the
simple truth that all men are brothers. The good order o f the polis requires
everybody to mind his own business according to his natural gifts. Now that
the natures of the rulers, guardians, and workers are distinguished, and the
Paideia for the ruler has been elaborated, Socrates must stress that in spite of
their differences they still are all equal as brothers. With the poleogony it is
that same sequence of issues as in Romans and I Corinthians, where St. Paul
first distinguishes the charismata and their function in the community, and
then sternly reminds his Christians that, in spite of their different endowments,
they still are all members of the one body o f Christ and that the most devoted
service is worthless unless formed by love. To Socrates the physician the
differences are as it were dream images {oneirata), while the reality (aletheia)
is the equality of brotherhood (414d). The introduction of the supreme truth
as an unbelievable Big Lie is one o f the bitterest pages in a work that heaps
scorn on Athens."
For Voegelin, Plato's dialogue confronts the political corruption of Athens and is not an
abstract description of things political. The use by Voegelin of a Christian situation to clarify
the problem confronting Plato is an attempt to emphasize the commonality of the structure of
reality confronting both philosopher and Christian saint. The Myth of Metals serves to
illustrate the unity of humankind by pointing towards the source o f this unity in the experience
of transcendence. The emphasis Plato places on the truth (aletheia) of brotherhood at the
expense of the dream (oneirata) of differences in capabilities is necessary to bring about the
good city.12 An appeal to transcendence is how Plato hopes to overcome the rift between the
classes of historical Athens.

11 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, pp. 105-106.
12 Ibid., pp. 106-108.
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Strauss's treatment of the Myth of Metals ignores the historical context of the
Republic and therefore misses the satire of the "Big Lie". Strauss understands the Myth of
Metals to be a "noble lie" or a necessary falsehood. He states, "The good city is not possible
then without a necessary falsehood; it cannot exist in the element o f truth, of nature."13 The
most fundamental truth for Voegelin is a lie against nature for Strauss. Strauss further
argues:
The division of the human race into independent self-sufficient cities is not
simply natural; the order of rank within the city would be simply natural if it
were divinely sanctioned with sufficient force. It is the second part of the
noble lie which, by adding divine sanctions to the natural hierarchy, supplies
the required incentive for the soldiers to obey the rulers and thus to serve the
city wholeheartedly. Yet unless one ascribes a weight not warranted by the
text to the divine sanction, one must admit that the suggested incentive is not
sufficient.14
Nature is stronger than divine sanctions lacking force, therefore Strauss brings us to Plato's
communism as the necessary complement to the Platonic myth. The natural differences
between persons are the focus of Strauss's study of the Republic. The conclusion of his study
shows the impossibility of the best city being realized on the grounds o f these natural
differences.
Plato's bitter satire towards the city of Athens is impossible without focusing on a
transcendent source of human unity. The realization of the best city can be understood to be
similarly impossible if its components are against human nature. The following section will
examine the components of the best regime from both a perspective which understands the

13 Leo Strauss The Citv and Man. p. 102.
14 Ibid, p. 103.
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spirit of transcendence to animate the best city and a perspective that views the best city as an
impossibility.
Waves of Order or Waves of Laughter
Voegelin understands Plato's Republic to represent an actual attempt to embody the
Good. He states:
The right order o f man and society is for Plato an embodiment in historical
reality of the idea of the Good, of the Agathon. The embodiment must be
undertaken by the man who has seen the Agathon and let his soul be ordered
through the vision, by the philosopher. Hence, at the center of the Republic,
Plato deals with the rule of the philosopher and the vision of the Agathon.15
This perspective leads Voegelin to take seriously the somatic unity of the polis as a building
block necessary to overcome both the provincialism of Greek politics and the obstacles to the
rulership of philosophers.
Strauss's response to the somatic unity of the polis reveals an exact opposite
interpretation of the purpose of the Republic. He states:
The just city is against nature because the equality of the sexes and absolute
communism are against nature. It holds not attraction for anyone except for
such lovers of justice as are willing to destroy the family as something
essentially conventional and to exchange it for a society in which no one
knows of parents, children, and brothers and sisters who are not
conventional. The Republic would not be the work which it is if this kind of
lover of justice were not the most outstanding kind in the practically most
important sense o f justice. Or to state this in a manner which is perhaps more
easily intelligible today, the Republic conveys the broadest and deepest
analysis of political idealism ever made.16

15 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, p. 47.
16 Leo Strauss The City and Man. p. 127.
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Much as Strauss's interpretation of Plato's Allegory of the Cave does, his analysis of the
somatic unity of the polis brings into question the persuasive powers o f the Good. He goes
so far as to state the best city is against nature. Yet, the presence of the possibility of the best
city throughout the Republic is a fiction which brings into question the conventions
preventing the realization of the best city. The contingent nature of nature is pointed to by a
teaching addressed to both the city and man. Strauss's interpretation o f the Republic raises
the serious question whether the Good can be embodied within the city or if it must remain
the property of a few speculative souls who are pulled away from the city by their theoretical
quest.
Voegelin's approach to the Good rests upon a conviction that the city enables a
person to fulfill his potential as a human being and the corruption of the city threatens to
diminish the stature of the person fit for rulership. The Good can penetrate both the
philosopher and society and unless there is to be real loss on the level o f temporal existence,
the philosopher is obliged to attempt to make the order in his soul manifest in the order of the
city. Voegelin clarifies the issue:
Human existence meant political existence; the restoration of order in the soul
implied the creation of a political order in which the restored soul could exist
as an active citizen. As a consequence, he had to burden his inquiry
concerning the paradigm of good order with the problem of its realization in a
polis. We have no means to go back of this motive. That Plato conceived his
spiritual authority as political must be accepted as the impenetrable mystery of
the way in which his personality responded to the situation.17

17 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, p. 90.
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Plato's use of the waves of communism of women and children, the relative equality of men
and women and the rulership of philosophers is his "attempt to overcome the disruptive
family divisions by transforming the ruling class of the polis into a single family."18 It is a
concrete response to the political disorder facing the philosopher.
Voegelin's ambiguity regarding this project emerges in his discussion o f the realization
of the best polis. Plato is obliged to demonstrate that his best polis is a realizable project. He
advances this argument by suggesting the surest and quickest way of realizing this project is
through the expulsion of the entire population over the age of ten from the polis and placing
those under the age of ten in the care of the philosophers. Voegelin notes such a "program
has only one flaw: it cannot be executed by true philosophers. For any attempt to realize the
order of the idea by violent means would defeat itself. The authority of the spirit is an
authority only if, and when, it is accepted in freedom."

He elaborates, "The passage has no

other function than to show that technically it is not impossible to translate the idea into
reality, and to forestall the facile assumption that the Socratic politeia is an impractical
daydream. The idea can be realized if the people want to realize it...."19 Voegelin is at pains
to illustrate the Platonic project is at once realizable and that Plato's spiritual sensitivity would
prevent him from acting in such a way as to make the cure worse than the disease. Voegelin's
articulation of Plato's anthropological principle and the paramount importance o f the order of
the individual soul through a divinely inspired reason makes this interpretation plausible.

18 Ibid.. p. 118.
19 Ibid.. p. 135.
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The seriousness which Voegelin lends to Plato's three waves is in stark contrast to
Strauss's interpretation of the natural improbability o f the political program put forward by
Plato. Strauss contends Plato's political plan is filled with abstractions from reality and that
these abstractions reveal the gap between the perfection attainable by man and the city.
Strauss understands Plato's premier political work to be an extended analysis of political
idealism and not an example o f it. Strauss argues:
This proofj it is hardly necessary to say, is based on the disregard of, or the
abstraction from, a number of most relevant things; it is "abstract" in the
extreme. If we wish to understand the Republic, we must find out what these
disregarded things are and why they are disregarded. The Republic itself,
carefully read, supplies the answers to these questions.20
The "disregarded things" inherent in communism o f women and children, the equality of the
sexes and the rulership of philosophers as well as the anthropological principle where the city
is man writ large are the varieties of eros.
Strauss's exploration of the anthropological principle is the beginning of the
uncovering of “disregarded things.” He theorizes that Plato "implies that there is a parallelism
between the city and the human individual, or, more precisely, between the city and the soul
of the human individual. This means that the parallelism between the city and the human
individual is based on a certain abstraction from the human body."21 The abstraction from the
body into the three classes of the city directs us to consider justice as such. The consideration

20 Leo Strauss The City and Man. p. 9.
21
p. 16.
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of justice as such returns us to the consideration ofjustice in the individual. At this point,
Strauss challenges the position of spiritedness in the hierarchy of the soul.
Strauss acknowledges that it may be appropriate to honor the spirited class of the
city, the warriors, but he questions whether spiritedness is superior to desire. He believes,
"....it is much less plausible that spiritedness as such should deserve higher respect than desire
as such...."22 Anyone familiar with Plato's Republic certainly is familiar with a certain
ambiguity regarding the status o f eros. Eros is at once the passion of the best life and the
obsession of the worst life. Given that there is philosophic eros but no philosophic
spiritedness, Strauss understands eros as such to be superior to spiritedness as such. Strauss
appears to be applying a theory of the Ideas to the passionate pull of eros, and he understands
this manner of abstraction to be characteristic of the Republic.23
The philosophic life is similarly entangled with the problem of abstraction. The
philosopher is spurred on by his particular or private passion for truth, yet truth appears to
have a public or common character. The philosopher must abstract from his private
experience to present a case for his way of life. By presenting the city as "man writ large"
Plato has an opportunity to present the case for philosophy within constraints acceptable to
non-philosophic souls. The best city with its communism of women and children, the equality
of the sexes and the rulership o f philosophers begs for tolerance of philosophic eros by
demonstrating the impossibility of the best city due to eros in its particulars.

22 Ibid, p. 22.
23 Ibid.
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It may be proper to apply Strauss's comments regarding the nature o f victory and
defeat in Aristophanes' plays to the problems uncovered by Plato's Republic. He states:
By making us see in this simple way the difference between worthy and
unworthy designs, the poet teaches the just things. Yet since the designs-as
distinguished from the ends by themselves, like peace-are in all cases
laughable, he teaches us the just things by making us laugh. The designs are
laughable because they are (more or less obviously) impossible, the poet
addresses the wise as distinguished from the laughers (1155-56).24
Thinking deeply on the different forms of eros that animate the citizens of a city reveals the
improbable nature of the best city. The different passions of men and women, young, old and
those In-Between, and philosophers, gentlemen and the people make demands o f the
Republic unrealizable within the constraints of what most people would understand to be
nature. One only need think o f the havoc produced by having young men and women
exercising together in the nude, asking fathers and mothers to give up their children or having
persons concerned with questions take leadership from persons concerned with action. The
impossibility of these happenings can best be understood if we imagine Socrates as President,
co-ed high school gym classes in the nude and parents allowing these things to pass. Amidst
the laughter of these images, Strauss offers the wise a quite sobering conclusion. The best
city, as it is described in the Republic, abstracts from the passions which make it impossible.
As previously noted, Strauss understands the Republic to be an analysis o f political
idealism. He understands the Republic to be comprehensible only if the silences and
contradictions of the dialogue are followed to their rational conclusions. Strauss asserts:

24 Leo Strauss Socrates and Aristophanes, p. 278.
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The just city is then impossible. It is impossible because it is against nature
that there should ever be a "cessation of evils," "for it is necessary that there
should always be something opposed to the good, and evil necessarily
wanders about the mortal nature and the region here." It is against nature
that rhetoric should have the power ascribed to it: that it should be able to
overcome the resistance rooted in men's love o f their own and ultimately in
the body; as Aristotle puts it, the soul can rule the body only despotically, not
by persuasion; the Republic repeats, in order to overcome it, the error o f the
sophists regarding the power of speech. The just city is against nature
because the equality of the sexes and absolute communism are against nature.
It holds no attraction for anyone except for such lovers of justice as are
willing to destroy the family as something essentially conventional and to
exchange it for a society in which no one knows of parents, children, and
brothers and sisters who are not conventional.25
Strauss's conclusions regarding the purpose and teaching of the Republic vary quite
significantly from Voegelin's interpretation of that work. These differences can be traced to
the different valuations Strauss and Voegelin place upon the Good and the persuasive effect
this reality has upon the order o f human community. Strauss's emphasis on philosophy being
the combination of sense perception and a reason defined as a dialectic entangled in the
potentially Sisyphean task of understanding the whole leads to his skepticism regarding the
project o f the Republic as an historical attempt to bring order to the feuding communities of
the Hellenes. Voegelin's understanding of the cosubstantive process of order in the world of
human action between human and divine presence leads him to articulate the vision of
formative reality contained within his interpretation of Plato's Republic. The following
section will clarify the differences in interpretive approaches animating the two men's inquiries
into the Republic.

25 Leo Strauss The City and Man. p. 127.
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Spiritual Strength and Utopia
Strauss's interpretation o f the Republic illuminates the limits o f the city. The city is
not capable of attaining the excellence of the individual because of its composite nature. The
plan of the best city, as it is revealed in the Republic, points to this conclusion by the necessity
of the removal of the varieties of eros from the city to make its excellence realizable. The
wise will understand this abstraction to point toward the limits of the city as it confronts the
varieties of human nature. Heterogeneity appears to be a permanent part of the human
condition. Plato's Republic and his other dialogues convey the appropriate messages to
persons of different noetic capabilities. The wise will realize the limits of politics and the
politically inclined will look to the wise for guidance in achieving political excellence. The
Republic contains an eternal teaching about politics and the philosopher's relation to this
serious dimension of human existence.
Voegelin's interpretation of the Republic illuminates the limits o f man. Plato responds
to the crisis of his time through his philosophic meditations as a means of resisting the
radically immanent desires of the sophists and the political catastrophe awaiting to engulf the
world of the feuding city-states. The journey of a Dionysaic soul to the Good becomes the
primary source for the spiritual strength necessary to resist the disorder of the times. Without
the transcendent, man will drift into the demonic nothingness of meaningless and destructive
power struggles. Man's consciousness of the transcendent enables him to take actions
necessary to preserve existence on a human scale.
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Such divergent interpretations of the same dialogue do not immediately appear to be
antagonistic to one another. Strauss's teaching simply contends there are higher callings than
the life of politics. The higher callings do not invalidate the lower callings of the political
world and may even be of assistance to these lower callings. Voegelin's teaching is that the
higher calling demands of its bearer resistance to the forces of disorder through the most
effective means. A situation can be so out of hand that preservation of one's own wellordered life may be the most effective form of resistance. Strauss's ironic reading of the
Republic assumes this situation to be the normal situation of philosophy in its relationship to
the city. Philosophy or the struggle for right order is somehow threatened by and a threat to
the political manifestation of social order. Strauss perceives a gap between the philosophic
life and the life of the citizen that Voegelin does not accept as the normal state of affairs. The
apparent incompatibility of philosophy and the city and how this incompatibility is overcome
points toward a serious disagreement between Strauss and Voegelin. Fortunately, both men
left sufficient evidence in their substantial body of scholarship as to reveal the nature of their
differing interpretations of the Platonic dialogues.
Strauss's understanding of Thomas More as a Platonist and Voegelin's interpretation
of Thomas More's Utopia in his Studies in the History of Political Ideas offer an important
heuristic in understanding the differences between the two men's approaches to classic
philosophy. Strauss's approach to Plato's Republic has strong parallels to Voegelin's
interpretation of Thomas More's Utopia. The use of the intrinsically flawed best regime as a
mode of political theory strikes Voegelin as lacking the spiritual strength necessary for
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effectively resisting the disordering forces present in reality. Strauss presents the flawed best
regime as a means to communicate to persons o f different natures. This approach would
imply that a Voegelinian interpretation of the Republic misses the essential limits inherent in
the political.
Strauss treats More as a Platonist who is a Christian. The one difference Strauss
emphasizes between More's Utopia and Plato's Republic is that More's Utopia is presented
after lunch whereas, Plato's Republic is presented in place of dinner. This may account for
the differences between what is missing from the two dialogues. Strauss argues that the
Republic abstracts from the varieties of eros. Desire may be what is manifestly present in a
dialogue which substitutes for dinner.26 Voegelin understands More's Utopia to be based
upon a similar abstraction. Superbia or pride is what is missing from More's Utopia.27 The
fullness coming after lunch may point toward the self-satisfaction that makes the absence of
pride notably present in More's Utopia. The similarity between Strauss's understanding of
Plato's Republic and Voegelin's understanding o f More's Utopia makes Voegelin's
commentary on Thomas More a potentially rich criticism of classical thought as it is
understood by Strauss.
Voegelin presents More's thought as an instance in which the spiritual power has
declined to such a significant degree that "the problem of the happy republic presented
itself.... as the problem of the joint rule of the prince and the secular philosopher." He further

26 Ibid.. p. 61.
27 Eric Voegelin Studies in the History of Political Ideas. Archives of the Eric Voegelin
Institute, pp. 960-961.
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notes, "the secular intellectual, however, is in a difficult position insofar as he has no place to
go. Unless he becomes a political intellectual, and as such an adjunct to the powers that be or
will be, what shall he do?"28 The type of Raphael, the homeless wanderer, is the pole More
opposes to the political intellectual. Strauss's commitment to political philosophy and his
understanding of the betrayal of philosophy by the intellectuals29 makes a closer exploration
of a Voegelinian interpretation of More's philosophy essential to uncovering the tensions
inherent in Strauss's presentation o f classical philosophy.
The most fundamental tenant of classical philosophy as it is presented by Strauss is
Socratic irony. Socratic irony enables one to speak to friends while speaking in a politically
defensible manner. This mode of philosophizing is also present in More. More distinguishes
between philosophia scholastica (school-philosophy) and philosophia civilior (polite
philosophy). School-philosophy is for discussions among friends and should not venture into
the political realm. Polite philosophy is not enamored with abstract truths and allows the
political play to continue without disturbing its course with irritating interruptions. The
"polite philosopher" will not bother people with strange notions but will instead attempt to
bring about the good or minimize the bad by the use of tricks of persuasion. This Morean

28 Ibid, p. 952.
29 Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History, p. 34, speaks about this portrayal. The
source for this insight is most probably from Julien Benda’s La Traison des Clercs
(1927) available in English translation as The Betrayal o f the Intellectuals. Richard
Aldington, trans. (Boston: 1955).
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position places one in mind of Strauss's presentation of Platonic political philosophy,
especially the use of that art in Xenophon's On Tyranny.30
The centrality of political philosophy in Strauss's interpretation of classic philosophy
makes Voegelin's indictment of More's polite philosophy pertinent to exploring the
differences between the two men's approach to the classical experience. Regarding More's
use o f polite philosophy, Voegelin asserts:
The answer is not impressive. It is neither Platonic, nor otherwise profound.
It is persuasive commonsense for a man who wants to play a role in politics,
who is intelligent and sensitive enough to feel the responsibilities which he
may incur, and who needs a little opiate to overcome his scruples. Today we
call it the argument of the "collaborator." The skill in dodging the issues is
remarkable. An abstract truth, indeed, is not fit for every situation; but there
are situations where the abstract truth must be pronounced in order to break
out of the morass of moral confusion. One can, indeed, not root out
traditional vices at a moment's notice; but there is a limit beyond which delay
is impermissible. And that all men are not good and therefore all things
cannot be well, is sound admonition to a perfectionist; but it easily can
become a cover for condoning crimes. What makes this argument so flat is
the renunciation of the spirit as the ultimate authority beyond the temporal
order and its insufficiencies. The commonwealth tends to acquire an ultimacy
which properly belongs to the spirit. The ominous symptom of the shift of
accents is More's distinction between scholastic and polite philosophy. The
meaning of philosophy as the intellectual dimension of the life of the spirit, as
the intellectual articulation of an order that culminates in the life o f the spirit
and the orientation o f the soul toward the realissimum, apparently had been
lost for More quite as much as for Erasmus.31
From a Voegelinian perspective, Straussian political philosophy may have the benefit of
enlightening perfectionists but the lack o f spiritual authority threatens to guide the
practitioners of political philosophy into collaboration with social corruption.

Socratic

30 Leo Strauss On Tyranny (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
Eric Voegelin Studies in the History of Political Ideas, p. 954.
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ignorance without a transcendent pull is dragged down by the baser demands of the human
condition.
Strauss's treatment of piety in his On the Euthyphron reveals a bias within his work
against spiritual authority or the transcendent pull as it manifests itself in the individual soul.
Strauss sides with both the searching of Socrates and the orthodox view of piety against the
flawed experiential insights of Euthyphron. The defective articulation of the authority of the
spirit is dismissed as ridiculous without considering the possibility of the effective articulation
of the spirit. Strauss, like More, stands between the poles of the wanderer and the political
activist. Existence informed by a spiritual pull becomes suspect for Strauss. Nevertheless, his
special perspective as both Jew and philosopher gives a richness to his studies which may
account for a philosophical perplexity that does not abandon the claims of faith nor abandon
the inquiry of the dialectic.
The Spirit of Philosophy
The embodiment of justice by the exceptional personality infers the presence of a
transcendent reality as an opposing pole to immanent existence. If this were not the case,
survival and pleasure would be the sufficient grounds of social order. If it is to be effective as
a source of right order in the midst of social chaos, justice cannot simply be an uninspired law
or a disembodied ideal. Strauss is incredibly enigmatic in his description of this particular
problem and may shroud his understanding o f the problem in the simple pronouncement."...
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if one denies the primacy o f the ideas, one denies the possibility of knowledge." The ideas are
the grounds of knowledge but this knowledge is set as an alternative to the divine.32
Strauss's construal o f the metaphysical heights of Plato's philosophy is sufficiently
sparse as to unduly open itself to a variety of interpretations. One could argue this is in
perfect attunement with his understanding of the contingent nature of nature contained within
his understanding of the classic natural right teaching.33 Yet, his exoteric commitment to the
Platonic-Aristotelian concept o f the ariste politeia places him at odds with Voegelin's
understanding. Voegelin states:
Aristotle did not create 'ideal states' (the very word 'ideal' has no equivalent in
Greek), but developed imaginative paradigms, models of the best polis. What
is best' again has nothing to do with 'ideals', but will be decided by the
pragmatic suitability of the model to provide an environment for the best' or
'happiest life'; and the criterion o f the best or happiest life in its turn will be
established by a philosophical anthropology.34
Strauss's treatment of the best regime in his reading of the Republic points to its impossibility
and returns the reader to the subject of the philosophic life. Perhaps the one significant detail
regarding the content of Strauss's understanding of the philosophic life is his opposition to
Voegelin's conception of the philosophic life as revealed by their private correspondence.
Voegelin's understanding of the equivalent nature of philosophy and revelation
created significant problems for Strauss. Strauss contends, "As to your question,
"Philosophy and Faith," I deny that the bistorical fact of the beginning of philosophy consists

32 Leo Strauss "On the Euthyphron" in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, p. 201.
" Leo Strauss Natural Right and History, p. 159.
34 Eric Voegelin "The Oxford Philosophers" in Philosophical Quarterly, volume 3, 1953, p.
109.
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in the attitude of faith of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Parmenides,1which you assume.
Whatever noein might mean, it is certainly notpistis in some sense."35 Voegelin's response to
Strauss's misgivings regarding the faithful foundation of philosophy reveals a certain
perplexity on his part regarding the outcome o f the Straussian approach to philosophy. He
states:
....I wish to thank you for the opportunity to read your Philosophy and Law.
After reading it, your present position is actually more difficult for me to
understand than before. I have the impression that you have retreated from
an understanding of the prophetic (religious) foundation of philosophizing
(with which I would heartily agree) to a theory of episteme, and that you
refuse to see the problem of episteme in connection with experience, out of
which it emerges. Why you do this, I do not know. And how this position
can work, when it comes to the treatment of a concrete problem (for
example, to an interpretation of a Platonic myth), I cannot predict—for that I
would first have to see the concrete implementation.36
Strauss’s sparse treatment of the Platonic myth indicates that Strauss did not find the myth to
be central to philosophy but perhaps an appendage of political philosophy. For Strauss,
philosophy stands in opposition to the myth and faith albeit polite opposition. Myths and
religion provide social stability for those who are not of the type capable of ordering their
own lives. The philosopher, who seeks knowledge, is in opposition to the believers who
possess what they understand to be the one thing necessary. The distance between the
philosopher and the political man is expressed in the ironic tale of the Republic. The political
may be necessary but its particular manifestations will vary. The philosopher seeks for
essential knowledge and in that quest discovers the necessity of the political. The

35 Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin "Letter 36," in Faith and Political Philosophy, p. 76.
36IM . p- 77.
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preeminence Strauss places on the philosophic life has the unsavory effect of disclosing how
some persons may be in the relation with others as the puppet master is related to the puppet.
This effect is mitigated if this order is somehow related to a reality that sanctions this
relationship. Yet, the philosopher's apparent skepticism about essence of these higher things
while largely accepting the lower things raises serious questions regarding his privileged
position in an egalitarian society dedicated to the promotion of the general welfare.
Voegelin's or perhaps more accurately Aristotle's theory of equivalent experiences37
does not subordinate the myth to simple political expediency but recognizes the legitimacy of
the experiences engendering both revelation and philosophy. Voegelin's excellent essay
"Immortality: Experience and Symbol" illuminates the portrait of philosopher as a member of
the human community expressing the experience of the individual, the society and history.
He states:
Both society and history are man writ large. The field, that is to say, is not
confined to man as a single person, but embraces the manifold of human
beings in society and history: for the tensions Man experiences in his personal
existence are the same he recognizes as structuring the other sectors o f the
field. With regard to the structure o f the field, then, we can distinguish two
principal dimensions. There is first, the tension between existence in truth and
the deficient modes of existence. This is the very tension in which the
philosopher lives and moves himself. His concern is, therefore, not with truth
as a bit of information that has escaped his contemporaries, but as a pole in
the tension of order and disorder, of reality and loss of reality, he experiences
as his own. His existence comprehends the disorder by which he feels
repelled as much as the order toward which his desire moves him.38

37 Eric Voegelin “Equivalences o f Experience and Symbolization in History” in Published
Essays: 1966-1985. pp. 130-133.
38 Eric Voegelin "Immortality: Experience and Symbol" in Faith and Political Philosophy, p.
190.
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For Voegelin, philosophy is a struggle to exist in truth. The struggle for existence in truth
facing the philosopher is more highly differentiated than the struggle o f the average person
but it confronts the same structure of reality. The noetic and pneumatic differentiations of the
apprehension of reality are equivalent experiences of man's attempt to live in truth. Plato's
resistance to the inverted philosophies of the sophists and the corrupt power players of his
day is representative for all human beings seeking to live in truth. This interpretation of
Platonic philosophy is not to be mistaken with a doctrinaire adherence to Platonism.
Voegelin's famed resistance to doctrinaire positions of any sort is best articulated in
the later part of the preceding quotation where he discusses deficient existence. He states:
There are second, the tensions on the level of deficient existence. When the
reality of truth has declined to traditionalist belief in symbols, the scene is set
for the appearance of unbelief and reasoned objection to belief. For belief,
when losing contact with truth experienced, not only provokes objection but
even gives aid to the enemy by creating the doctrinaire environment in which
objection can become socially effective. This class of tensions, i.e., the
dynamics of belief and unbelief I shall call the subfield of doctrinaire
existence. The philosopher’s concern, now, is not with this or that part of the
field, but with the whole of it-to its full extension and in all of its structural
dimensions—for his search would lose direction if he were to disregard the
points of orientation. In particular, he must resist the professional temptation
o f taking his stance at the pole of the tension toward which his desire moves
him; if he were to start sermonizing on existence in truth as if it were an
absolute object in his possession, he would derail into doctrinaire existence.39
The attentive reader will note the difference between Voegelin and Strauss is that Strauss is
willing to accommodate the claims of doctrinaire existence by presuming the vast majority of
persons are incapable of living the existence o f the philosopher, whereas Voegelin recognizes

39 Ibid.. pp. 190-191.
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the deficiency of doctrinaire existence as such. Strauss places the philosopher in an immanent
community with his fellow human beings but Voegelin understands the philosopher to be a
part of the spiritual community of humankind. The differences in approaches are quite
significant regarding claims of authority.
Strauss contends that the philosophic life is the best life and the content of that life is a
quest to understand the whole. He recognizes this life to be a function of the nature of the
select individual who has the passion to persist in this challenge. He exoterically argues that
the political is ennobled by this transpolitical goal. The philosopher becomes the friend of the
gentleman through this ennoblement of the political. The philosopher has a natural
superiority to his fellow men, and therefore, deserves a position of transpolitical authority.
This transpolitical authority is due to the philosopher's attention to nature and his willingness
to exoterically accept the opinions or beliefs of his fellow citizens while questioning the nonessential components of their civic faith.
Voegelin's philosopher resists the corruption of his society and through this resistance
is led to the source of order in the transcendent and immanent indexes of his consciousness.
His resistance to disorder leads him beyond the question of belief and unbelief to existence in
truth. The philosopher becomes authoritative through his spiritual strength and his ability to
re-present experiential reality. Voegelin's description of philosophy clarifies the meaning of
this authority. He states:
Philosophy is not a doctrine of right order, but the light of wisdom that falls
on the struggle; and help is not a piece of information about truth but the
arduous effort to locate the forces of evil and identify their nature. For half
the battle is won when the soul can recognize the shape of the enemy and.
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consequently, knows that the way it must follow leads in the opposite
direction.40
The philosopher is authoritative as he sheds light upon the meaning of existence in truth
through his resistance to evil. The philosopher brings conceptual clarity to the struggle for
right order through noetic reason. Philosophic reason does not eliminate the need for other
expressions of right order such as the more compact cosmological myth. Humankind did not
wait for the advent of philosophy to make sense out o f its participation in reality. This point
is well illustrated by Plato's skillful use o f myths throughout his dialogues and by Voegelin's
meditative investigations of noetic, cosmological and revelatory articulations of existence in
truth.
Strauss's accent on philosophy and the philosophic life makes his teaching susceptible
to a criticism of the philosopher as an elitist who places himself above the city. His argument
that tragedy belongs to the city, whereas comedy or doubt about the city is more akin to
philosophy strengthens this interpretation. Strauss's teaching about philosophy’s relation to
comedy brings Straussian philosophy very close to the deficient form of existence Voegelin
characterizes as unbelief. One may protest that Strauss's teaching involved both Athens and
Jerusalem and thus argue that he stands on the heights over the deficient modes o f existence
of unbelief and belief that he struggles to exist in truth. The careful student o f Strauss must
confront the solid fact that Strauss's career was dedicated to wonder and questioning.
Strauss's own words point to his commitment to the Athens of doubt. He states:

40 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, p. 62-63.
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According to the Bible, the beginning o f wisdom is fear of the Lord;
according to the Greek philosophers, the beginning of wisdom is wonder.
We are thus compelled from the beginning to make a choice, to take a stand.
Where then do we stand? We are confronted with the incompatible claims of
Jerusalem and Athens to our allegiance. We are open to both and willing to
listen to each. We ourselves are not wise but we wish to become wise. We
are seekers for wisdom, philo-sophoi. By saying that we wish to hear first
and then to act to decide, we have already decided in favor of Athens against
Jerusalem.41
Radical doubt or doubt about doubt may bring the philosopher to Jerusalem but the discovery
of nature seems to preclude a return to the world o f miracles inherent in the world of faith.
The discovery of a common reality engendering both philosophy and revelation appears to be
the only honest accommodation between Jerusalem and Athens but Strauss's teaching appears
to oppose this form of accommodation. Jerusalem and Athens are sturdier pillars of Western
civilization when they stand apart. Bringing them together may collapse the tension that has
made the civilization of the West existentially resilient.
Voegelin understands Jerusalem and Athens not as mutually antagonistic modes of
approaching the human condition but as equivalent experiences in the process of man
articulating his experience of participatory reality in its pneumatic and noetic forms of
differentiation. Voegelin attempts to clarify these differentiations as theophanic events. He is
quite clear about rejecting the level of belief or disbelief as deficient in his study of these
forms. In his exegesis of the vision of Paul he makes this point quite powerfully. He
contends:

41 Leo Strauss "Jerusalem and Athens: Some Preliminary Reflections" in Faith and Political
Philosophy, p. 112.
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Hence there can arise no question of "accepting" or "rejecting" a theological
doctrine. A vision is not a dogma but an event in metaleptic reality which the
philosopher can do no more than try to understand to the best of his ability.
As the vision occurs in the Metaxy, it must not be split into "object" and
"subject." There is no "object" of the vision other than the vision as received;
and there is no "subject" of the vision other than the response in a man's soul
to divine presence. The vision emerges as a symbol from the Metaxy, and the
symbol is both divine and human Any attempt to break up the mystery of
divine-human participation, as it occurs in a theophanic event, is fatuous. On
the subjective side, one cannot "explain" the divine presence in the vision by a
psychology of Paul. And on the objective side, "critical doubts" about the
vision of the Resurrected would mean that the critic knows how God has a
right to let himself be seen.42
In the paragraph prior to this clarification of the appropriate way to approach the study of the
Pauline vision Voegelin clarifies the agreement between Paul and Plato regarding the
structure of reality. He states:
Plato and Paul agree that meaning in history is inseparable from the
directional movement in reality. "History" is the area of reality where the
directional movement of the cosmos achieves luminosity of consciousness.
They furthermore agree that history is not an empty time-dimension in which
things happen at random but rather a process whose meaning is constituted
by theophanic events. And finally they agree that the reality of history is
metaleptic; it is the In-Between where man responds to the divine presence
and divine presence evokes the response of man.43
In the context of participatory reality as experienced by Voegelin in his meditative analysis of
classic and Judaeo-Christian texts, the Platonic myth, the revelations of the Prophets and the
visions of the Saints are authoritative insofar as they articulate and constitute the meaning of
human existence. For Voegelin, the Platonic Myth is not a necessary bow to hoi polloi so the
philosopher can continue to pursue his speculations in peace, but instead a means by which all
42 Eric Voegelin The Ecumenic Age, pp. 242-243.
43 Ibid.
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persons open to existence in truth and by their encounter with the myth may be strengthened
in their resistance to the forces which would eclipse reality.
The paradoxical nature of a reality constituted by both structure and an exodus from
present structure makes the struggle for existence in truth incredibly difficult. On one hand,
an extreme emphasis on structure can ossify into social institutions oblivious to the needs of
individual souls. On the other hand, overemphasizing the dynamic nature of the process of
exodus can become so compelling that individuals will either try to escape mundane existence
through world-fleeing actions or attempt to transfigure mundane reality into an immanent
realm of perfection. For Voegelin, the classic emphasis on structure by Plato and Paul's
emphasis on exodus maintain the balance to preserve existence in the In-Between of a
paradoxical reality articulated by Plato in his Symposium. Voegelin contends:
Neither does the classic concentration on structure abolish the unrest o f the
movement that becomes manifest in the Platonic uncertainties, nor does the
Pauline relegation of ethics and politics to the fringes of a history that has
been contracted into the transfiguring exodus abolish the cosmos and its
structure. When the paradox of reality becomes luminous to itself in
consciousness, it creates the paradox of a history in suspense between the
Ananke o f the cosmos and the freedom of eschatological movement. That
the two branches of the paradox are distributed, in the Ecumenic Age, over
the noetic theophanies of Hellenic philosophers and the pneumatic
theophanies of Israelite-Jewish prophets must be acknowledged, but cannot
be explained. The process of history is a mystery as much as the reality that
becomes luminous in it.44
Strauss's reading of the classic authors as being in subtle conflict with the city and the gods of
the city creates a dichotomy between faith and reason which Voegelin's reading does not

44 Ibid, p. 258.
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share. The differences between Jerusalem and Athens are present but not antagonistic. The
differentiation and articulation of reality through the symbols-experiences of philosophy and
revelation disclose the same fundamental reality albeit with different accents on that
fundamental reality. This fundamental reality is the reality in which all human beings
participate. Strauss's distinction between the philosopher and the gentleman not to mention
the common man certainly does not accent this truth. His teaching that one must understand
the author as the author understood himself could be a source of his failure to see the same
reality in the experiences of the religious and the philosophic.
Strauss's failure to distinguish the transcendent component of Plato's eros may be a
weakness in his interpretation of classic philosophy but his teaching regarding the philosopher
and the gentleman with its elitist overtones is not a failure of his interpretive skill. Philosophy
is articulated in terms of what Voegelin calls "the myth of nature." This particular element
has the most disturbing overtones for a society informed by the great universalistic faiths,
particularly Christianity. In his exegesis of the Phaedrus. Voegelin points to this danger
inherent in classic philosophy:
The differentiation of society into the citta corrotta and the erotic souls
engenders a tension of such sharpness that the common bond of humanity
between the lost souls and the manic souls is almost broken. The difference
between the souls tends to become a generic difference between a lower type
of human beings, close to animals, and a higher type of semi-divine rank.
This divinization, which seems absurd in the realm of Christian experience, is
inherent in the logic of the myth of nature43

45 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, p. 141.
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Strauss's adherence to the insights of classic philosophy does not appear to transcend this
problem. In fact, his insistence on the comic bias of philosophy would infer the capability to
distance oneself from the affairs of the world to such a degree as to experience the concerns
of the unenlightened as non-serious except as far as their satisfaction is necessary for the
philosopher to pursue his peculiar way of life.
The seriousness of Voegelin's meditations upon the paradoxical nature of reality does
not permit the scholar to charge him with making light of the human condition. In fact, the
weight of his meditations gives his thought a bias toward a tragic interpretation of human
existence. One senses an almost autobiographical note as he ponders the state of public
unconsciousness in the wake of the Enlightenment. He states:
In this "climate of opinion," to be characterized as a state of public
unconsciousness, it becomes incumbent on the true philosophers, who are
always rare, to regain consciousness through regaining its historical
stratification. The existential problem of the philosopher who finds himself in
this situation was explored by Nietzsche who, in his Schopenhauer als
Erzieher, described the problem of regaining consciousness as the task of
finding the way that rises "from the height of skeptical discontent and critical
resignation up to the height of tragical meditation." Such personal efforts,
however, have not yet made much of a dent in the climate of opinion. As the
debate around Toynbee shows, the "tragical meditations" on the process of
reality has by far not yet been restored to public consciousness.46
Voegelin's reading of the life of Socrates as replacing tragedy as the authoritative
representation of existence in truth for Athenian society points to Plato's attempt to arouse
the public from its unconsciousness. The Republic represents a belief in the awakening of a
large enough body of souls as to make philosophy and the order of the soul the ordering

46 Eric Voegelin The Ecumenic Age, p. 176.
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principle of the Hellenic world. Strauss's reading of the Republic never understood Plato to
have such exaggerated hopes or intentions.
The preceding analysis has amply illustrated the two men’s understanding of the
philosophic enterprise as entailed in the life of Plato. In a sense, the Republic can be viewed
as Plato's preeminent description of the philosophic life. For Strauss, the Republic reveals the
limits of the political and points toward philosophic life as an excellence that transcends the
political. For Voegelin, the Republic illustrates the pragmatic attempt to resist the spiritual
disorder that threatens to eclipse reality. The difference between a comic understanding and a
tragic understanding of philosophy is powerfully illustrated by the implications of these two
readings. The differences between these two perspectives remain but fade as we explore
Plato's pragmatic turn, the Laws. The following section will analyze the relationship of a
minimum dogma and the law from a Straussian and Voegelinian perspective.
Minimum Dogma and the Laws
The Laws is Plato's attempt to deal with the political situation confronting him as a
philosopher. For Strauss, the Laws is Plato's most political work. As his citation of Avicenna
at the beginning of his work on the Laws indicates, he also understands this most political
work to deal with prophecy and the divine law. Faith and politics are intertwined as varieties
of opinion. Some sort of opinion appears to be necessary for political existence.
For Voegelin, the Laws is the spiritually sensitive man's response in a political
environment dominated by spiritually weak men. The vision of the Good and the
embodiment of the Idea in the well-ordered soul is replaced by a minimum dogma which acts
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as a means of resistance against the spiritual weakness of vessels too fragile to embody the
Good. Men are no longer the sons of God but instead the puppets of God. Nevertheless,
man is attuned to order by the authoritative, well-ordered soul, the soul in communion with
the Good.
Both men treat the Laws with utmost seriousness. The city is after all the realm of
tragedy for both men. It is interesting that Voegelin finds Plato's political teaching to be
surpassed by his spiritual understanding, whereas Strauss remains silent or almost silent about
this component of the Platonic teaching. In a letter to Voegelin, Strauss asserts:
Can one call the proper order of the polls (in Plato's Laws) a conversation?
Here exists domination by command and legend, but precisely no
conversation, which as such is based on the fiction or the reality of equality.
In the Platonic sense, there is no Socratic dialogue. You yourself say that the
dialogue is a means of combat for the restoration of public order: once it is
restored the means of combat loses its sense. So: does the dialogue belong
to the improper "order" or to the "unhealthy" soul or society?47
Strauss appears to neglect the struggle inherent in human existence as the primary reality
confronting the philosopher. The dogmas of the Laws may contain more than command and
legend. They may actually point toward the reality animating the struggle to exist in truth.
The "unhealthy" soul or society may have the potential to eclipse the reality behind the
symbol but cannot obliterate the reality engendering the symbol. Strauss is silent about
spiritual struggle, largely because his role as an ally of philosophy demands of him to be
attentive to the surface of things. In the instance of the Laws, the surface deals with
commands and legends or put more succinctly, political reality.

47 Leo Strauss "Letter Number 39" in Faith and Political Philosophy, p. 90
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Strauss's reading of the Laws moves him from the pious grounds of law to its mortal
founders. His reading is typical of his usual style. Strauss raises questions about the sincerity
of the protagonist's arguments and quickly returns to the intricacies of the dialogue. The
Athenian Stranger is in the company of men who are not his equals and they must be treated
as such.
Strauss notes that the subject of gods and theology emerges in the discussion of the
penal law. He asserts:
The Athenian is thus compelled or enabled to discuss what Adeimantos calls
theology (Republic 379a5-6) within the context of the penal law, whereas
Socrates discussed it within the context of pre-philosophic, nay, the most
rudimentary education. We have seen how much the Athenian's discussion of
crimes, especially of incest, murder, and disrespect of parents is based on the
belief in gods. This observation does not do full justice to his theology. After
all, almost his whole teaching seems to stand or fall by the belief in gods.
Almost his whole teaching is colored by piety as commonly understood, as
understood, for instance, by Megillos or Kleinias, not to say by old women
living in the most remote comers of Crete. Yet we have also seen the he
questions piety. He surely is not, if we may borrow an expression from a
distinguished contemporary student of Greek poetry "a fundamentalist from
the Bible Belt" (H.D.F.. Kitto, Poiesis. University of California Press 1966,
213). But we must add at once he is not an indifferentist.... Being a
philosopher, the Athenian is concerned with the truth about the gods.48
The truth about the gods is pre-philosophic and this truth is contained within Plato's most
political work. The philosopher's teaching to the political men is rooted in a piety which they
readily understand but that teaching is based upon a keen understanding of the case against

48 Leo Strauss The Argument and Action of Plato's Laws (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1975) pp. 140-141.
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piety. In a certain sense the philosopher's teaching is an attempt to accommodate the impious
with the pious, the transpolitical with the political.
Plato's minimum theology and the laws against impiety are a subtle presentation of
the political nature of the law. Arguments which certainly lack an apodictic clarity become
the basis for a minimum theology which is central to the legal structure of the polis. Persons
are to accept that 1. there are gods; 2. the gods are good; and 3. the gods cannot be bribed.
Strauss emphasizes the points where the young man is lauded for his bravery in questioning
the accepted opinions and where the stranger questions the over-zealous character of his
speeches defending the minimum dogma.49 The potential doubter is strengthened in his
questioning even as the political nature of the laws is revealed.
The laws regarding impiety lay out punishments for the different types of unbelievers.
Those who are candid about their unbelief are to be punished. The dissemblers who use their
unbelief to their advantage at the expense of others are to be put in the worst of all prisons.
Strauss raises the question what is to be done with the dissembler who is impious but keeps
this impiety from all but his closest friends. He wonders:
Furthermore, the disjunction made by the law is not complete: what happens
to the atheist who is a just man and does not ridicule others because they
sacrifice and pray and who to this extent is a dissembler? Is it literally true of
him that he deserves not one death or two, i.e. no death at all, nor
imprisonment? Also, why could such an atheist not possess a good memory
and be good at learning? One could say that he will become guilty if he
frankly expresses his unbelief—but what if he expresses it only to sensible
friends? Can one imagine Socrates denouncing him to the authorities?50

49Ibid, pp. 154-155
50 Ibid, p. 156.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217

The minimum dogma of the city protects the ironic doubter. The Athenian stranger lays the
groundwork for a reconciliation between the political men (lovers of opinion) and the
philosophers (lovers of wisdom). The doubt inherent in the philosophic life is tempered by an
understanding of the nature of the lovers of opinion. The philosopher accommodates these
lovers of opinion to save his life and to protect the city from his doubt.
The Nocturnal Council is to be the instrument of the justice of the city and within the
context of discussing the Council and the demands upon its membership the dialogue ascends
to the Socratic level of the dialogue. The Athenian Stranger challenges Kleinias to follow the
hard way and to investigate the question whether virtues are many or one. The Athenian
moves through virtue, to the noble and the good and finally to the subject of the being and
power of the gods. The Athenian states that no mortal can become truly god-revering unless
he grasps both the eternity of the soul and the intellect in the stars. Strauss asserts:
It follows from this grave statement that the grasp of the first two subjects of
study, i.e., of ideas of the virtues and of virtue and of the ideas of the noble
and of the good, does not by itself lead to the habit of god-revering or piety....
Furthermore, from the virtues one is more directly led to their leader, the
intellect, than to the ideas, and the intellect is the ground of the kosmic order,
within which and through which virtue is possible (cf. Gorgias 507d6-508a8).
Yet apart from the fact that considerations such as these would lead to the
result, unacceptable to most people, that there are no ideas of the virtues, the
Athenian does not say or indicate anything to the effect that the third subject
of study is higher in rank than the first two, or even equal in rank to them.
We are then forced to conclude that the ideas retain in the Laws, if in a
properly subdued or muted manner, the status which they occupy, say in the
Republic.51

51Mi,pp. 183-184.
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The intellect and not necessarily the divine intellect becomes the ground of kosmic order.
The Ideas appear to be a possible explanation of order. An experientially based rationalism is
the order expounded by Strauss's Plato but this experientially based rationalism does not
account for experiences which are inarticulate or mysterious except for asserting the need to
continue the quest for rational understanding. This uncertainty about ultimate things finds an
easy accommodation with the serious world of political maneuver.
Uncertainty for the few and dogma and politics for the rest is the clear Straussian
teaching. Philosophy must be protected from the dogmatism inherent in ruling. Acceptance
of the opinions of traditional society while attempting to cultivate the openness necessary for
philosophy is the one way to protect philosophy as a way of life. Philosophy corrupts itself
when it makes a claim to rule. In order to prevent this corruption, Strauss accepts the claims
of the religious and the political to rulership. Through political philosophy, Strauss hopes to
gain the acceptance of the ruling powers for philosophy. Yet the philosopher's antipathy
towards the city and public service cannot be absolutely overcome. Strauss's commentary on
the end of the Laws, Plato's most political work, has the Athenian Stranger remaining silent to
the call to service.52
For Strauss, there are two types of justice. There is the justice of the city and the
justice of the philosopher. The justice of the city is dealt with by the philosopher in a dialectic
of rhetoric. The just man obeys the laws just as the pious man obeys the gods. The justice of
the philosopher is different from the justice of the city. The philosopher must suspend

52 Ibid.. p. 186.
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judgment on issues that are of central importance to both the city and man. The philosopher
must strive for an understanding of the whole on the basis of his own capabilities. The
philosopher's task is beyond his capabilities and perhaps because of that fact, Strauss argues
philosophy is more comic than tragic. The philosopher is absurd and is aware of his absurdity
and the absurdity of the entire world. The anchor of nature is the grounding of both the
philosopher and the city. Only the philosopher is aware of or bothered by how problematic
that grounding is.
The choice between politics and philosophy is the problem for the classic world. The
accommodation between politics and philosophy in political philosophy is a solution that
protects the integrity of both the philosophic and the political ways of life. The philosopher
appears to take the politicians seriously and the politicians leave the philosophers to their
harmless and possibly beneficial speculations. The minimum dogma proposed by Plato is an
accommodation to the needs of political men and the laws on piety are a subtle
acknowledgment of the right to philosophy. It is difficult to imagine how this teaching is a
solution to the crisis of modernity unless we can understand the crisis of modernity as the
collapse of the theoretical realm into the political realm. How Strauss envisions separating
these two realms in the midst of the information age is beyond this writer's imagination, but
radical doubt about power politics may mitigate the excesses which have defined the age of
ideology. By removing philosophic justice from the city, Strauss manifests philosophic
justice. The separation of the life of thought from the life of action offers the bold-minded an
arena which does not disrupt the peace of the city. Strauss goes so far in his interpretation of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

220

Plato's Laws as to assert, "the most serious thing is play and education, and play and
education belong to peace rather than war, therefore everyone must live the life of peace as
well as he can.”50 In light of the entire Platonic teaching, the philosopher to some degree
appreciates the goodness and the nobility of the city.
Voegelin's interpretation of the Laws is oriented toward battling the corruption of
Athenian society. His Plato is determined to embody the idea of the Good in an actual city.
The spiritual strength of Plato has enabled him to resist the corruption of his general society
and become the new focal point of those seeking right order. The vision of the Good and his
sense for a Beyond are the expressions of a compact eschatology capable of illuminating the
proper measure of man. The failure of this vision to become the focus of a sufficient number
of persons on which to build social order is the problem addressed by the Laws.
Voegelin reflects on the problem of the ordering power of the spirit in his first volume
of Order and History. He states:
The spirit lives in the world as an ordering force in the souls of human beings.
And the human anima naturalis has an amplitude of characterological variety
that breaks the ordering spirit in a broad spectrum of phenomena. Plato and
Aristotle, in the construction of their paradigms of the best polis which must
accommodate the variety of characters, have made this fundamental problem
of social order explicit. The prophets, philosophers, and saints, who can
translate the order of the spirit into the practice of conduct without
institutional support and pressure, are rare. For its survival in the world,
therefore, the order of the spirit has to rely on a fanatical belief in the symbols
of a creed more often than on the fides caritale formata—though such
reliance, if it becomes socially predominant, is apt to kill the order it is
supposed to preserve.54

53 Ibid, p. 106.
54 Eric Voegelin Israel and Revelation, pp. 376-377.
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Voegelin's treatment of the transcendent dimension of order in human affairs does not neglect
the pragmatic aspects of realizing that order. He recognizes the formative power of the spirit
for some while acknowledging how that formative force is broken against persons less
attuned to transcendent order. The role of a creed and the support of institutions becomes a
necessary component to maintain the presence of the spirit in the world. The deadening of
the spirit by creedal and institutional dogmas is the particular danger in this compromise with
human frailty.
According to Voegelin, Plato responds to his life in the In-Between, the world of
man's apperception of the immanent and transcendent poles of existence, by first attempting
an heroic appeal to those capable of attuning themselves to the Good and, when that appeal
fails to mobilize enough souls to make the order of the Good incarnate in the polis, he
attempts the creedal solution of ecclesiastic statesmanship. Voegelin illustrates the meaning
of this transition in his comparison of the evolution from the Republic to the Laws with the
evolution from the Sermon on the Mount to the organized church:
The counsels of the Sermon originate in the Spirit of eschatological heroism.
If they were followed by the Christian layman to the letter among men as they
are, they would be suicidal. The Sermon is addressed to the disciples of the
Son of God, to his mathetai, much as the Republic appeals to the disciples of
the son of god Plato. While the counsels of the Sermon cannot become the
rules of social conduct in the world as it is, they are nevertheless the
substance of Christian doctrine. If they and their guidance were removed
from Christianity, the power center that makes it an effective historical reality
would be destroyed. Since the Sermon is unbearable in its purity, the Church
infuses as much of its substance as men are capable of absorbing while living
in the world: the mediation of the stark reality of Jesus to the level of human
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expediency, with a minimum loss of substance, is one of the functions of the
Church.55
The parallels Voegelin makes between classical philosophy and Christianity should not be
exaggerated. Voegelin states, "Plato is not a Christian Saint."56 Voegelin acknowledges the
universal message contained within Plato's philosophy of the Good, but he understands Plato
to have remained tied up in “theocratic sectarianism.” The Republic and the Laws remain
works dedicated to the embodiment of the Idea in the polis. One can sense Voegelin's
discomfort about this historical mortgage of philosophy but his pragmatic understanding of
the political situation facing Plato enables him to empathize with his spiritual genius.57 The
distinction between the philosophical life and the political life which both Strauss and
Aristotle make seems to blur when confronted by Voegelin's portrait of Plato.
The violence Plato understood to be a part of embodying justice may not be an
indication of his irony but his recognition of political reality. The skeptical may point to the
Platonic injunction that it is better to suffer injustice than to do injustice as a contradiction of
the political Plato's somewhat heavy-handed thoughts about political actions. But when a
good man is confronted by social disintegration, it may be a great injustice to not defend
social order by any means available, including both force and persuasion.
Voegelin's praise of Plato is not dependent upon his pragmatic political program,
though he does not find excessive fault with that program. Voegelin understands Plato to be

55 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, p. 226.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid, p. 227.
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an exquisite artist and a spiritually sensitive thinker. His commentary on Plato's genius
begins in the following manner.
As the religious artist Plato has reached the universal level which as a theocrat
he did not reach. As the lawgiver of the Hellenes he has narrowed the spirit
to its finite embodiment in a political organization of the elect (leaving to one
side that he failed in practice); as the creator of the poem he has entered, if
not the Church, the universal community of the Spirit in which his guidance is
as authoritative today as it ever was in the past.58
Voegelin interprets the Laws as an ascent to God. The divine is not subordinated to politics
as it appears to be in Strauss's interpretation of the Laws but instead it is the focal point of
order for the Laws. The myth is the vessel for this divine content.
The myth of the divine puppet master and Voegelin's explanation of serious play
make Plato's genius as a religious artist and mystic philosopher manifest. The diminishment
of the sons of god (Republic) to the puppets of god (Laws) is an acceptance of the fact that
not enough persons are attuned to the Good to make the political order envisioned in the
Republic a possibility. Plato finds himself nearly alone as the embodiment of the Good and
must attempt to create an order that will bring individuals as close to the formative vision as
their spiritual fortitude will permit. The Athenian Stranger’s contempt for man bothers his
partners in the conversation because they are blind to the formative vision which makes play
and education the most serious human pursuits.
A presence gives human affairs a weight that they would not have without this
presence. Strauss's vision of philosophy as doubt and slightly comic in essence appears to be

38 Ibid, p. 228.
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based on an inability to authoritatively feel this presence. Voegelin does not believe this state
defines Plato's vision of order. The puppet is pulled by the iron cords of temptation and
necessity but the presence of a golden cord gives the individual the possibility of following a
higher purpose. Man may be a plaything of the God but this attachment to the divine gives
humanity a special status. Voegelin declares:
This play, then, is serious because it is ultimately directed by God, "the most
serious." Man's part in it is equally serious because in this serious play he
attunes himself to the divine direction. No other preoccupation of man's life,
not even war, can be as serious as the ritual play in which he plays out his life.
Men, however, in their spiritual confusion, lose sight of what is "most
serious." Hence human affairs, which otherwise would not be so important,
have to be taken seriously by the wanderers, and the play of creating the
nomoi becomes itself a serious play. Nevertheless, sometimes the contempt
for this childish race of men, who do not know what is serious and what is
not, breaks through; then the Stranger pulls himself up and admits that man,
after all, has to be accorded some seriousness, for, in spite of his fall, he is
destined to play the serious play.59
Law and legislating are ennobled by that which transcends human affairs and the person who
is best attuned to this transcendent reality becomes the preeminent law-giver. The authority
of the law-giver rests upon the insight that an ordering principle exists which is not created by
the closed human consciousness. Plato speaks of this ordering principle as God. The
importance of man recognizing this transcendent component of reality is pointed to by one of
Voegelin's reflections regarding man's status. He states:
History shows the destruction that is worked when the parts want to govern
the whole; and the lesson is the insight that a stable order can be restored only
if the self-willed particularism is overcome and the parts fall again into their
proper places through their orientation toward God.60
59 Ibid, p. 235.
60 Ibid, p. 237.
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The place each part holds within the whole is not governed by a de-divinized nature but by a
complex interplay of structure and process symbolized by the relation of Man, God, World
and Society. Voegelin captures the implications of this relationship in the Laws by discussing
Plato's use of play.
Voegelin cites Jan Huizinga's Homo Ludens to prepare his discussion of the presence
of play in Plato's Laws. Huizinga states:
In play we recognize the spirit. For play is not matter—whatever its essence
may be. Even in the animal world it breaks through the limits of mere
physical existence. If we consider it in the perspective of a world determined
by forces and their effects, it is a sitperabimdans in the full meaning of the
word, something that is superfluous. Only through the influx of spirit, which
abolishes absolute determination, does the phenomenon of play become
possible, thinkable, and intelligible. The existence of play confirms again and
again the super logical character of our situation in the cosmos. Animals can
play, hence they are more than mechanical things. We play and know that we
play, hence we are more than merely reasonable beings, for play is
unreasonable.61
In light of Voegelin's latter work in Anamnesis, we may question whether play is
unreasonable in the sense of classical reason as it is understood by Voegelin but he certainly
would agree with Huizinga's insight about play being a superabundans. It is interesting to
ponder the fact that that which is superfluous becomes the focal point of the most meaningful
human activities. Voegelin states:
By virtue of this quality of transcendence play could become the vehicle of
cultural growth through the creation o f spiritual worlds in religions, legal
institutions, languages, philosophy and art. The history of culture shows
indeed that the spiritual worlds of the high civilizations grow out of archaic
forms in which the origin in forms of play is still clearly discernible. In
61 Jan Huizinga Homo Ludens (Basel, 1944) p. 5.
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particular, play is the vehicle of religious expression from archaic rites to the
subtleties of the liturgical drama and the symbolism of the dogma62
Voegelin particularly admires Plato's weaving together of play (paidia), education or
formation ipcddeia) and the play of the Laws, itself. The serious play of education, religion
and the laws is to bring harmony between the desires of the people and the Good
(Agathon).6j
Voegelin understands Plato to be combating the frivolous play of the Sophists, who
through their actions destroyed the order of the polis. He asserts, "From the play of children
[,] pcddeia leads us to the serious play of adults and further on to the play of the community
under the nomoi."64 Plato's serious play is an act aligned with the process of creating order by
attending to the structure of the ordering presence of transcendent reality.
The spiritual weakness or dullness of the Athenian community made it a poor vessel
for the divine reality apperceived by Plato. Most persons were not capable of the sustained
vision of the Good which enabled Plato to become the point of transcendent authority's
manifestation of itself through the play of symbols. The Laws transforms men from the sons
of God to the puppets of God and this transformation requires an appropriate political
response. Plato is forced to confront the problem of how he can effectively embody the Idea
of his divine vision. The solution for which he opts is the minimum dogma of the Laws.
62 Eric Voegelin Plato and Aristotle, p. 258.
63 Ibid, pp. 259-262.
64 Ibid.. p. 262.
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Voegelin presents the minimum dogma as being central to the order of the Laws.
The dogma is a tool to combat spiritual disease (nosos) from becoming socially predominant.
He notes that "The nosos of spiritual disorientation occurs at all times in individual cases; and
most men are liable to be afflicted by it.1,65 The dogma denies men the opportunity to act
without understanding their actions have consequences beyond their immediate effect. The
dogma is enforced as the laws (nomoi) of the city.
Enforcement of the laws falls upon members of the Nocturnal Council. We must
note that Voegelin's explanation of the knowledge necessary to participate on the Nocturnal
Council is much less stirring of doubt. Strauss presents the Athenian Stranger's teaching in a
questioning fashion and within the climate of opinion of twentieth century America it
becomes quite easy to join his skepticism regarding the truth of these doctrines and accept
them as simply political. The choice between the political life and the philosophical life is
forced by this presentation of the situation. Voegelin does not cut the training in divinity from
its divine context and therefore encourages us to see the truth of the myth. Nevertheless, he
questions the efficacy of the Platonic solution. After reviewing the tyrannies of the classical
and modem ages, Voegelin reflects, "We have good reason to doubt that a project of the
Platonic type would solve the problems of the age on the pragmatic level of history; but we
have lost our illusion that ‘freedom’ will lead without fail to a state of society that would
deserve the name of order."66

65 Ibid, p. 164.
66 Md., P- 265.
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Voegelin's commentary on the Laws ends with the Athenian Stranger calling his
exposition concerning education and breeding his contribution to the city. The
Lacedaemonian, Megillus, encourages his Cretan colleague to do everything within his power
to gain the cooperation of the Stranger in the founding of the new colony.67 Naturally, the
Athenian Stranger does not refuse to participate in the building of the colony.
67 Ibid.. p. 268.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: TRUTH AND POLITICS
The divergent interpretations of classical texts offered by Strauss and Voegelin
provoke the thoughtful reader to wonder which interpretation is more true. The
prejudices held by this author indicated the initial direction of the inquiry. Strauss’s
perceived preferences for dialectic over myth, the radical separation of theory and
practice, the defense of orthodoxy and an emphasis on esoteric teaching appeared to
challenge philosophy as an expression of universal humanity. In contrast, Voegelin’s
mature thought promised a theoretical bridge connecting humanity in the drama of the
spirit called history. His theory of consciousness and equivalence of experiences
expressed the divine-human participation in reality that constituted the symbolsexperiences of myth, philosophy and revelation.
Our study pressed Strauss’s interpretation of classical philosophy on several
fronts. Firstly and perhaps our most significant finding involved discovering that Strauss
largely understood history as political history. This discovery pointed toward the most
significant difference between Strauss and Voegelin. Strauss did not believe that the
debate over truth could be resolved through politics. He understood the root of the
crisis of modernity to be intertwined in this fundamental error. Voegelin would certainly
agree with this first tenet of Strauss’s approach to philosophy but would also contend
that man’s contact with eternal truth has a time dimension leaving behind symbolsexperiences of this search for order. This trail of symbols-experiences demands the
attention of those concerned with the drama of humankind. This fundamental
disagreement colored the tone of their inquiries into the nature of classical philosophy.

22Q
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The second finding of this inquiry is that Strauss understood philosophy to be
more comic than tragic. In contrast, Voegelin emphasized the tragic origin and nature of
the philosophic enterprise. Aristophanean comedy acted as a liberating force facilitating
a treaty between philosophy and the city. This treaty was essential because the quest for
“that which is always” is in stark contrast to the particular needs of the city. Voegelin’s
tragic understanding of philosophy emphasized the need for decision based on existence
in truth and the ties binding the philosopher to his political community. Both men’s
teachings have the philosopher acting politically in defense of the search for truth.
The third finding of this study brought us to confront the Socratic legacy implied
by a philosophy slightly more comic than tragic and a philosophy existentially linked to
the cult of tragedy. Voegelin presented Socrates as a savior figure turning men away
from inverted existence. Strauss presented Socrates as a teacher bringing men to their
respective level of excellence by a politically savvy dialectic. We questioned Strauss’s
commitment to existence in truth and wondered whether the relation of his questioning
and political philosophy implied a conservative skepticism favoring orthodox political
order. The strong arguments Strauss made for the life of questioning would lead the
inquisitive away from orthodoxy, while encouraging gentlemen to remain loyal to the
faith of their fathers. Voegelin’s open criticism of doctrinal existence is similar to this
Straussian formulation insofar that it accepts no society has ever ordered itself
completely through noetic reason.
The fourth finding of our study involved the investigation of the utopic nature of
Strauss’s enterprise and of the possibility of potential spiritual weakness being the
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motivating factor behind Strauss’s conception of political philosophy. Strauss’s reading
of the Republic contained a teaching to cure the politically ambitious from over
exaggerated hopes in the political and to turn them toward the quest for eternal truth.
The moderating influence of Strauss’s Utopia is a cure for the dangers of ideological
thinking. The openness of Strauss’s inquiry into “the question of the whole” indicates a
tremendous philosophic strength in pursuit of necessary knowledge and great patience
for pursuing the eternal mysteries of the universe. Voegelin’s own interpretation of the
Republic presents a Plato dedicated to resisting the forces of disorder by addressing the
spiritual needs of the polis through facilitating existence in truth by pointing to the wellordered soul as the source of political order. By emphasizing Plato’s struggle for order
within the Hellenic world, Voegelin brings attention to how existence in truth bears a
political mortgage.
The final finding of this study focused on the resolution of the philosopher’s
political obligations through minimum dogma. Voegelin understands the Laws as a
product of Plato’s ecclesiastical statesmanship, whereas Strauss understands the Laws to
be Plato’s most political work and subsequently his least philosophic work. Voegelin’s
Platonic teaching emphasizes the need to incorporate as much of the substance of the
Good into a community as that community can bear. Strauss’s Platonic teaching
emphasizes the split between the eternal and the particular.
The political lesson contained within the two men’s classical studies is
remarkably similar. The eternal cannot be completely embodied in the political.
Strauss’s concern about Voegelin’s use of the term existential indicated that Strauss
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sensed Voegelin’s scholarship brought him incredibly close to transgressing this
important truth.1 The development of Voegelin’s philosophic vocabulary to eventually
include “non-existent reality” and “It reality” indicates Voegelin’s awareness of this
potential danger.2 Both men’s readings of Socrates’/Plato’s engagement with the
political are defenses of this fundamental truth. The disagreement between the two men
lays in their interpretations of how Socrates/Plato articulated that truth.
Strauss treats the Platonic dialogues as potentially containing the definitive
teaching about man and his relationship to the world. Voegelin approaches the dialogues
as the artifacts of one man’s struggle to exist in truth and how that struggle casts light on
humankind’s struggle for existence in truth. Both interpretations are universalistic but
we are forced to ask ourselves what is the respective status of the transhistorical Plato
and the Plato of history.
Truth and History
Strauss introduces us to the problem of truth when he chooses to pursue the
question of natural right. He states:
Certainly the seriousness of the need of natural right does not prove that
the need can be satisfied. A wish is not a fact. Even by proving that a
certain view is indispensable for living well, one proves merely that the
view in question is a salutary myth: one does not prove it to be true.
Utility and truth are two entirely different things. The fact that reason
1“Letter 26” and “Letter 27” in Faith and Political Philosophy, pp. 62-46, are the letters
containing Strauss’s initial concern regarding Voegelin’s use of the word existential and
Voegelin’s clarification of his use of that word in a manner refuting much of modem
existentialist thought.
2 Eric Voegelin “Immortality: Experience and Symbol” in Published Essays: 19661985. p. 42; “The Beginning and the Beyond: A. M editation on Truth” in What Is
History and Other Late Unpublished Writings, p. 218, offer insight into Voegelin’s
struggle with theoretical vocabulary to prevent the immanentization of the divine mystery
of reality.
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compels us to go beyond the ideal of our society does not yet guarantee
that in taking this step we shall not be confronted with a void or with a
multiplicity of incompatible and equally justifiable principles of “natural
right.” The gravity of the issue imposes upon us the duty o f a detached,
theoretical, impartial discussion.3
Strauss understood Socrates and Plato to be engaged in a similar theoretical discussion.
The search for truth may be met with demoralizing or confusing results is an important
corollary for the philosophic life. Political philosophy is bom from this corollary.
For Strauss, the role of history in the search for truth is minimal at best. In a
letter to Voegelin, he states:
Classical philosophy is “ahistorical” insofar as it is a search for the aie on,
within which all history has taken or can take place, for the aie on in no
way opens up through “history”: history is for classical philosophy
infinitely unimportant, insofar as the decisive question, the fundamental
questions, necessarily relate to the aie on. The fundamental questions-(l)
the question of the arche or the archai, (2) the question of the right life
or the ariste politeia. “History” in the strict sense belongs in the practical
dimension, in the dimension that is subordinated to the theoretical.
Historicizing means the forgetting of eternity. This forgetting must be
understood in terms of the rejection of classical philosophy.4
Strauss’s formulation is quite elegant. In principle, Tmth is accessible to men of the
Platonic temperament through their sense perception and use of reason in all times and
places. One may legitimately wonder how unaided finite man grasps the eternal.
Strauss’s famous formulation of philosophy being necessary because o f man’s own
demonstrable deficiency is the only philosophic answer Strauss gives us. He does offer
us the unphilosophic alternative of orthodoxy as a bastion against the Sisyphean task of

3 Leo Strauss Natural Right and History, p. 6.
4 Leo Strauss “Letter 35” in Faith and Political Philosophy, p. 75.
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classical philosophy but we cannot be certain whether this bastion is merely a political
retreat from the demands of philosophy.
Voegelin challenges Strauss’s presupposition regarding the importance of history
for the philosophic enterprise. Much of his scholarship wrestles with the tension
between the truth of order and its realization in concrete situations. Voegelin dares to
make history a central concern of philosophy. In a meditation on the constitution of
history Voegelin states:
What becomes visible in the new luminosity, therefore, is not only the
structure of consciousness itself (in classical language: the nature of
man), but also the structure of an “advance” in the process of reality.
Moreover, the site of the advance is not a mysterious entity called
“history” that would exist independent of such advances; the site rather is
the very consciousness which, in its state of noetic luminoisty, makes
these discoveries. The theophanic events do not occur in history: they
constitute history together with its meaning. The noetic theophany,
finally, reveals consciousness as having the structure of metaleptic reality,
of the divine-human Metaxy. As a consequence, “history” in the sense of
an area of reality in which the insight into the meaning of existence
advances is the history o f theophany.5
Voegelin understands history to be the site of man’s awareness of both his participation
in a “divine-human Metaxy,” as well as indicating the structure of advance in the process
o f reality. History is constituted by irruptions of divine presence into the consciousness
of man. Philosophy is existential insofar that it is a record of man’s search for the divine
and the divine’s response to that search. The divine may be mysterious but its reality is
attested to by a trail of theophanic events constituting history.
Truth is either the necessary but wanting quest after the eternal or the story of
the divine-human constitution of history with an eschatological structure. A pure

5 Eric Voegelin The Ecumenic Age, p. 252.
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rationalism would find Voegelin’s empirical studies to lack the necessity of rational truth.
This criticism is based upon the general premise that the empirical approach cannot
validate its own authenticity.6 Strauss’s understanding of Platonic philosophy as
dialectic is at least more promising from a rationalistic perspective. However, dismissing
Voegelin’s project on this basis would be incredibly unfair considering Voegelin offers us
an understanding o f reason that claims an experiential grounding that is the condition of
human rationality.
Voegelin has defined reason as being the nexus of divine-human participation.
This formulation offers insight into how finite man can have contact with the ground of
being. Strauss’s formulation of reason includes the search for the ground but does not
articulate how finite man can be involved in the quest for the eternal. He states
philosophy is necessary due to man’s need for knowledge about the best life and the
beginning but fails to articulate the grounds of those needs. The closest he comes to
explaining the need for philosophy is in his discussion of the conflicting opinions of men.
Differing opinions may make politics necessary but they are not sufficient grounds to
choose a life of questioning. Questioning without grounds could be understood as
senseless chatter.
Strauss’s respect for orthodoxy as the life of obedience as a way to the eternal is
largely due to his understanding of philosophy as essentially needy and therefore
committed to a questioning that does not cease. Voegelin’s cautious interpretation of
Deuteronomy as a flattening o f existential tension indicates Voegelin’s awareness of the

6 On empiricism and the problem of induction see Errol Harris’s Hypothesis and
Perception (London: George Allen & Unwin) chapters. 1-4.
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problem of order engendering an order by law but he is equally aware of manifestations
of the divine challenging man to live more immediately in the tension o f the divinehuman Metaxy. He states:
We are dealing here with phenomena that have been little explored; and
caution is, therefore, in place.
Nevertheless, it looks as if in
Deuteronomy, we were touching the genesis of “religion,” defined as the
transformation o f existence in historical form into the secondary
possession of a “creed” concerning the relation between God and man. In
the case of Deuteronomy, this first “religion” in the history of mankind
would have to be described as the Sinaitic revelation, mediated through
Moses, when broken by the belligerence and civic virtue of a little men’s
patriotic movement.7
Despite language that may appear to depreciate the achievement of the Law, Voegelin is
accepting of Deuteronomy as the vehicle that preserved the Yahwist order in the Jewish
postexilic community. Nevertheless, Voegelin, as a philosopher of history, is primarily
concerned with the divine-human encounter and how that encounter is articulated,
preserved and lost and not with defending a particular community’s struggle to maintain
existence in truth. This aspect of Voegelin’s work often leads him to note deficiencies
that challenge the ordering principles of religious communities and political entities.
Strauss does not appear to go as far as Voegelin by seeing the common ground
of faith and philosophy in divine presence. Strauss states:
Now we are at any rate confronted with the fact that there is a radical
opposition between Bible and philosophy, and this opposition has given
rise to a secular conflict from the very beginning. This conflict is
characteristic of the West, the West in the wider sense of the term
including the whole Mediterranean basin, of course. It seems to me that
this conflict is the secret of the vitality of the West. I would venture to
say that as long as there will be a Western civilization there will be
theologians who will suspect the philosophers and philosophers who will
be annoyed or feel annoyed by theologians. But, as the saying goes, we
7 Eric Voegelin Israel and Revelation, pp. 374-376.
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have to accept our fate, and it is not the worst fate which men could
imagine. We have this radical opposition: the Bible refuses to be
integrated into a philosophical framework, just as philosophy refuses to
be integrated into a biblical framework. As for this biblical refusal, there
is the often-made remark, that the god of Aristotle is not the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and therefore any attempt to integrate the
biblical understanding into philosophic understanding means to abandon
that which is meant by the God Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.8
The question of how we must live bears the same weight for philosophy as the
commandments on how we must live bear for faith. But is there no common ground
between questioning and belief. If there is no common ground, only the battle between
questioning and belief preserve us from the terrors o f the abyss or the mind-numbing
conformity of theocracy. From this perspective, one can easily understand Strauss’s
formulation of Jerusalem and Athens as holding the secret to the West’s existential
resilience.
Fortunately, we are not without a common ground in Straussian thought.
Strauss states:
I believe still today that the theioi nomoi is the common ground of the
Bible and philosophy-humanly speaking. But I would specify, that in any
event, it is the problem of the multitude of theioi nomoi that leads to the
diametrically opposed solutions of the Bible on the one hand and
philosophy on the other.9
The problem of divine law or perhaps political order is the common ground of
philosophy and faith. Divine law, a law grounded in the eternal, is understood to be
essential for the best life from the philosophic perspective, but it is not necessarily given
and therefore problematic. Divine law, a law grounded in the word of God, is given

8 Leo Strauss ‘The Mutual Influence o f Theology and Philosophy” in Faith and Political
Philosophy, p. 221.
9 Leo Strauss “Letter 39” in Faith and Political Philosophy, p. 78.
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from a Biblical perspective making obedience the greatest existential problem. Once
again we are confronted by the problem o f two realities, not to mention “the multitude
of theioi nomoi.”
Voegelin’s philosophy of history and theory of consciousness potentially resolves
this problem by moving the tension between Jerusalem and Athens into a divine-human
nexus. Voegelin argues:
The issue of revelation as the source of reason in existence is
conventionally anesthetized by carefully reporting the philosophers’
“ideas” without touching the experiences that have motivated them . In a
philosophical study, however, the philosophers’ theophanies must be
taken seriously. The questions which the revelatory experiences impose
must not be dodged, they must be made explicit: Who is this God who
moves the philosophers in their search? What does he reveal to them?
And how is he related to the God who revealed himself to Israelites,
Jews, and Christians.
Unless we want to indulge in extraordinary theological assumptions, the
God who appeared to the philosophers, and who elicited from
Parmenides the exclamation “Is!”, was the same God who is what he is in
the concrete “I am who (or: what) I am,” as the God who is what he is in
the concrete theophany to which man responds. When God lets himself
be seen, whether in a burning thombush or in a Promethean fire, he is
what he reveals himself to be in the event.10
Voegelin’s claim appears to resolve the problem of “the multitude of theioi nom or by
pointing toward the source of symbols-experiences of man’s spiritual history. If the
eternal, as Strauss speaks of the goal of classic philosophy, manifests itself in a variety of
forms constituting the spiritual history of man, the contemplation of history becomes part
of the question of the whole. Voegelin states, “When the process of history represents

10 Eric Voegelin The Ecumenic Age, p. 229.
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the process of reality preeminently, the events of history rather than of nature become
crucial as criteria of order and disorder in the cosmos.”11
Truth and Politics
Strauss’s formulation of political philosophy recognized an essential tension
between theory and practice, as well as a need not to collapse this tension. Voegelin’s
formulation of a theory of consciousness recognized that tensional existence with an
eschatological direction was articulated in a series o f theophanic events called history.
These abstract pronouncements conceal a passionate resistance to a politics of folly.
The politics of folly they opposed consisted o f the belief that man could achieve
Truth through practical action. Strauss understood the teaching of classical philosophy
to involve a necessary split between the search for Truth and the political order of a
society. He states, “If I am not mistaken, the root o f all modem darkness from the
seventeenth century on is the obscuring of the difference between theory and praxis, an
obscuring that first leads to a reduction of praxis to theory (this is the meaning of socalled rationalism) and then, in retaliation, to the rejection of theory in the name of a
praxis that is no longer intelligible as praxis.”12
In accordance with preserving praxis as praxis, Voegelin’s philosophy of history
traces the relationship between the Ecumenic empires and the spiritual outbursts
coinciding with these empires and concludes:
No imperial expansion can reach the receding horizon; no exodus from
bondage is an exodus from the condicio humana; no turning away from
the Apeiron or turning against it, can prevent the return to it through
death.... Conquest and exodus symbolize enterprises of participation in
11 Ibid, p. 328.
12 Leo Strauss ‘'Letter 28” in Faith and Political Philosophy, p. 66.
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the directional flux of reality. Note: Enterprises of participation, not
autonomous human actions that could result in conquest of, or exodus
from, reality.... Conquest and exodus, thus are movements in reality.13
Political action cannot transfigure reality. The mystery of universal humanity cannot be
solved through military conquest or creedal formulation. Under such exacting
stipulations, the arena of the political confronts the demands of resisting the worldconquerors and serving the needs of a humane existence. The exaggerated hopes of
emperors and ideologues promise to involve men only in senseless murder.
Both men set limits to what can be achieved by the political. A certain decency
propelled their search for these limits. When speaking about what motivated him to
philosophize, Voegelin wryly stated:
I should perhaps say the strongest influence is my perhaps misplaced
sensitivity toward murder. I do not like people just shooting each other
for nonsensical reasons. That is a motive for finding out what possibly
could be the reason someone could persuade somebody else to shoot
people for no particular purpose. It is not simply an academic problem,
or a problem in the history o f opinion and so on, that evokes my interest
in this or that issue in the theory of consciousness, but the very practical
problem o f mass murder which is manifest in the twentieth century.14
Voegelin’s act of resistance paralleled Strauss’s own desire to maintain standards of
excellence against barbarism. In a review of Eric Havelock’s The Liberal Temper of
Greek Philosophy Strauss argued:
Scholarship which is meant to be a bulwark of civilization against
barbarism, is ever more frequently turned into an instrument of
rebarbarization. As history suggests, scholarship is, as such, exposed to
that degradation. But this time the danger is greater than before. For this
13 Eric Voegelin The Ecumenic Age, pp. 215-216.
14 Eric Voegelin “Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two” in The Beginning
and the Beyond: Papers from the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences, supplementary
issue of Lonerean Workshop. Fred Lawrence, ed. (Chico, California: Scholars Press,
1984) p. 26.
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time the danger stems from the inspiration of scholarship by what is called
a philosophy. Through that philosophy the humane desire for tolerance is
pushed to the extreme where tolerance becomes perverted into the
abandonment of all standards and hence of all discipline, including
philological discipline. But absolute tolerance is altogether impossible;
the allegedly absolute tolerance turns into ferocious hatred of those who
have stated most clearly and most forcefully that there are unchangeable
standards founded in the nature of man and the nature of things. In other
words, the humane desire for making education accessible to everyone
leads to an ever increasing neglect of the quality of education.... True
liberals today have no more pressing duty than to counteract the
perverted liberalism which contends “that just to live, securely and
happily, and protected but otherwise unregulated, is man’s simple but
supreme goal” and which forgets quality, excellence and virtue.15
The crisis of the West demanded a standard to prevent civilization from slipping into a
murderous egalitarianism. Strauss, like Voegelin, turned to the classic tradition in search
o f a bulwark against barbarism.
Their shared focus on classical materials did not blind them to their political
existence in a liberal democracy. Strauss embraced his role as a teacher of virtue in a
democratic society. He stated:
It was once said that democracy is the regime that stands or falls by
virtue: a democracy is a regime in which all or or most adults are men of
virtue, and since virtue seems to require wisdom, a regime in which all or
most adults are virtuous and wise, or the society in which all or most
adults have developed their reason to a high degree, or the rational
society. Democracy, in a word, is meant to be an aristocracy which has
broadened into a universal aristocracy.
Prior to the emergence of
modem democracy some doubts were felt whether democracy thus
understood is possible. As one of the two greatest minds among the
theorists of democracy put it, ‘Tf there were a people consisting of gods,
it would rule itself democratically. A government of such perfection is
not suitable for human beings.” This still small voice has by now become
a high-powered loud speaker.16
15 Leo Strauss “The Liberalism of Classical Political Philosophy” in Liberalism: Ancient
and Modem (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989) pp. 63-64.
16 Leo Strauss “What Is Liberal Education?” in Liberalism: Ancient and Modem, pp. 45.
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His friendly chastisements at once called for democracy to meet its highest calling while
reminding it of the obstacles imposed on that calling by nature. Strauss imitated his
Socrates proving the adaptability of Platonic political philosophy.
Voegelin’s feelings about liberal democracy were equally mixed. Voegelin
reflected on the tendency of the origin of the good society in the life of reason to be
eclipsed by belief in the goodness of a governmental form:
In the West, constitutional democracy as a constitutional form is so
closely allied with the notion of the good society that we must note a
strong tendency to forget, both in theory and in practice, that “goodness”
is the quality of a society and not of governmental form. When society is
good it can function under the form of a constitutional democracy; when
it is not good, it cannot. Thus a society which is not qualified for this
governmental form can easily start down the road to disaster if it adopts a
Western-type constitution. Unconscionable damage to millions of people
throughout the world has resulted from ill considered constitutional
experiments modeled after the West.... We must admit that constitutional
democracy may be a terrible form of government for an Asian or African
country, whereas some form of enlightened despotism, autocracy, or
military dictatorship can be the best if we believe that the rulers are using
this means to create a good society.17
The good society could only emerge when enough individuals acted in accordance with
the demands of existence in truth. For Voegelin, this truth involves the realization that
man’s greatest hopes and loves lay properly in the transfiguring mystery of divine reality.
The attentive reader will note that neither Strauss nor Voegelin offer a positive
plan for political action. From the perspective of the lessons learned in our perusal of
their works, we would not expect to find an agenda for political action from their

17 Eric Voegelin “Industrial Society in Search of Reason” in World Technology and
Human Destiny. Raymond Aron, ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963)
pp. 41-42.
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scientific programs. Strauss offers us a lesson in moderation. He advises us not to limit
the possibilities o f man to the most vulgar levels o f achievement. He does this by
promising man a chance to glimpse the eternal and contends the possibility o f that
glimpse ennobles man’s political endeavors. Strauss’s assault on the modem merger of
politics and theory brings into question a reality defined by power relations alone.
Similarly, Voegelin illuminates the depth of man’s nature and warns him against
attempting to ignore the tensions of existence. Man cannot resolve these tensions
through political violence without doing violence to his own humanity. His only hope is
to attend to what Voegelin calls “the Beyond.” He states, “When the presence of the
Beyond is experienced in the noetic act, there reveals itself a Being that is neither the
Apeiron nor one of the cosmic things but the immortally divine reality that will redeem
its followers from their Apeirontic fate. The Beyond is indeed beyond the cosmos
because the participation in its parousia permits the soul of man to ‘rise’ from
intracosmic mortality to transcosmic immortality.”18
The highest goals of both Strauss and Voegelin are fundamentally mysterious
though for perhaps different reasons. Strauss’s version of the philosophic life throws
man into a potentially empty search for truth in hopes of participating in the eternal.
Voegelin’s version of the philosophic life articulates the experiences of divine-human
participation in the constitution of reality.
Harry Jaffa offers us insight into the mystery occupying Strauss. He states:
Although the establishment of Christianity in the fifth century was
understandable, it was nevertheless inconsistent with both reason and
18 Eric Voegelin “Beginning and the Beyond: A Meditation on Truth” in What Is
History? And Other Later Unpublished Writings, pp. 221-222.
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revelation.... The very idea of religious establishment meant an attempt by
political means-that is to say, by practical reason-to resolve theoretical
questions on the nature of faith and its relationship to reason. The result
was theological despotism.
The essence of modernity, on the other hand, is the parallel attempt to
resolve theory on the basis of practice, by asserting that philosophy has
been transformed into wisdom-as in the persons of Hitler or Stalin. The
earlier attempt led to theological despotism, and the modem effort led to
ideological despotism. Political moderation is rooted in the refusal to
resolve the mystery of human life by political means. It is rooted, as well,
in the recognition o f a moral order-which understands human freedom not
as the mere absence of restraint, but as directed to living a human life in
the light of its transcendent ends, whether these are defined by reason or
by revelation.19
The openness of Strauss to mystery is parallel to the openness displayed by Voegelin.
They were both dedicated to opposing despotisms that would restrain man’s inquiry into
reality.
Glen Hughes presents Voegelin’s search in cool theoretical terms lacking the
enthusiasm of many of Voegelin’s mystical meditations. An examination of Hughes’
presentation of Voegelin’s theory of differentiation may enable us to separate Voegelin
as scientist from Voegelin as mystic. Hughes states:
There is only the one cosmos. The “truth of existence,” as Voegelin calls
human living informed by the differentiating insights that reveal it to be a
tension toward transcendence, does not annul the “truth of the cosmos,”
as human living as part of and subject to the rhythms, structures, and
laws of finite reality. On the contrary the Beyond of finite things can only
be manifest through finite reality. It would be in line with Voegelin’s
thought to say that transcendence is a further dimension o f meaning that
is revealed when the finite cosmos is recognized to be inadequate as the
source of its own meaning. That is, we become aware of strictly
transcendent being when we recognize that finite meaning presupposes an
ultimate ground of meaning that can only be non-finite. But while our
questioning leads us to recognize this non-finite ground, we also
19 Harry Jaffa “The Bible and Political Philosophy” in Leo Strauss: Political Philosopher
and Jewish Thinker, p. 209.
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recognize it to lie beyond the scope of our finite imagination and
understanding. Thus the restricted dimensions of meaning we understand
lead us to acknowledge an unrestricted dimension of meaning that we
understand to lie beyond our understanding.20
Though Hughes speaks of Voegelin, this may also be an accurate description of the
process culminating in Strauss’s philosopher’s search for the eternal. If this is so, the
similarity in political prescriptions of Strauss and Voegelin may be grounded in a similar
understanding of the process of the philosophic search.
Strauss’s refusal to understand that revelation has a similar structure to the
philosophic search most likely rested on his respect for the integrity of God’s address to
man. Strauss speaks of the promise of Judaism and confronts Heidegger’s challenge to
Judaism. He states:
Heidegger does not speak of the prophet’s “hearers,” but he clearly
means that the prophets themselves were concerned with security....
Surely the Bible teaches that in spite o f all appearances to the contrary the
world is guided by God or, to use the traditional term, that there is a
particular providence, that man is protected by God if he does not put his
trust in flesh and blood but in God alone, that he is not completely
exposed or forsaken, that he is not alone, that he has been created by a
being which is, to use Buber’s expression, a Thou.... In other words, the
biblical experience is not simply undesired or against man’s grain: grace
perfects nature; it does not destroy nature. Not every man but every
noble man is concerned with justice or righteousness and therefore with
any possible extrahuman, suprahuman support of justice or with security
of justice. The insecurity of man and everything human is not absolutely
terrifying abyss if the highest of which a man knows is absolutely secure.
Plato’s Athenian Stranger does not indeed experience that support, that
refuge and fortress as the biblical prophets experienced it, but he does the
second best: he tries to demonstrate its existence. But for Heidegger
there is no security, no happy ending, no divine shepherd; hope is
replaced by thinking; the longing for eternity, belief in anything eternal is
20 Glen Hughes Mystery and Myth in the Philosophy o f Eric Voegelin (Columbia and
London: University of Missouri Press, 1993) pp. 53-54.
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understood as stemming from “the spirit of revenge,” from the desire to
escape from all passing away into something which never passes away.21
Whether Plato’s search for Truth discovered the secure foundation o f justice or was only
the search for such a foundation is as problematic as understanding whether the faith of
the prophets is the loving struggle for faith or God’s abiding presence preserving that
faith. We will give Eric Voegelin the final word, as we cite his interpretation of the
Prophet Elijah’s return from the desert. He states:
When the sensual machinery of divine appearance had duly run offpreparing the appearance, but not the appearance itself-there was a gentle
stillness. And at that moment the sensual symbolism of Exodus, Desert,
Canaan, and Death fell apart and revealed its secret as the life of the spirit
right here and now in the world. As Plato’s prisoner, after the vision of
the Agathon, must return to the Cave and rejoin his fellow-prisoners, so
Elijah is sent back, by the gentle stillness, from the Mountain of God to
Israel.22
21 Leo Strauss “Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion” in Liberalism: Ancient and
Modem, pp. 234-235.
22 Eric Voegelin Israel and Revelation, p. 350.
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